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## SOPHOCLES ON HIS OWN DEVELOPMENT.

The passage of Plutarch's tract *De Profectibus in Virtute* <sup>7</sup> which reports Sophocles' account of his own development is in its way a unique record. No other Attic writer of the fifth century B. C., except Aristophanes, has left his opinion on his own work, and Aristophanes does not give his in the language of sober prose. It is therefore surprising that, though many editors and critics mention this passage, it has not been fully discussed, and what agreement exists about its meaning is open to grave doubts. It is surely worth our while to see what the words really mean and to ask whether, as has been commonly assumed, they refer merely to Sophocles' diction <sup>1</sup> and not to more general aspects of his art. If we can decide what their precise meaning is, we are in a better position to apply them to the extant plays and fragments of Sophocles and to illustrate his conception of his own progress by his actual achievement.

We may first ask where Plutarch found the passage. He does not say what his source is, and his only hint is the word *ἔλεγε*. T. B. L. Webster suggests that the quotation comes from Sophocles' book *On the Chorus*, which is mentioned by Suidas, s. v. *Σοφοκλῆς*. But we may doubt this for several reasons. First, a purely personal statement of this character would probably be out of place in a Greek treatise on the composition of drama. If

<sup>1</sup> This view is held by A. E. Haigh, *The Tragic Drama of the Greeks*, pp. 161-2; R. C. Jebb, *Trachiniae*, p. xlvi; U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Hermes*, XL (1905), pp. 150-1; M. Pohlenz, *Die griechische Tragödie*, I, p. 231; T. B. L. Webster, *Sophocles*, p. 143; G. Perrotta, *Sofocle*, p. 8. It does not seem to be shared by K. Reinhardt, *Sophokles*, p. 17, but he does not argue for his view.

Aristotle's *Poetics* had forerunners in the same genre, it indicates that in its first stages literary criticism was technical and practical, not reminiscent and autobiographical. Secondly, the word ἔλεγε implies that Sophocles' statement was made in conversation; it means "said" or "used to say." If the words came from a book, we should expect ἐγραψε. Thirdly, the word ἤδη in the statement shows that when he made it Sophocles referred to what was then present time, and this points to conversation,—“I am now . . .” A more likely source than the treatise *On the Chorus* is some book which recorded the conversation of Sophocles in which the words occurred, and such a book existed in the *Epidemiae* of Ion of Chios, which told anecdotes about Sophocles and reported a conversation between him and an Eretrian on questions of poetry, such as the use of certain epithets (*apud* Athenaeus, XIII, 604 a-d). This work was known to Plutarch who uses it for his lives of *Cimon* (9) and *Pericles* (28), and it seems to be a likely source for Sophocles' account of himself. For it contained literary and other anecdotes about him and reported his words as he said them. If this is right, we may assume that the substance of Plutarch's quotation is reasonably accurate. For Ion was a friend of Sophocles and is as good a witness as we can ask for. But of course there is a possibility that Plutarch has transposed the original words into the literary language of his own time. We might well be surprised at his doing this; for though his memory was sometimes at fault, we do not know of his rewriting his original. But such a view is not *primâ facie* impossible. If, however, we find that the words are not appropriate to the language of later literary criticism, we may assume that Plutarch has quoted accurately and that the words are as near to what Sophocles actually said as any reported talk can be to its original.

So far as the MSS are concerned, the quotation presents no difficulties. It is grammatical as it stands, and there are no serious variants. Since the context is relevant, the whole sentence of Plutarch may be quoted: ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ Σοφοκλῆς ἔλεγε τὸν Αἰσχύλου διαπεπαιχῶς ὄγκον, εἶτα τὸ πικρὸν καὶ κατὰ τεχνον τῆς αὐτοῦ κατασκευῆς, τρίτον ἤδη τὸ τῆς λέξεως μεταβάλλειν εἶδος, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἠθικώτατον καὶ βέλτιστον, οὕτως οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες, ὅταν ἐκ τῶν πανηγυρικῶν καὶ κατατέχνων εἰς τὸν ἀπτόμενον ἥθους καὶ πάθους λόγον καταβῶσιν, ἄρχονται τὴν ἀληθῆ προκοπὴν καὶ ἄτυφον προκόπτειν. As

the words of Sophocles stand, they have an intelligible and obvious structure. It is clear that the participle *διαπεπαιχώς* governs not only *τὸν Αἰσχύλου ὄγκον* but also what follows, *τὸ πικρὸν καὶ κατὰ τεχνον τῆς αὐτοῦ κατασκευῆς*, and those are wrong who, like Haigh, Wilamowitz, and Perrotta, supply some word to mean "adopted" with the second group. Any interpretation must take account of the two objects governed by *διαπεπαιχώς*, and we must reject the translation "imitate playfully" which is suggested by the eighth edition of Liddell and Scott. For though this may apply to the first part on the assumption that Sophocles began by imitating the *ὄγκος* of Aeschylus, it can hardly apply to the second; for few will agree that Sophocles passed through two Aeschylean periods, and the change of *αὐτοῦ* to *αὐτοῦ* is quite unwarranted so far as the MSS are concerned. Another evasion of the text is to change *διαπεπαιχώς* to *διαπεπαλαιχώς* as Webster does. His ingenious translation "fought his way through" makes the change look attractive, but the word means "having gone on wrestling," and the accusatives would have to be internal. In fact, if they were to have the sense which Webster gives them, they should be in the dative, as we see from such examples as Galen, XVII (1), 569, where *διαπαλαίω* is used with *νοσήματι* in the sense of "wrestle against." What sense can be made with such a word and such internal accusatives is not clear, and in any case we have no right to alter *διαπεπαιχώς* until it has been proved untenable. But though it cannot mean "imitate playfully" or even "handling with a light touch," as F. C. Babbitt nicely turns it,<sup>2</sup> in this context, that does not mean that it is corrupt. We must see what other meaning can be found for it.

Those who believe that Plutarch has rewritten the passage in the language of Hellenistic or Greco-Roman criticism might point to *διαπεπαιχώς* and say that the word is used by Demetrius, *De Eloc.* 147, where, in discussing a passage of Sophron which compares boys pelting men to the Trojans pelting Ajax with darts, he says that there is a charm in the comparison, *τοὺς Τρῶας διαπαίζονσα ὥσπερ παῖδας*. Rhys Roberts rightly translates "which makes game of the Trojans as though they were boys."<sup>3</sup> But

<sup>2</sup> *Plutarch's Moralia*, I, p. 421.

<sup>3</sup> In *Class. Rev.*, XL (1926) Rhys Roberts suggests that Sophocles did actually make fun of Aeschylus in such a line as frag. 611, but since he attributes this to the second stage and accepts the correction of *αὐτοῦ*, he fails to establish his point.

this sense does not help with Sophocles. For we can hardly believe that Sophocles regarded his own first works as making fun of Aeschylus. If there was a joke, it was surely against himself for imitating the master with too great devotion. So the parallel is irrelevant, and, if this was the normal use of the word in the first century, we have a small indication that Plutarch did not rewrite his original or use someone else's rewriting of it. In any case a more satisfactory parallel to Sophocles' διαπεπαιχώς may be found in an author nearer to him in time than Demetrius. Plato at *Laws* VI, 769a uses the words παιδιὰ καλῶς διαπεπαισμένη for a "game well played out." The combination with δια- gives the meaning of continuance to a finish, and the uncompounded use of παίζω may well explain what Sophocles means. For in archaic and classical Greek it is used for the conduct of different arts. Used first of dancing by Homer at θ 251 and ψ 147 and by Hesiod at *Scut.* 277, it is later used by Anacreon of singing and dancing (frags. 2, 4 and 5, 4), by *Homeric Hymn* III, 206 of Apollo playing the lyre, by Pindar of poets performing their songs (*Ol.* I, 16) and by Aristophanes of Pan piping (*Frogs* 230). This use naturally led to the later use of παίγιον in the sense of "poem" by Leonidas (*Anth. Pal.*, VI, 322), Polybius (XVI, 21, 12), and Philetas (Stobaeus, II, 4, 5). Plato even uses it of a comic dramatic performance (*Laws* VII, 816e). It is therefore quite possible that Sophocles, speaking with the ease of conversation, used παίζω of his own art and prefixed δια- to it to show that at the time of speaking he had finished with two stages in the practice of his poetry. If so, the word means simply "having played out," in the sense of "having practised to the limit."

In the first stage Sophocles practised the ὄγκος of Aeschylus. The later critics often use the word, but ambiguously, sometimes in a good sense, sometimes in a bad. Thus "Longinus" uses it both of the dignity of oratorical eulogies (*De Subl.* 8, 3) and of inflated pomposity (*ibid.* 3, 4); Demetrius both combines it with μέγεθος (*De Eloc.* 36 and 54) and applies it to the inappropriate pomp with which trifles may be invested (*ibid.* 83). It would therefore be a little strange if Plutarch, transposing Sophocles' words into the language of his own time, used a word which was ambiguous and did not help to clarify what the quotation meant; it is easier to believe that he kept ὄγκον because it



was in his text. Nor is the word confined to the later critics. In his *Rhetoric* III, 6 Aristotle speaks of ὄγκον τῆς λέξεως and means something like "grandeur of language," and this shows that in the fourth century ὄγκος had passed into literary criticism. In the *Poetics* 1459 b 28 he speaks of ὁ τοῦ ποιήματος ὄγκος and means "the grandeur of the poem," while his description of the hexameter as ὀγκωδέστατον (*ibid.* 1459 b 35) means that it is the weightiest of metres. Aristotle shows that in his time ὄγκος was used in literary criticism and in a favourable sense. But since he makes his meaning clear by adding qualifying phrases like τῆς λέξεως and τοῦ ποιήματος and does not use the word in isolation as Sophocles does, we cannot claim that Sophocles used the word just as he did. He may well be using it in a vaguer sense than Aristotle does, and he may also have had a clearer perception of the metaphor which is involved in its application to matters of poetry.

We should be able to get some light from Sophocles' use of ὄγκος in his plays. He uses it metaphorically in four places. One of these (*O. C.* 1341) does not really concern the present problem, but the three others are more relevant. At *Trach.* 817, when Hyllus says

ὄγκον γὰρ ἄλλως ὀνόματος τί δεῖ τρέφειν  
μητρῶν . . .;

he means, as Jebb says, the dignity which belongs to the name of mother, and the use here, like Aristotle's, is favourable. On the other hand at *Ajax* 129 when Athene says to Odysseus

μηδ' ὄγκον ἄρη μηδέν·

she means that he is not to show pride and when at *O. C.* 1162 the speech which Polynices requests is said to be οὐκ ὄγκου πλέων, the word again means pride in an unfavorable sense. The existence of the two meanings is easily understood. What may look like proper dignity in one place may look like empty presumption or pomposity in another. Now in his attribution of ὄγκος to Aeschylus Sophocles does not hint which meaning he intends and the natural solution is that his ὄγκος covers both. What this is can be seen from the simplest use of the word to mean "size." We know that Sophocles did not admire Aeschylus without reservations, since he said of him εἰ καὶ τὰ δέοντα ποιῇ, ἀλλ'

οὐκ εἰδώς γε (Athenaeus, I, 32b), but he admired him enough to practise his methods for a time, and we might expect him in retrospect to use some word which was reasonably impartial. And if *ὄγκος* means "size" or "bulk" or "bigness," this is what he does.

The application of such a metaphor to poetry need not cause surprise, nor need we look to later critics for parallels. Such bigness belonged to bodies. Plato speaks of τὸν τῶν σαρκῶν ὄγκον (*Laws* III, 959c), and Xenophon applies the adjective *ὀγκώδης* to the bellies of horses (*Equ.* 1, 12). To speak of the *ὄγκος* of poetry meant simply that somehow it had size or bigness. Now this is very similar to what Aristophanes does when he makes Euripides contrast himself with Aeschylus

ἀλλ' ὡς παρέλαβον τὴν τέχνην παρὰ σοῦ τὸ πρῶτον εὐθὺς  
οἰδοῦσαν ὑπὸ κομπασμάτων καὶ ῥημάτων ἐπαχθῶν,  
ἴσχανα μὲν πρῶτιστον αὐτὴν καὶ τὸ βάρος ἀφείλον

(*Frogs* 939-41).

And later in the play the same notion of *βάρος* appears when Aeschylus decides to weigh his verses against Euripides:

τὸ γὰρ βάρος νῦν βασανεῖ τῶν ῥημάτων (*ibid.* 1367).

The notion that poetry can have a *βάρος* or weight is not far removed from the notion that it can have *ὄγκος* or size. Both are metaphors from physical bodies, and both are ambiguous in the sense that weight and bulk can be used either for praise or blame. Or rather, though both may be thoroughly admirable, each has a weak side which appears if it is wrongly used. Just as the real fullness of Aeschylus might degenerate into turgidity, so his majesty might sometimes appear to be merely pompous. In any case the lines from Aristophanes show that this kind of physical metaphor was quite appropriate to the criticism of poetry in the fifth century.

Aristophanes may perhaps throw some more light on what Sophocles meant by the *ὄγκος* of Aeschylus. In its metaphorical use the word could be applied to any kind of majesty or pride; it referred to the element of greatness or size which may be seen in thoughts and words. So the Aristophanic Aeschylus says of his own work

ἀνάγκη  
μεγάλων γνωμῶν καὶ διανοιῶν ἴσα καὶ τὰ ῥήματα τίκτειν.  
κἄλλως εἰκὸς τοὺς ἡμιθέους τοῖς ῥήμασι μείζοσι χρῆσθαι

(*Frogs* 1058-60)

when Euripides taxes him with speaking with "Lycabettuses and great pieces of Parnassuses,"—also examples of size. The same notion underlies the Chorus' address to Aeschylus:

ἀλλ' ὦ πρῶτος τῶν Ἑλλήνων πυργώσας ῥήματα σεμνά

(*ibid.* 1004)

no less than Euripides' taunts that his rival's poetry was full of "Scamanders, moats, men at arms, brazen griffens" καὶ ῥήμαθ' ἱππόκρημνα (*ibid.* 928-929), where the last words again suggest the size and height of Aeschylean poetry. So when Sophocles spoke of the *ὄγκος* of Aeschylus he meant something which would be quite in the spirit of contemporary language about poetry and would convey an impression of the size of Aeschylus' creation.

Plutarch's quotation merely says τὸν Αἰσχύλου *ὄγκον*, but most scholars have assumed that Sophocles was speaking only about his language. That *ὄγκος* could be applied to diction is shown by Aristotle's *ὄγκος τῆς λέξεως* (*Rhet.* 1407 b 26), but there he explains what he means by adding τῆς λέξεως, and that *ὄγκος* could be used in literary criticism for other matters than diction is shown not merely by Aristotle's statement that ὁ τοῦ ποιήματος *ὄγκος* is increased in the epic by events taking place simultaneously (*Poet.* 1459 b 28) but by Aristophanes' account of his own activities at *Wasps* 1024:

οὐκ ἐκτελέσαι φησὶν ἐπαρθεῖς οὐδ' ὀγκῶσαι τὸ φρόνημα

where the metaphor in *ὀγκῶσαι* is applied to the spirit which informed his poetry. Sophocles might use *ὄγκος* for almost any aspect of his art; and, if he used it in a restricted sense for the diction alone, we should expect him to anticipate Aristotle and make his meaning clear. This conclusion is countered by Wilamowitz who presses the nature of the context in Plutarch and says that this shows Sophocles' concern to be only with diction. But when we look at the context, we find that his concern is not between one kind of diction and another in orators but between artificiality and truth in their work, between what is ostentatious and elaborated and what expresses character and feeling. In

fact Plutarch suggests that the progress of Sophocles was not simply in his language but in his poetic art generally which passed from an Aeschylean *ὄγκος* to something quite different. And when we look at the Aristophanic notion of *βάρος* in poetry, we find that this too is not limited to diction. For Euripides begins at *Frogs* 937-938 by saying that he has no cock-horses in his plays,—a question of subject matter,—goes on to say that he took themes from books (943), and adds that he included monodies,—a question of musical and dramatic technique. Sophocles may well have meant no more than that in his first stage he practised the full majesty and pomp of Aeschylus; and, though this would include a high, tragic diction, it certainly might also include other elements in the Aeschylean drama. A better argument that Sophocles refers only to his diction might be extracted from the superlatives at the end of his statement, *ἡθικώτατον καὶ βέλτιστον*. We might claim that these refer to the best of three stages, and since the last is specifically concerned with diction, the other two must be. But the superlatives do not necessarily mean this, and make perfectly good sense if they are taken simply to refer to different kinds of diction in general. Moreover, that Sophocles does not refer merely to diction follows from the description of the second stage where, as we shall see, the word *κατασκευῆς* must describe something more general in the way of composition.

Something of what Sophocles meant in practice by this *ὄγκος* may be seen in the fragments of his *Triptolemus*, which was produced in 468 B. C. (Pliny, *N. H.* XVIII, 65) and may well have been one of the plays with which he won his first victory over Aeschylus which is assigned to this year (Plutarch, *Cimon*, 8; *Marmor Parium* 56). In this there are certainly traces of Aeschylean pomp in the language. The remarkable line, of which Demetrius so disapproved (*De Eloc.* 114)

*ἀπυνδάκωτος οὐ τραπεζοῦται κύλιξ* (frag. 611)

may well have been an unsuccessful attempt to rival Aeschylean grandeur. Another line

*σὲ δ' ἐν φρενὸς δέλτοισι τοὺς ἔμους λόγους* (frag. 597)

has been thought to have some connection with *P. V.* 789 <sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> So Pearson *ad loc.*

ἦν ἐγγράφου σὺ μνήμοσιν δέλτοις φρενῶν

but the figure in it is probably traditional since Pindar uses a variation on it at *Ol.* X, 2, Aeschylus uses it in different forms at *Suppl.* 185, *Cho.* 448, *Eum.* 275, and Sophocles reverts to it in old age at *Phil.* 1325. No doubt the language of the *Triptolemus* had Aeschylean echoes and mannerisms, but the play seems to have owed more to Aeschylus than them. The speech in which Demeter gave Triptolemus a geographical account of the West where his journey lay (frag. 598, Dionysius Hal., *Ant. Rom.* I, 12) recalls similar descriptions given by Prometheus to Io in the *Prometheus Bound* and to Heracles in the *Prometheus Delivered* and has no parallel in the extant plays and fragments of Sophocles. Moreover, the appearance of Demeter on the stage as an active promoter of the dramatic development recalls Athene in the *Eumenides* and Aphrodite in the *Danaides* and has little in common either with the rôle of Athene in the *Ajax* or the use of Heracles as a "deus ex machinâ" in the *Philoctetes*. The notion of building a play round the foundation of an Attic festival, as the *Triptolemus* is round the Eleusinia, seems too to have parallels in Aeschylus. For it has been thought that his *Danaides* ended with the foundation of the Thesmophoria,<sup>5</sup> his *Salaminiae* with the Aiantea,<sup>6</sup> and the last play of the Prometheus trilogy with the Promethea.<sup>7</sup> Finally, the splendour of the serpent-drawn car in which Triptolemus makes his journey and which seems to have been actually presented on the stage<sup>8</sup> recalls Aeschylus' love of pageants and such remarkable means of locomotion as the sea-horse of Oceanus in *Prometheus Bound*. In another play, the *Lemniae*, we can also discern an undoubted Aeschylean influence. Of this play Sophocles wrote two versions, and in the first of these he gave a list of the Argonauts as Aeschylus had done in his *Cabiri* (frags. 385-386). The significant point here is that in the second version Sophocles omitted this list (Steph. Byz., s. v. Δώτιον), as if he felt that it was inappropriate to his riper manner. In his early period, too, it seems next to certain that Sophocles composed trilogies.<sup>9</sup> One on the

<sup>5</sup> D. S. Robertson, *Class. Rev.*, XXXVIII (1924), pp. 5-23.

<sup>6</sup> R. C. Jebb, *Ajax*, p. xxiii.

<sup>7</sup> G. Thomson, *Prometheus Bound*, p. 35.

<sup>8</sup> Webster, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

<sup>9</sup> For Sophocles' trilogies cf. A. W. Pickard-Cambridge in *New Chap-*



saga of Telephus is well authenticated, and others have been claimed with reason on Medea and Danae. Composition on this scale, so unlike Sophocles' later method with single plays, may have tended to produce a grandiose, Aeschylean effect. There is little doubt that in his Aeschylean days Sophocles followed his master in other respects than diction, and the effect at which he he aimed might well be called *ὄγκος*.

The second stage belonged to Sophocles himself. He had found something of his own, and this he practised till he exhausted it. But the phrase *τὸ πικρὸν καὶ κατὰ τεχνὸν τῆς αὐτοῦ κατασκευῆς* is by no means easy to translate. Almost every word in it calls for comment. First, *κατασκευῆς*. Webster suspects that it is of the Roman period, and it was certainly used by later critics. For Dionysius uses it to mean "ornament" (*Ad Pomp.* 2) and Diogenes Laertius quotes Diogenes of Babylon as having defined it as *λέξις ἐκπεφηνυῖα τὸν ἰδιωτισμὸν* (VII, 59), that is the avoidance of colloquialism. Neither of these helps much with Sophocles. For he would hardly call ornament "bitter," and the avoidance of colloquialism seems too special a meaning for the fifth century. On the other hand *κατασκευή* had also the much less technical meaning of "arrangement" (Dionysius, *Ad Amm.* ii, 16). Sophocles may well be using the word like this. For Plato applies *κατασκευή* to quite abstract things, as at *Laws VIII*, 842c *ἡ τοῦ βίου κατασκευή* and V, 739b *τῆς τῶν νόμων κατασκευῆς*. Its fundamental meaning is "construction," and that is applicable to the composition of poetry. Moreover, the verb *κατασκευάζω* is used for imaginative fabrications, as when Plato says *εἰ μὴ Γοργίαν ἢ Νέστορά τινα κατασκευάζεις* (*Phaedrus* 261c) or Demosthenes *παροίνους μὲν τινὰς καὶ ὑβριστὰς κατασκευάσει* (LIV, 14), and it could be used with such words as *πρόφασιν* (Xenophon, *Cyr.* II, 4, 7) or *τὸ ἀπόρητον* (Demosthenes, II, 6) in the sense of "invent." The natural meaning, then, for Sophocles' *κατασκευή* is "fabrication" or "invention." He contrasts his second stage, which was at least of his own fabrication, with his first when he practised an art which belonged to Aeschylus, and that is why *Αἰσχύλου* is so soon followed by *αὐτοῦ*.

The character of this *κατασκευή* is explained by *τὸ πικρὸν καὶ*

κατάτεχνον, and about these words too there is strong disagreement. On the one side Pearson takes them to refer to an "occasional harshness and want of polish,"<sup>10</sup> and Webster translates by "unpleasant and artificial." On the other side Jebb takes τὸ πικρόν to mean "pungency" and κατάτεχνον "subtle elaboration." The Hellenistic critics do not really help to a solution. For while πικρός is used in the bad sense of "harsh" by Dionysius (*Ad Pomp.* 3; *Ad Amm.* ii, 2; *De Comp.* 22), it is used in the good sense of "pungent" by Demetrius with reference to the Attic dialect (*De Eloc.* 177). This disagreement leaves us where we were, and we must see if the fifth century can do any better. This too provides no decisive parallel in literary criticism, but Jebb ingeniously tried to explain the word by quoting Eupolis on the oratory of Pericles

οὕτως ἐκῆλει καὶ μόνος τῶν ῥητόρων  
τὸ κέντρον ἐγκατέλειπε τοῖς ἀκρωμένοις (frag. 94, 6-7)

and suggested that Sophocles left a sting in his hearers as Pericles did. But it is not certain that Eupolis meant this; it is at least possible that his figure is not from a bee leaving its sting but of a charioteer driving his team to such a frenzy that it passes all others. In any case, even if Eupolis meant that Pericles' oratory left a sting, this does not throw any light on Sophocles' use of πικρός.

A much sounder method is to look at the normal use of πικρός in the fifth century, and this is simply that it is the opposite of ἡδύς. The two words are contrasted as opposites by Alcmaeon of Croton (frag. 4, Diels<sup>4</sup>), Empedocles (frag. 90, 1), and Democritus (frags. 9 and 125) while Sophocles himself contrasts *τερπνά* and *πικρά* at *O. C.* 615. There can surely be little doubt that when he discerned a bitter element in his own composition, he meant that there was something in it which gave not pleasure but pain. What he meant by this we shall see when we consider the whole phrase to which τὸ πικρόν belongs.

The element of τὸ πικρόν is qualified by the word *κατάτεχνον* and since the article is used only once, the whole phrase is a unity and must be treated as a complex whole. We should not, like Jebb, dissolve it into two quite separate components, for which

<sup>10</sup> *Fragments of Sophocles*, I, p. 230.

the correct Greek would be τὸ πικρὸν καὶ τὸ κατὰ τεχνον. On the meaning of κατὰ τεχνος the later critics throw no light, since they do not use the word, and Webster's suspicion that it is of the Roman period cannot be substantiated. The only passage which throws any light is an erotic epigram of Philodemus (*Anth. Pal.*, V, 132, 5), in which he addresses his love and exclaims:

ὦ κατατεχνοτάτου κινήματος.

Liddell and Scott take this to mean "artificial," but it is hard to see what that can mean in the context, and surely Waltz is on the right road when he translates "cette démarche savamment ondulée."<sup>11</sup> In fact the word means something like "ingenious." Nor is it surprising that it is combined with κατασκευής if the latter means "invention." The two words are well assorted, and their association recalls Aeschines' complaint of τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς κατασκευάς of Demosthenes (II, 1). The prefix κατα- simply intensifies and draws attention to the large amount of τέχνη in Sophocles' invention. The word is used because it is more expressive than a simple word like τεχνικός. When we combine this with the other words in the phrase, we find that Sophocles claimed for his second period a painful ingenuity in his own invention.

What he meant by this may be easily illustrated, notably by the *Ajax*. In no other extant play does Sophocles show such ingenuity in providing painful effects. We have only to remember the scene in which the mad Ajax is mocked by Athene,—a scene to which there is no parallel in Greek tragedy except perhaps in the *Bacchae*,—the device by which the stage is emptied and the scene changed that Ajax may kill himself in solitude, the prolonged pathos of the silent figures of Tecmessa and Eurysaces watching over the dead body while Teucer quarrels with the Atridae about burial. A similar painful originality may be deduced from the fragments of lost plays. It is clear from Plutarch (*Amat.* 17) that in the *Niobe* some at least of the children were actually killed on the stage. In the *Polyxene* the ghost of Achilles appeared above his tomb and spoke to the departing Greeks with mysterious majesty of the groaning realms of Acheron which it had left (frag. 523), a scene which

<sup>11</sup> *Anthologie Grecque*, II, p. 67.

showed surely a greater boldness than even the appearance of Darius' ghost in the *Persae* or Polydorus' in the *Hecuba*. In the *Odysseus Acanthoplex* Sophocles secured a specially painful effect when he brought his dying hero onto the stage and made him recognize his slayer in his own son (Cicero, *Tusc.*, II, 48). Stranger than any of these, if the evidence of the scholiast on Aristophanes' *Birds* 99 is to be trusted,<sup>12</sup> was the *Tereus*, where a particularly bloody catastrophe ended in the chief characters being turned into birds and appearing in their new forms. In these cases Sophocles secured effects more painful than anything known in Aeschylus, and used a high degree of inventive ingenuity.

The third stage was different from the other two. On that all agree, but the words *τρίτον ἤδη τὸ τῆς λέξεως μεταβάλλειν εἶδος ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἠθικώτατον καὶ βέλτιστον* have been subjected to alteration and misinterpretation. The text must be tried out as it stands, and we cannot accept alterations which are made simply to suit a preconceived theory about what Sophocles ought to have meant. First, Bernhardt, approved by Wilamowitz, wished to alter *μεταβάλλειν* to *μεταλαβεῖν*. For this there is no need, since *μεταβάλλειν* can mean "change to," as it does at Euripides, *I. A.* 343, 363, Plato, *Rep.* IV, 424c, *Crat.* 405d, and is impeccable in form and sense. Secondly, the omission of the article before *τῆς λέξεως*, suggested by Schoene, is thoroughly insidious. For it makes it easier to take the whole passage as referring simply to *λέξις* by making *τρίτον* agree with *εἶδος* and the words mean "a third kind of diction." That would be all very well if Sophocles were referring simply to diction, but we have seen that this is open to doubt, and the case for such a view is not strengthened by playing with the text. In fact *τρίτον* is beyond reproach; it should be taken adverbially in the sense of "thirdly." As such Sophocles uses it at *Ant.* 55 and possibly at frag. 380. If we keep the MSS reading, we get excellent sense: "thirdly, he was now changing to the kind of diction which, etc."

The third stage differs from the first two in its attention to *λέξις*, diction. The word means this at Plato, *Apol.* 17d, where

<sup>12</sup> ἐν γὰρ τῷ Τηρεῖ Σοφοκλῆς ἐποίησεν αὐτὸν (sc. τὸν Τηρέα) ἀπωρινωμένον καὶ τὴν Πρόκνην. If the transformed Tereus did not appear on the stage, there seems little point in the Hoopoe's remarks at *Birds* 100-1. On the other hand Horace, *A. P.* 187 is against the scholiast.

Socrates says of his strangeness to forensic language *ξένως ἔχω τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως*, and at *Laws* VII, 795e *Μούσης λέξις* means "poetical diction." So too Aristotle uses the word at *Poetics* 19-20 and *Rhetoric* III, 7. There is, then, no difficulty about Sophocles having used it before them in the same sense. But his precise meaning depends on how we take his words. The clause which begins with *ὅπερ* can, grammatically speaking, be taken either as explanatory of the whole preceding clause or as explanatory simply of *εἶδος*. The objection to the first view, which Festa supports,<sup>13</sup> is that the change undergone by Sophocles is called *ἠθικώτατον καὶ βέλτιστον*, and it is hard to see how it could be either of these. *ἠθικώτατον* might be defended as meaning "expressive of his own character," but the actual change would not be so described. Still less would the change itself be called "best"; for there is no question of comparing one change with another, but of comparing one state with another. This view seems to involve insuperable obstacles, and it is quite easy to take *ὅπερ* as referring to *τὸ τῆς λέξεως εἶδος*. Sophocles after mentioning his third stage says what it is and praises it.

It should be possible to state more precisely what Sophocles meant by saying that his kind of diction was *ἠθικώτατον*. *ἠθικός* is applied in various ways to literature by Aristotle, who uses it of tragedy (*Poet.* 1456 a 1), the *Odyssey* (*ibid.* 1459 b 15), songs (*Pol.* 1341 b 34), and the diction of oratory (*Rhet.* 1408 a 10 ff.). In all of these cases its meaning is much the same. That kind of tragedy is *ἠθική* which deals mainly with character; the *Odyssey* has more interest in character than the *Iliad*; since "ethical" melodies are distinguished from those of action or passion, we may assume that they are concerned mainly with character; in rhetoric a speech is *ἠθική* if it expresses the character of the person who makes it. So *ἠθικός* means "concerned with character," and so, more precisely, "expressive of character." So when Sophocles said that his diction was *ἠθικώτατον*, he meant no more than that his characters spoke in a way that was characteristic of them. His position is well illustrated by that of Aristotle who in discussing *ἠθική λέξις* says *ἐὰν οὖν καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα οἰκεία λέγῃ τῇ ἕξει, ποιήσει τὸ ἥθος· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα οὐδ' ὡσαύτως ἂν ἀγροῖκος ἂν καὶ πεπαιδευμένος εἴπειεν* (*Rhet.* 1408 a 30). In his third stage this was true of Sophocles.

<sup>13</sup> *Riv. indo-gréco-ital.*, III (1919), pp. 9 ff.



In making the persons of his plays talk in character Sophocles was not really a pioneer. Aeschylus had certainly done the same thing with the Watchman in the *Agamemnon* and the Nurse in the *Choephoroi*; in the language of Clytaemnestra it is hard not to detect a peculiar directness which accords with her ruthless personality. Moreover, this claim of Sophocles seems all the more remarkable if we accept, as some still do, the view that he created ideal types; for we should hardly expect them to talk in character, and a common assumption is that they just speak in poetical language which belongs more to Sophocles than to them individually. The advocates of this view base their opinion on what Sophocles himself said, αὐτὸς μὲν οἷους δεῖ ποιεῖν, Εὐριπίδην δὲ οἷοι εἶναι (Aristotle, *Poet.* 1460 b 34) and agree with Bywater who assumes that with δεῖ we must supply εἶναι and translate "he drew men as they ought to be, but Euripides as they were." The natural deduction from this translation is that Sophocles disliked realistic characters and preferred ideal types. Moreover, this interpretation is not modern. Bywater quotes a remark attributed to the poet Philoxenus (S. Maximus Conf., 2, p. 632, Combef.) who, in answer to a complaint that while Sophocles produced good women he produced bad, said: Σοφοκλῆς μὲν οἷας δεῖ εἶναι τὰς γυναῖκας λέγει, ἐγὼ δὲ οἷαί εἰσιν. Philoxenus, then, assumed that Sophocles' women were morally good and that Sophocles himself had said so. This assumption attributes a curious blindness to Sophocles where his own work was concerned. His Clytaemnestra in the *Electra* hardly qualifies to be called χρηστή, and when we turn to his male characters, who must be included in his own statement, what are we to say of the Atridae in the *Ajax*, Aegisthus in the *Electra*, or Creon in the *Oedipus at Colonus*? Their conduct may perhaps be explained, but it cannot be held up as a model for imitation. If Philoxenus and Bywater are right, Sophocles did not know what he was saying when he compared his own characters to those of Euripides, and, as a critic of his own work, his opinion is of little value.

There is, however, a way out of this difficulty. We need not put too much trust in Philoxenus. He was, after all, merely answering in his own way someone who praised the goodness of Sophoclean heroines; he may well have accepted for purposes of argument what was a complete misinterpretation of Sophocles' real meaning. There are other, and more satisfactory, ways of interpreting his words than Bywater's. First, we might supply

not *εἶναι* but *ποιεῖν*; for it is as easy to supply an infinitive out of *ποιεῖν* as out of *εἶσι*, and then Sophocles would say that while Euripides created characters as they were, he himself created them as they should be created. Or, alternatively, we can make a concession to the followers of Bywater by supplying *εἶναι* but take the words not of moral or ideal excellence but simply of dramatic propriety; the characters are what they ought to be in a play. Whichever alternative we prefer, the result is the same. Sophocles maintained that characters must be created with dramatic propriety. And this is what Aristotle seems to have understood him to mean. For in the same section where the remark is quoted, he both uses it as an argument that what is not true may none the less be what it ought to be in a play and postpones till later his discussion whether actions in a play are morally good and bad, as if this were a different consideration. If we so interpret Sophocles' words and combine them with his other words about diction which displays character, we may deduce that by *ἡθικώτατον* he did not mean greater realism or colloquialism but simply something more suited to his characters than what he had hitherto used.

The change of which Sophocles spoke may of course be illustrated by comparing early work like the *Ajax* with late work like the *Philoctetes*. But this is to assume that the remark was made by him at the end of his life, and that is a doubtful assumption. In fact we may mark a perfectly real difference in the question of diction between the *Ajax* and the *Antigone*. In the *Ajax* the language is not really *ἡθική*. So far as the manner of speaking is concerned there is little difference between Ajax and Tecmessa, between Odysseus and the Atridae. A small point will make the similarity of diction clear. In the quarrel between Teucer and Menelaus Menelaus uses an *alvos* about the uselessness of a man of bold words in a stormy sea (1142-1149) and Teucer answers him with another *alvos* of the same length and the same kind about a man who triumphed over his neighbour's woes. Now in action the two characters are quite different, and for the audience they stand for strongly contrasted points of view, but in their language they are at this point indistinguishable. Sophocles uses an old technique which survived in comedy at least until Aristophanes' *Lysistrata*, but it is not well suited to the portrayal of character. But in the *Antigone* the characters are certainly to some extent differentiated by their manner of speech. The

Guard has his curious mixture of colloquialisms and pomposity which well suits a man of his condition. Creon's measured utterance and abundant maxims show him as the true type of platitudinous entêtement and make a strong contrast with the simple and direct utterance of Antigone. Of course there are many who still believe that the *Ajax* is later than the *Antigone*, but even they must admit that the language of the *Ajax* is far less adapted to the characters than that of the *Antigone*. Nor need they be treated too seriously, since the whole dramatic technique of the *Ajax* shows the marks of an early date. On a balance of evidence we may conclude that while the *Ajax* represents the second stage of Sophocles' development, the *Antigone* represents the third. A comparison of the two plays will show what he meant by the change of his own painful ingenuity to that kind of diction which most displays character.

In conclusion, then, Sophocles' remark, put into *oratio recta*, means this: "After practising to the full the bigness of Aeschylus, then the painful ingenuity of my own invention, now in the third stage I am changing to the kind of diction which is most expressive of character and best." The three stages have been illustrated by the *Triptolemus*, *Ajax*, and *Antigone*, and the remark agrees with what we know of the facts. No doubt the process was gradual, and there is no need to assume decisive and deliberate breaks between the different stages. In fact both ἡδῆ and μεταβάλλειν indicate that when Sophocles made the remark he was still in the process of moving over from the second to the third stage. Nor need we assume that he spoke the words at the end of a long life. In fact, if they come from Ion of Chios, they must have been spoken before 421 B. C., when Ion, as we know from Aristophanes' *Peace* 835 ff., was already dead. In that case they cannot take account of the *Electra*, *Philoctetes*, or *Oedipus at Colonus*. And indeed the remark may come from a considerably earlier date. For Ion's account of Sophocles belongs to the Samian war of 441-440 B. C., and this is at least a likely source for anything that Sophocles said about his own art. If this is right, the third period may be said to have begun with the *Antigone*. For it was his success with this play that brought him as a general to Samos, and it is likely that he would have it in mind when he spoke of the latest development of his art.

## ALEXANDER'S PLANS.

If it is true, as some believe, that Alexander planned a western expedition, then our picture of the great Macedonian will have to be altered in some essentials. The whole question depends (so far as published research goes and, be it added, quite unnecessarily) on the authenticity of Diodorus XVIII, 4, 1-6. Alexander's *ὑπομνήματα* (including plans for a western expedition) are imbedded in this passage, and many writers—Kaerst, E. Meyer, Jacoby, Schubert, Endres, Kornemann, Kolbe, and recently Wilcken<sup>1</sup>—assume that the *ὑπομνήματα* descend from Hieronymus and treat them as history. In 1921 Tarn rejected<sup>2</sup> them as unhistorical and now in 1939 is publishing a learned paper, "Alexander's Plans," in *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, which fortifies his previous arguments and adduces a good deal that is new.<sup>3</sup> Tarn and Wilcken ably present the opposing points of view and between them cover the literature on the subject. Briefly put, I believe that Tarn has shown conclusively that Wilcken's position is untenable, but I do not believe that it necessarily follows from Tarn's discussion that Alexander did not plan a western expedition: consequently, I may limit myself pretty much to Tarn's papers. Finally, I shall call attention to two passages in Arrian in the hope that we may advance the argument further; if our interpretation is correct, it will of course place Alexander in a new light.

Though I shall rest my case on Arrian, it is best to begin with Diodorus. I shall not argue that the *ὑπομνήματα*, at least as we now have them, are genuine. What I shall do, in the first place,

<sup>1</sup> U. Wilcken, *Die letzten Pläne Alexanders des Grossen* (Berlin, 1937).

<sup>2</sup> W. W. Tarn, "Alexander's *ὑπομνήματα* and the 'world-kingdom,'" *J. H. S.*, XLI (1921), pp. 1 ff. Niese, Beloch, and Wilamowitz had also rejected them. M. Cary, *The Legacy of Alexander* (New York, 1932), p. 3, is convinced by Tarn's "damaging criticism." A. D. Nock also rejects, in his review (*C. P.*, XXXIII [1938], p. 126) of W. Kolbe, *Die Weltreichsidee Alexanders des Grossen* (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1936).

<sup>3</sup> I am very grateful to Dr. Tarn for his kindness in sending me advance proofs of his article. (This is now published in *J. H. S.*, LIX [1939], pp. 124-135.)

is to examine their authenticity, and this means beginning with Tarn's paper of 1921. Speaking generally, those who favor the *ὑπομνήματα* believe that they fit, somehow, Alexander's character, whereas the first step necessarily must be to determine their genuineness. Because he has subjected the *ὑπομνήματα* to a searching analysis, Tarn's papers are, I believe it is fair to say, the only really vital ones on the subject. Tarn's method, again speaking generally, is to point out the absurdity of this or that item in the *ὑπομνήματα* and to proceed to show how the idea grew until, in some instances, it actually became part of the Romance. This is a proper and valuable way of approaching the problem; but, when concluded, it is still fair to ask, I think, whether the story had as its beginning any solid substratum of fact. If other evidence is found, we may then say that the *ὑπομνήματα* of Diodorus preserve in curious fashion an echo of history and perhaps throw some additional light on Alexander's secretariat—but that is all. Without other evidence, however, we must insist that the demonstrably false statements among the *ὑπομνήματα* not only make the entire list suspect but practically worthless, even though a true statement here and there may have survived the vicissitudes of time and may make us wish to guess at the background.

Before we consider the plans themselves, we must examine briefly the contention that our passage in Diodorus is not from Hieronymus. Schubert<sup>4</sup> has proved that books XVIII-XX are a composite work, containing much that is not from Hieronymus; and Tarn in 1921 showed that this is especially true of XVIII, 2-4, though he accepted one item as definitely from Hieronymus. Therefore, says Tarn, we cannot assume that the story of the *ὑπομνήματα* is from Hieronymus, and the whole story must be examined on its merits. That is true, but, since Tarn reaches the conclusion that the passage is not Hieronymus, I must suggest a danger in his method. He is quite correct, I believe, in making substance, rather than style, the criterion by which to judge a writer's source. But I do not think it is correct to favor the "long quotation"; that is to say, if a doubtful passage or phrase is preceded or followed by one of reasonably certain

<sup>4</sup> R. Schubert, *Die Quellen zur Geschichte der Diadochenzeit* (Leipzig, 1914).



authorship, the two probably go together. The Alexander historians could (and did) draw from different sources in the same sentence; and yet I see that Tarn still favors the long quotation, for in a recent book <sup>5</sup> he remarks that Kornemann <sup>6</sup> has "justly emphasised the fact that the named fragments of a lost historian are no more than a starting point for reconstruction." In a review of Kornemann, however, I have shown the pitfalls of this method.<sup>7</sup> Since, therefore, we simply do not know who was the ultimate source of our Diodorus passage, we must, as Tarn says, examine the story on its merits.

After Alexander's death Perdikkas found in the king's *ὑπομνήματα* <sup>8</sup> certain plans, which he referred to the army. Tarn shows (p. 16) that the army had no competence in such matters, and says that Hieronymus therefore cannot be the source here. Granted that the army would not be consulted concerning plans, it is still an open question whether the source of Diodorus knew of any plans at all. As Tarn remarks (p. 10), "There is no inherent improbability in the supposition of a collection of royal plans." Our task of discovering the echo in Diodorus, if there be an echo, is simplified if we resolutely seek the kernels of historical fact, recognizing that the *ὑπομνήματα* of Diodorus are necessarily a far cry from those of Alexander (whether from Hieronymus or another good, early source is immaterial here). Diodorus gives the following plans: <sup>9</sup>

(1) The completion of Hephaestion's pyre (*πυρά*). "The pyre," says Tarn (p. 11), "was already finished. . . . The first plan, then, is a historical absurdity." In his *Life of Alexander* (72, 3), however, Plutarch states that Alexander planned to spend ten thousand talents upon a tomb (*τύμβος*) and obsequies (*ταφή*) for Hephaestion, and upon their embellishments. I submit that it matters little whether Diodorus (or his source) confused pyre and tomb; it was the costly memorial which

<sup>5</sup> *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge, 1938), p. 44.

<sup>6</sup> E. Kornemann, *Die Alexandergeschichte des Königs Ptolemaios I von Aegypten* (Leipzig, 1935).

<sup>7</sup> *A. J. P.*, LVIII (1937), pp. 108 ff.

<sup>8</sup> I do not know what *ὑπομνήματα* means. "Memoranda" is the usual translation.

<sup>9</sup> I am following C. T. Fischer's text of Diodorus in the Teubner edition (Leipzig, 1906).

Alexander had on his mind and this could hardly have been finished by the time of his own death. Incidentally, if Alexander kept *ὑπομνήματα*, are we to suppose that he struck off the plans as they were fulfilled?

(2) The construction of six temples in Europe at a cost of 1500 talents each. "This might be true," says Tarn.

(3) A synoecism of cities. Tarn says that "no synoecism of cities by Alexander, done, begun, or planned, is known." If the proletariat of new foundations came from native villages, would that constitute a synoecism?

(4) Interchange of peoples between Europe and Asia. Tarn says that it is "probably safe to believe that this plan, at any rate in part, had genuine tradition behind it."

(5) A magnificent temple at Ilion. "Strabo XIII, 393 may be evidence that Alexander had thought of this years before," says Tarn.

(6) A tomb for Philip like the Great Pyramid in Egypt. With Tarn, we may quickly dismiss this.

"So far, then," says Tarn, "the plans given in the *ὑπομνήματα* are a mixture of things very possibly true and things certainly false. Of the latter, one is obviously of Egyptian manufacture; while the former relate to *building* and *colonisation*." I believe my comments show, however, that all the plans may be substantially true, except the sixth.

(7) This, as Tarn states, is the plan that matters: The construction of 1000 warships, larger than triremes, in Phoenicia, Syria, Cilicia, and Cyprus for the expedition against the Carthaginians and the maritime peoples of Libya and Spain and the coterminous coast as far as Sicily; the construction of a road along the coast of Libya as far as the Pillars of Heracles; and the construction of harbors and dockyards at convenient places for the great fleet.

Tarn says (p. 17) that the principal item in the *ὑπομνήματα*, "the plan to conquer Carthage and the Mediterranean basin, is part of a legend which developed by regular stages from the Cleistarchean embassies to the Romance, whose basis is admittedly the last echo of the Cleistarchean vulgate. This item was not formulated *earlier* than c. 200 B. C." Two points here. Referring to a story given by Curtius, to be noted again below, Tarn says (p. 14) that "Alexander's plan to march from Spain to Italy over

the Alps is obviously taken from Hannibal's march, and this story therefore is later than 219." The mention of the Alps certainly is late,<sup>10</sup> but we still do not come to grips with the main point, whether Alexander did or did not have designs of any sort upon the West. Similarly with the embassies. Some of them—those from the Libyans, Bruttians, Lucanians, Etruscans—are certain. "As all embassies appeared in the *Journal*," says Tarn (p. 12), "it is difficult to credit any not in Arrian." We do not need to; those from Rome, for example, are a late addition; but the fact remains that before his death Alexander had contacts of an official nature with western peoples, and the story would grow with time. Finally, we may mention Tarn's observation (p. 13) that "it is hardly necessary to remark that if you are going to the Pillars you do not begin by sending your fleet to Babylon" (from Phoenicia, in sections, overland). I think you do, if you are already at Babylon and are planning first of all a colonization of the Persian Gulf and, especially, if you are as ignorant of Arabia and Africa as Alexander was.

Let us examine more closely the possibility that Alexander envisaged an expedition against the West. Tarn states (p. 14) that "it is likely enough that Alexander may have meditated sending out expeditions of *exploration and discovery*, whether round Africa, or in the Atlantic like Pytheas; precisely as he did send an expedition to explore the Caspian." It seems to me just as reasonable to admit the likelihood of an expedition of conquest, but there is no proof yet for either. Turning to Wilcken, we see (p. 5) that he looks upon the *ὑπομνήματα* as a collection of official documents, kept perhaps by Eumenes, who had the Ephemerides in charge.<sup>11</sup> The purpose of Wilcken's paper, as I have already intimated, is not to discuss the authenticity of the *ὑπομνήματα*, but, by searching for their traces, to reach a deeper understanding of Alexander. Wilcken finds in Curtius X, 1, 17-18 confirmation of Alexander's plan for an expedition against Carthage and Europe and is surprised (p. 14) that students have not turned it to account, even though Tarn has

<sup>10</sup> Curtius really speaks of sailing past the Alps; a small slip, corrected by Tarn in 1939.

<sup>11</sup> In *The Ephemerides of Alexander's Expedition* (Providence, 1932), p. 73, I pointed out that Eumenes probably was not the secretary of the expedition for the last years.

summarized and commented upon it. Since the Curtius passage is not the only one that can be summoned to the support of Diodorus, it will be well to examine all the evidence.

After Nearchus joined him in Carmania, Alexander planned, according to Curtius, to go from Syria to Africa, conquer (be hostile to) Carthage, continue through Numidia to Gades and Spain by way of the Pillars of Hercules, and sail past the Alps to Italy and Epirus—an expedition for which he would need 700 heptereis. If one will examine the Itinerary in my *Ephe-merides* (p. 58), it will be seen that at precisely this same point Plutarch remarks (68, 1) that, when Nearchus joined him, Alexander formed the desire of sailing down the Euphrates, circumnavigating Arabia and Libya, and then of entering the Mediterranean by way of the Pillars of Heracles; hence ships of every kind were built for him at Thapsacus. Only slightly later in the Itinerary, and with the same source before him, Arrian (VII, 1, 1-4) has this to say: "When he arrived at Pasargadae and Persepolis, Alexander was seized with a desire to sail down the Euphrates and Tigris to the Persian Sea. . . . Some authors also say that he was planning to sail round the greater part of Arabia, the country of the Ethiopians, Libya, and the land of the Nomads beyond Mt. Atlas, as far as Gades in our sea, believing that, after he had conquered both Libya and Carthage, he might justly be called king of all Asia. . . . Some say that he planned a voyage thence into the Euxine Sea, to Scythia and Lake Maeotis, while others state that he planned to go to Sicily and the Iapygian promontory. . . . For my part I do not know what were his plans." These detailed plans at (let me emphasize) this point in the narrative are untrustworthy, for they rest on neither Ptolemy nor Aristobulus, and may therefore be dismissed with Curtius and Plutarch.<sup>12</sup>

Thus far, then, and in spite of Wilcken, there has not been a scintilla of evidence for a western expedition, even though Tarn's arguments against it may not in every case have been conclusive. We may now note that in his 1939 article Tarn examines once more the Diodorus and Curtius passages: the pyramid-tomb (an

<sup>12</sup> I am not noticing Arrian, IV, 7, 5 and other passages in the ancient authors which give vague (or untrustworthy) references to Alexander's desire to conquer the world.

impossibility); the 1000 warships (developed from Curtius' impossible statement); the use of the name "Alps" (which, like the pyramid-tomb, cannot be earlier than 196-5); the construction of the military road along the coast of North Africa (Alexander is not known to have built any roads)—all these are unquestionably far later than Alexander, and certainly no careful historian can use Diodorus' *ὑπομνήματα* as history. Perhaps, as Tarn says, "anyone putting forward, as a plan of Alexander's, anything so extraordinary as the conquest of the Mediterranean basin would naturally insert some true items in the supposed *ὑπομνήματα* if he could, to give verisimilitude to his story." The plan, as we have it, was probably concocted in the late Hellenistic period to show that Alexander "was to have what Rome in fact did have," and we can almost hear a Greek "speaking: 'So you Romans have now got the Mediterranean and its coasts, the sceptres of land and sea—*γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης σκῆπτρα*. Well and good. But if Alexander had lived, those sceptres would have been his—here's his plan—and where would you have been then?' "

At all events we may agree that the Diodorus passage, even if it does go back to a historical kernel,<sup>13</sup> cannot be very helpful (as I explained earlier); but the truth is we do not need Diodorus for Alexander's western plans, and students of the problem must address themselves to Arrian. Tarn, in 1939, has touched on part of this, but for other purposes, and I give his point in some detail. Toward the end of his paper Tarn devotes two paragraphs as to "how the plan for the conquest of the Mediterranean basin grew up." The embassies at Babylon played a part, but "I now think that Alexander's schemes, real and alleged, of *exploration* were a far more important factor, and I must look at these. When he turned back at the Beas he *abandoned* a hard-won

<sup>13</sup> I mean just this by "kernel" or "echo": I hope to show that Arrian (without fully realizing it, a fact which lends strength to his credibility) reveals that Alexander had an idea of western conquest. This idea was embroidered with time; witness Diodorus, Curtius, Plutarch, and even Arrian VII, 1, 1-4. The details, then, are all worthless; the most we can ever hope to do is to recover the *idea*. Tarn says this: "But as Alexander certainly thought of the circumnavigation of Arabia for himself, he *could* equally well have thought of that of Africa; he had no idea of its size"—I hope to show that he *did* think of it.



conquest. . . . The abandonment of the eastern Punjab was a turning-point in Alexander's career, for once he had quitted India, he made no more conquests, but turned his thoughts to exploration instead. He tried to explore the coast of his own province of Gedrosia, to help maritime trade; and when he died he had two explorations in hand, the Caspian and the coast of Arabia. . . . A story was told that, after Arabia, he meant to circumnavigate Africa and enter the Mediterranean through the Pillars; <sup>14</sup> as he knew nothing of the size of Africa or of Herodotus' story of a Phoenician circumnavigation which took three years, the story has some chance of being true, though he could hardly have gone in person. But projects of exploration by a naval and military force will, in literature, pass with the greatest ease into projects of conquest. The (supposed) projected circumnavigation of Africa became a plan for conquering North Africa from the Pillars eastward.<sup>15</sup> The real plan of exploring the Arabian coast, known from the *Journal*,<sup>16</sup> became, in the Curtius passage already discussed, the conquest of that coast; and that passage exhibits a (supposed) projected circumnavigation of the Mediterranean in actual process of passing into the conquest of the Mediterranean basin."<sup>17</sup>

Tarn says again, at the end of his paper, that after quitting India Alexander "turned to exploration instead of further conquests." I cannot find the evidence for this: Alexander fought,

<sup>14</sup> Tarn refers to the Plutarch passage (68, 1) and adds, "no mention of conquest." Plutarch, however, says that ships of every kind were built for Alexander at Thapsacus; but I have already said that Plutarch is not evidence here.

<sup>15</sup> Tarn's references are to Arrian, V, 26, 2; VII, 21, 1.

<sup>16</sup> See my note 22.

<sup>17</sup> Curtius in effect, continues Tarn, ascribes to Alexander a rather vague and not very belligerent expedition, which "presently develops into the full-blown plan for the conquest of the Mediterranean basin given by Diodorus. That the Diodorus passage is later, perhaps much later, than the already late Curtius passage, and has merely grown out of it, is surely now self-evident." *Mutatis mutandis*, this can be said of much of the material in the Alexander historians. Yet the question remains, what, if anything, lay back of it all? Generally we do not know, and without an impeccable source it is not worth while guessing. On the other hand, where an impeccable source *does* exist, we must give it full weight, for everyone will agree that much vital information concerning Alexander is missing; see my note 22.

wherever it was necessary to fight; he colonized Rhambacia, and, for him at least, this was outside India, for he had crossed the Arabius river and a large stretch of desert; in short, the departure from India shows no radical break with his past. But this is really part of another problem. We must turn to the passages in Arrian, not, however, with an idea of determining "how the plan for the conquest of the Mediterranean basin grew up"; above all, it does not concern us to discover how "the (supposed) projected circumnavigation of Africa became a plan for conquering North Africa from the Pillars eastward." If we can establish that Alexander hoped to *circumnavigate Africa*, it obviously follows that we have proved the existence in his mind of an idea for a western expedition. Call it conquest or exploration, Alexander voluntarily surrendered nothing; and certainly we do not need the fertile imagination of a Curtius or Diodorus to embroider the picture for us. The trouble has been that the *ὑπομνήματα* are just specific enough to make us concentrate on the Mediterranean, and, the details being chiefly absurd, we have lost ourselves in proving the impossibility of it all. Let us now forget Diodorus, Curtius, and Plutarch.

The passage of fundamental importance is in Arrian.<sup>18</sup> In addressing the mutinous troops at the Hyphasis (Beas) Alexander says that "the distance before we reach the Ganges and the Eastern Sea is not great; I tell you that the Hyrcanian (Caspian) Sea will be seen to be united with this, because the Great Sea encircles the whole earth. I will also show to the Macedonians and to the allies that the Indian Gulf flows into the Persian, and the Hyrcanian Sea into the Indian Gulf. From the Persian Gulf our expedition will sail round to Libya as far as the Pillars of Heracles. From the Pillars all the interior of Libya will be ours, and so the whole of Asia." The extraordinary ignorance of geography, which would have been impossible at a later date, points to a good source; and in fact there is nothing that is suspect about this passage; but, above all, it must be noted how very modest are Alexander's plans<sup>19</sup> as compared with those in the other Arrian passage (VII, 1, 1-4) quoted above, where

<sup>18</sup> V, 26, 1-2. Tarn has alluded to it (see my note 15).

<sup>19</sup> Alexander's ambitions are restricted to Asia (with which Africa was often grouped), though his empire will extend up to the Pillars.

Arrian, characteristically, has forgotten the (less dramatic) plans of the speech. To take our second important passage in Arrian. In Bactria Alexander told Pharasmanes<sup>20</sup> that he now had a "desire of conquering the Indians; after he subdued them, he would possess the whole of Asia. He said that after he had conquered Asia he would return to Greece and make an expedition through the Hellespont and Propontis with all his forces to the Pontus." It is universally agreed, I think, that Alexander's ideas enlarged as his expedition progressed. In Bactria-Sogdiana he had one set of plans, India (and thus all of Asia) and then the Black Sea (which, he thought, was not far from where he then was<sup>21</sup>); but in India success and a larger world brought other ideas, still Asia to be sure, but an Asia that extended to the very frontiers of western Europe. This would entail a western expedition, round Africa. For my purposes it is not at all necessary to speculate on what Alexander may have planned after his return to Babylon, for the kernel of it was there three years earlier.

In 1921 Tarn said (p. 11) that "it is, of course, a strong argument against the genuineness of the *ὑπομνήματα* that they do not give a single one of the plans known from Arrian, though certainly the rebuilding of E-sagila and the Arabian expedition were *μνήμης ἀξία*." But the *ὑπομνήματα*, as we have them in Diodorus (if we may return to them), are dramatic. On the other hand, our brief quotations from the Ephemerides, which concern Alexander's last days, mention the (dry) immediate plans of an expedition.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Arrian, IV, 15, 5-6.

<sup>21</sup> Alexander mistook the Jaxartes for the Don.

<sup>22</sup> Strictly speaking, the Ephemerides do not specify the (Arabian) expedition, though we have probably been right in thinking so. Of the five extant Alexander historians, only Arrian (VII, 24, 4-26, 3) and Plutarch (75, 3-76, 4) give extracts from the Ephemerides for Alexander's last days, and Plutarch does not mention a proposed expedition. I wish to emphasize how odd it is that, with the reference to the expedition before him, Arrian does not elaborate at all in his regular narrative; I do not count VII, 20, for, as Tarn shows in his 1939 article, this was "only Hiero's report and throws no light on Alexander's intentions." This can only mean that much information about Alexander was lost, since an expedition of any importance would have caused a great stir. For us it is an added warning not to expect too much of our sources here.

If I have shown (as I have tried to do) that Tarn's objections to the *ὑπομνήματα* are not always conclusive, it certainly does not follow that I would take the next step and, with Wilcken, argue that Diodorus' plans fit Alexander's character—it would be as profitable to say that an expedition to China fitted him.<sup>23</sup> But I believe that I have shown that Alexander did have plans of a farseeing kind, preserved, perhaps, by an echo in Diodorus, but certainly to be discovered in trustworthy passages in Arrian. That is probably all that can be done with Alexander's plans. If we are to understand Alexander's character better—particularly if we are to examine the idea of his so-called world-kingdom—we must study him during his lifetime, and, it may be added, certain lines of inquiry may confirm some of the implications of this paper. For example, did Alexander envisage the brotherhood of man, or, lacking real vision, did he limit himself to a union of the new masters of Asia with the old, Macedonians with Persians? Did he envisage at the outset of his expedition the possibility of world conquest, or, like Philip, something definitely less? It is hard to believe that the experience of Xenophon and the ambition of Agesilaus were lost upon him. The world meant to him, as to everyone else, the Persian empire; the patches round about, inhabited by savages, could be ignored or attended to later. The West was another matter, but Alexander can hardly have been unaware of the near-successes of his neighbors in that quarter.

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<sup>23</sup> The only thing which would "fit" Alexander would be a trip to the Pillars, so as not to be outdone by Heracles.

## CORINTH AND THE ARGIVE COALITION.

Thucydides' account of the period which followed the Peace of Nicias is felt generally to be among the least satisfying portions of his work. It is disputable whether or not these chapters were finally revised,<sup>1</sup> but the intricacy of the diplomatic moves which have to be described and the absence of a central theme are obstacles which not even the most careful revision could remove. The narrative is moderately detailed, and in many cases the aims of states or parties are clearly defined, but to a greater extent than in other parts of his work the author leaves his readers to guess the motives underlying the negotiations which he records. These omissions spring from a variety of causes. First, the number of the states involved is large, and to define the object of each at every turn of the situation would overload his narrative. Secondly, his caution led him to venture upon motivation only where his sources were unquestionably trustworthy, and in this case the difficulty of obtaining information on intrigues whose aims were deliberately concealed must have been considerable. Thirdly, it is his practice to condense his accounts of schemes which were abortive or without much influence upon subsequent events.<sup>2</sup> A problem upon which he throws little light is raised by the mixture of forcefulness and hesitancy displayed by the Corinthians,<sup>3</sup> and it is the purpose of this article

<sup>1</sup> If the bulk of Book V is a late addition composed only when the author recognised the unity of the Peloponnesian War, he cannot here have followed his normal practice of collecting information about events at the time of their occurrence and must have begun this process when much was already forgotten. But discussion on the composition of his work continues without any very conclusive result.

<sup>2</sup> It is significant that the aims of Argos, Mantinea, and Elis, whose armies operated against Sparta in the campaign of 418, are more clearly outlined than those of Corinth, Boeotia, and Megara, whose estrangement from Sparta was only temporary.

<sup>3</sup> There is nowhere any indication that the fluctuations of Corinthian policy were caused by differences of opinion between political parties, as was the case at Athens and Sparta. In the Corinthian War the democrats and oligarchs at Corinth were sharply divided on foreign policy, but this was because the estates of the latter suffered from the protracted operations at the Isthmus.



to suggest what factors may have determined the course of Corinthian diplomacy.

It was the Corinthians who after the conclusion of the alliance between Athens and Sparta sent envoys to Argos to urge the formation of a defensive coalition under Argive leadership (V, 27, 2-3).<sup>4</sup> The ambitions of Argos are well known to Thucydides,<sup>5</sup> and he records them fully, since they led to the campaign of 418. The Argives were disinclined to renew their treaty with Sparta, because they hoped to reap the fruits of their neutrality in the Archidamian War and become the leaders of the Peloponnese (28, 2; 40, 3; 69, 1, cf. Aristoph., *Peace*, 475-7). This object was to be attained at the expense of Sparta, and the most promising feature of the situation was the resentment felt against Sparta by those allies which, believing their interests betrayed by the Peace of Nicias, refused to accept its terms. Among these was Corinth, whose envoys declared to the Argives that the newly-formed alliance between Athens and Sparta was designed to threaten Peloponnesian autonomy (27, 2). But this fear, which soon spread to other Peloponnesian cities (29, 3-4), was surely the creation of Corinthian propaganda. Thucydides nowhere suggests that it had any foundation,<sup>6</sup> and to him the Spartan purpose in concluding the alliance was a purely defensive one (22, 2); both Athens and Sparta were too exhausted by war and too embarrassed by difficulties arising from the Peace to embark upon a joint policy of far-reaching imperialism.<sup>7</sup> Under the leadership of Nicias Athens would scarcely entertain ambitions of this kind, and if he were ousted by the Radicals, the result would doubtless be a breach with Sparta. Considerations other than anxiety for their independence must have influenced the determination of the Corinthians to play the leading

<sup>4</sup> All references are to Thuc. V, unless otherwise defined.

<sup>5</sup> Considerable portions of Book V may well derive from Argive sources.

<sup>6</sup> Diodorus (XII, 75, 4) characteristically accepts this threat as a fact. Meyer, *G. d. A.*, IV, p. 467, and Ferguson, *C. A. H.*, V, p. 257, are inclined to believe that it had some foundation.

<sup>7</sup> The Spartans gave vague assurances that they would join the Athenians in compelling the Chalcidians, Boeotians, and Corinthians to accept the Peace (35, 3-5); but they evidently did not contemplate any offensive action.

part in initiating and organizing the Argive coalition; indeed, the promptitude with which they embarked upon their plan of action suggests that it was formed before the alliance between Athens and Sparta had been signed.

The two states which immediately declared their readiness to join the coalition were Mantinea and Elis, each actuated by a local grievance against Sparta. The outcome of an alliance between Argos, Corinth, Mantinea, and Elis, if it assumed an offensive as well as a defensive character, as the Argives at least intended, might well be a campaign against Sparta. Success in this venture would materially benefit the three partners of Corinth, especially Argos whose ambition to dominate the Peloponnese would be assured, but to the Corinthians themselves, though it might bring satisfaction, it could provide nothing more concrete. They had, it is true, every reason for animosity against the Spartans: the Peace of Nicias left Sollium and Anactorium in Acarnanian hands (30, 2),<sup>8</sup> failed to repair other losses sustained by them,<sup>9</sup> and secured none of the objects for which they had precipitated the Archidamian War. These feelings, however, occasioned only by disappointment, were easily forgotten at two subsequent moments when the situation suggested a rapprochement with Sparta (36-8; 48). A desire to avenge the betrayal of their interests by Sparta was neither the only nor the principal motive of the Corinthians in their energetic promotion of an Argive coalition.

The bitter hostility of Corinth towards Athens at this time is recognised by modern scholars,<sup>10</sup> but the extent of its influence in determining Corinthian policy has perhaps received insufficient attention. Now an attack by the coalition upon Sparta would involve the Athenians, who were committed to full support of the Spartans under the terms of their recent alliance (23, 1). But, as Thucydides points out (40, 2), the Argives were aware of the friction existing between the two powers, which might soon become intensified. They even entertained

<sup>8</sup> This appears to be the only passage (with the possible exception of 32, 4) in which Thucydides claims knowledge of unexpressed Corinthian sentiments during this period.

<sup>9</sup> Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 468; Ferguson, *op. cit.*, p. 255; De Sanctis, *Storia dei Greci*, II, p. 296.

<sup>10</sup> Ferguson, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

hopes of an alliance with Athens (*ibid.*), and at least had reason to expect that Athenian assistance to Sparta would be unsubstantial. Moreover, the Athenians could have little influence upon operations conducted in the interior of the Peloponnese, however scrupulously they might honour their obligations. The developments of 420-18 show how accurately the Argives gauged the situation in 421, and their hopes were doubtless shared by Mantinea and Elis (cf. 44, 2). But the Corinthians had very different intentions. They aimed, it seems, at nothing less than a renewal of the Peloponnesian War with the substitution of Argos for Sparta as the formal leader of the adversaries of Athens. The Spartans would probably be ranged on the Athenian side, but if all the principal states of the Peloponnese were brought into the Argive coalition, Sparta would be hemmed in by a cordon of enemies and would be unable, as well as perhaps unwilling, to prevent invasions of Attica and attempts to break up the Athenian empire.<sup>11</sup> Whereas the Argives at present regarded war with Sparta as the chief object of the coalition, the Corinthians probably hoped to reduce this to a purely defensive character. Owing to the danger of alienating the many Argives who had sympathy for Athens (44, 1) these Corinthian aims could not yet be divulged, and it would be only when other enemies of Athens—Boeotians, Megarians, Chalcidians—had been drawn in and had made their influence felt that Argive scruples could be overcome and the whole force of the coalition directed against Athens. The familiar war-cry of a crusade to liberate Greeks enslaved by the Athenians could then be renewed,<sup>12</sup> and if success were achieved, the Corinthians would be among the chief beneficiaries. This interpretation of their intentions is consistent with the invariable trend of their policy since the middle of the fifth century, when their commerce and their colonial empire were eclipsed by the advance of

<sup>11</sup> The inability of the Athenians to restore their authority in the Thraceward district suggested that such attempts might be more successful than those undertaken in the early years of the Archidamian War.

<sup>12</sup> The arguments of the Corinthian delegates at the congress of the Peloponnesian League in 432 (Thuc., I, 120-4) could be reaffirmed, with emphasis upon the economic menace of Athenian power even to Peloponnesian states which had no maritime interests (*ibid.*, 120, 2).

Athens; it may be confirmed by a brief examination of the part which they played in the diplomatic exchanges of 421-0.

The proclamation inviting states to join the Argive coalition was issued by Argos but drafted by Corinth. Whereas other cities might secure membership by communicating with a board of twelve Argive commissioners, Athens and Sparta might join only with the consent of the Argive demos (28, 1). This formula is astutely worded. That Sparta was not excluded from membership must have appeared to the Argives a mere formality designed to maintain the ostensibly defensive nature of the coalition and necessitated by the Spartan alliance with Athens. But the Corinthians may well have deliberately drawn up the proclamation in such a way as to facilitate the entry of Sparta into the coalition, if the alliance with Athens broke down and sentiment hostile to Athens became predominant at Sparta. The Corinthian attitude to the Thraceward district is also significant. When Corinth formally entered the Argive coalition, the Chalcidians, bitter enemies of Athens, joined at the same moment (31, 6), and whenever the Chalcidians are mentioned by Thucydides in this period, they appear in close association with the Corinthians (30, 2; 35, 3; 38, 1, 4), who evidently represented themselves as champions of a people betrayed by Sparta and likely soon to be subjected to Athenian attacks. Boeotia and Megara, also enemies of Athens but not actively threatened, proved less tractable, and their decision to hold aloof from the coalition for the present reflects a desire to avoid an open breach with Sparta. The next move was an attempt by Corinth and Argos to win the support of Tegea. Its failure damped the enthusiasm of the Corinthians (32, 3-4), and the reason for their disappointment is clear: Tegea was of strategic importance and an essential link in the chain of states with whose aid they hoped to isolate Sparta. As was later proved by the operations of 418, Tegeate fidelity would enable the Spartans to take the offensive against Mantinea and Argos. A Corinthian embassy was then sent to Boeotia and, after failing to win Boeotian support by direct persuasion, carried out a manoeuvre whose purpose Thucydides does not fully explain (32, 5-7). The Boeotians consented to send envoys with the Corinthians to Athens and seek to obtain for them the same system of ten-day truces which was in operation between themselves and the Athenians; if this attempt

failed, they would repudiate their own truce with Athens. The Athenians refused to accept a proposal which would amount to recognition of the Corinthian secession from Sparta and would thereby anger their ally. This result must have been anticipated by the Corinthians from the outset, and their diplomacy was evidently designed to embroil the Boeotians with Athens and thus overcome Boeotian hesitation in joining the Argive coalition. But the Boeotians, who had now perhaps realised the intentions of the Corinthians, failed to keep their promise.

The inclusion of both Boeotia and Megara in the Argive coalition was indispensable to the success of the Corinthian plan, since otherwise invasions of Attica could not be resumed, and the continued indecision of these states doubtless disappointed the Corinthians even more than the blank refusal of Tegea. It may therefore be to this moment of discouragement that an event belongs to which Thucydides refers considerably later (48). Argos, Mantinea, and Elis agreed that their alliance should be made offensive as well as defensive, but the Corinthians refused to participate in this alteration. They evidently recognised that any military operations which might ensue would be directed against Sparta and that their own ambitions had no prospect of fulfilment unless this offensive alliance included Boeotia and Megara. They were perhaps on the point of withdrawal from active participation in the coalition when at the end of 421 two newly-elected Spartan ephors, who disapproved of the Peace of Nicias, put forward secret proposals which, if carried into effect, would have caused a fresh alignment of the Greek powers (36). By a complicated method which need not be described here all the allies of Sparta in the Archidamian War were to be reunited under Spartan leadership with the valuable addition of Argos, and the outcome would certainly be a resumption of hostilities against Athens (36, 1). The Corinthians gladly associated themselves with the Boeotians, Megarians, and Chalcidians in the prosecution of this design (38, 1), and their action shows, as has already been suggested, that their feelings of resentment against Sparta were not very deep. That Sparta should become their ally instead of being their enemy was a most welcome prospect; the objects for which they had been working since the spring were likely to be attained in



a more attractive form than had hitherto seemed possible.<sup>13</sup> But owing to difficulties arising from the Boeotian constitution the scheme proved abortive (38, 2-3), and its failure left the situation unchanged.

The subsequent conclusion of an alliance between Sparta and Boeotia alarmed the Argives: they feared that they would have to face Sparta, Athens, Boeotia, and Tegea, a combination far stronger than their own coalition (40, 3). The suspicious tergiversations of Corinth, whose motives cannot have been intelligible to them, probably afforded a further cause of uneasiness. Hence early in 420 they began to negotiate with Sparta (40-1), regretting their refusal to renew the truce which had expired in the previous year. Soon, however, the growth of anti-Laconian sentiment at Athens and the forceful diplomacy of Alcibiades offered hopes that the Athenians might join the Argive coalition, and this prospect caused the Argives to discontinue their negotiations with Sparta. The long-standing sympathy of the Argives for Athens (44, 1) and their hope of profiting from tension between Athens and Sparta (40, 2) had always been a menace to the Corinthian plan.<sup>14</sup> When the Quadruple Alliance was formed, the Corinthians naturally refused an invitation to join it and began to seek a reconciliation with Sparta (48). A later attempt to win their support, which shows that Argos did not appreciate the bitterness of their antagonism towards Athens, was also unsuccessful (50, 5).

Corinthian diplomacy thus failed utterly. The only compensation of the new alignment was that the entry of Athens into the Argive alliance would increase friction with the Spartans, but the latter could not be expected to embark upon open war with the Athenians so long as Argos, Mantinea, and Elis challenged their authority in the Peloponnese and received intermittent support from Athens. The Corinthians could only wait for more promising times and meanwhile resist Athenian at-

<sup>13</sup> It is conceivable that the plan of the ephors may have been suggested to them by Corinthian envoys who were then at Sparta (36, 1) and must have been aware of the strained relations between Sparta and Athens. But no evidence can be adduced in support of this conjecture.

<sup>14</sup> Nevertheless, the Corinthian view that these Argive sentiments might be overcome was shared by the anti-Athenian party at Sparta, as is seen from the scheme promoted by the two ephors (36).

tempts to humiliate them further (52, 2; 53; 55, 1). The battle of Mantinea substantially improved their position, and in 416, when Athenian relations with Sparta were exceptionally strained, they declared war on Athens (115, 2-3), hoping soon to draw the entire Peloponnesian League into the conflict.

The foregoing interpretation of Corinthian diplomacy receives some support from the policy of Nicias in 421. The suggestion that the Peace should be reinforced by a defensive alliance was put forward by the Spartans, and the advantages which they hoped to derive from it are unequivocally explained by Thucydides (22, 2).<sup>15</sup> On the other hand, the factors which led Nicias and his Conservative followers to welcome the Spartan proposal are somewhat obscure,<sup>16</sup> for the view that he was a philo-Laconian, whose policy resembled that of Cimon, can no longer be maintained.<sup>17</sup> The Athenians sorely needed a breathing-space during which they might build up their damaged resources and fully restore their authority in the empire, especially in Thrace.<sup>18</sup> Quarrels which seemed likely to inflame the Peloponnesians would surely facilitate the attainment of these aims by distracting their former enemies. Why then did they consent to an agreement which rendered them liable to send aid if Laconia were invaded or the Helots revolted (23, 1-3)? Their conduct can be considered reasonable only if their own territory was in danger of invasion and a reciprocal guarantee from Sparta urgently needed. According to Plutarch (*Nic.* 10, 2) Nicias concluded the alliance because Corinth and Boeotia seemed likely to cause a renewal of the war, and modern scholars touch upon the prospect of invasion.<sup>19</sup> But Nicias in a speech delivered some years later implies that these two powers would

<sup>15</sup> The last words of this section are, however, barely intelligible, for the Spartans cannot have feared that the rest of the Peloponnesians would go over to Athens. If this had been likely, the readiness of the Athenians to accept the Spartan alliance would be even more remarkable. Editors have sought to remove the difficulty by emendation or transposition.

<sup>16</sup> Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 467, surely exaggerates the extent to which the alliance would enable Athens to influence Spartan policy.

<sup>17</sup> West, *C. P.*, XIX (1924), p. 228; Neumann, *Klio*, XXIX (1936), p. 38, n. 3.

<sup>18</sup> Glotz, *Histoire grecque*, II, pp. 659-60.

<sup>19</sup> Ferguson, *op. cit.*, p. 256; De Sanctis, *op. cit.*, p. 296.

hardly venture to attack Attica without support from others (Thuc., VI, 10, 3). It is arguable that but for the alliance Sparta might eventually have been persuaded to renounce the Peace; but if Corinth was organising a powerful coalition, including Argos, with the intention of directing it against Athens, the danger was far more pressing. Sparta could not with certainty secure Attica from invasion, as has been pointed out above, but the alliance might serve as a deterrent, and the readiness of the Athenians to assume commitments in return for somewhat problematical advantages shows how seriously the threat was regarded. Among the virtues of Nicias was a capacity for gathering information about the intentions of other states. The Corinthian plan may well have reached his ears and led him to seize the opportunity afforded by the Spartan proposal while his own party remained in power and relations with Sparta were moderately cordial.

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## EURIPIDES AND EUSTATHIUS.

The *παρεκβολαὶ εἰς τὴν Ὀμήρου Ἰλιάδα—Ὀδύσσειαν* of Eustathius contain approximately 325 citations of Euripides. The greater part of these citations are quotations of the text of Euripides and are, further, mainly from five tragedies. The tragedies are cited in the following proportion: *Phoenissae*, 39; *Hecuba*, 60; *Orestes*, 39; *Medea*, 28; *Hippolytus*, 48; *Bacchae*, *Heracidae*, *Alcestis*, once each; *Iphigeneia Taurica*, *Hercules*, *Helen*, twice each; *Iphigeneia Aulidensis*, *Troiades*, *Cyclops*, *Ion*, three times each. The citations include 52 of fragments and 26 references to Euripides in general.

The citation of Euripides by Eustathius, as well as of the multitude of other classical writers, was of course incidental to the main purposes of Eustathius. In the course of the *Commentaries* Euripides is cited for a variety of reasons, but usually primarily for the sake of illustration—of the use or distinction of meaning of a word or phrase, to substantiate a Homeric usage, to distinguish a Homeric and Euripidean usage, for the etymology, accent, or exegesis of a word, to illustrate Euripidean paraphrase or imitation of Homer, to illustrate the use of proverbs by Euripides, for glosses. Judging from the incidental nature of Euripidean citation, one might expect naturally that quotation of Euripides would be highly inaccurate. The degree of accuracy of Eustathius in quoting is an interesting question and a difficult one. For just as there is considerable difference in Eustathius' purpose in citation, so there is considerable difference in his method of citation, a difference doubtless increased by the nature of his book, its extent, and the length of time required for composition. To make clear the manner in which Eustathius cites Euripides and to determine the degree of accuracy attained in the quoting of Euripides, I have attempted to discover in the case of each citation the particular line and play which Eustathius was citing, and then have gathered together citations of a similar nature into several classes.

In the first class are formal, *verbatim* quotations of the text of Euripides which agree in every detail with the best MS tradition of the passage in question. That Eustathius intended

these quotations to be formal and accurate is made clear by the manner of introduction of the quotations—by the use of *εἰπών*, *φησὶ*, *οἶον*, *ἐν τῷ*, etc. The following are the references to formal quotations of Euripides in Eustathius:<sup>1</sup> *Phoenissae* 28 (Eustathius 1205, 52); 45 (381, 20); 45 (909, 28); 108 (239, 24); 283\* (236, 25); 383 (575, 6); 489 (811, 25); 1377-8\* (669, 48); 1406 (647, 9); 1462 (236, 35); 1587 (743, 5). *Hecuba* 21-2 (Eustathius 545, 29; 853, 50; 958, 60; 1271, 64); 64\* (249, 39); 131 (1381, 40); 260\* (1647, 37); 288-9 (1422, 12); 320 (690, 58); 345 (950, 64); 442-3\* (1401, 28); 553 (28, 20); 559 (930, 40); 603 (930, 42); 640\* (55, 15); 736 (1128, 7); 911\* (189, 12); 920 (540, 21); *Orestes* 72 (Eustathius 742, 55); 81 (653, 29); 162 (437, 37); 228 (791, 3); 234\* (1799, 31); 720 (1288, 15); 878 (1264, 19); 919 (1335, 61); 1137 (245, 7); 1205 (687, 53); 1384\* (1276, 15); *Medea* 1 (Eustathius 452, 33; 1248, 56); 1 (1419, 45); 8 (374, 12); 34 (1203, 30); 245\* (739, 34); 262\* (694, 25); 426\* (10, 29); 476 (896, 56; 1379, 59); 613\* (633, 39); 1033 (600, 13); 1164 (146, 29); 1198 (456, 46; 501, 12). *Hippolytus* 88 (21, 20); 201\* (701, 1); 274 (189, 24); 375 (168, 4); 436 (164, 31); 459\* (233, 35); 525-6\* (432, 6); 612 (1175, 29); 632 (170, 6); 948 (484, 15); 1172 (501, 20). *Bacchae* 124 (771, 56); *Hercules* 929 (1401, 12); *Iph. Aul.* 1149-50 (1693, 11); *Iph. Tau.* 1193 (108, 30); *Troïades* 1176-7 (757, 46); *Cyclops* 136 (1485, 31).

A second group of citations are formal, *verbatim* quotations, accurate in every detail. The quotations of this group, however, contain a variant reading which is either possible or probable, or suggests or supports a probable reading. These are as follows: *Phoenissae* 370\* (Eustathius 432, 12); *Hecuba* 260 (1117, 38);

<sup>1</sup> Passages marked with an asterisk furnish additional MS support to suspected or questioned readings. For example, in Eustathius 739, 34 on *Medea* 245, the reading of Eustathius supports *ἄσῃς* of ABL<sup>1</sup> against *ἄρης* V, *ἄσῃς* P, *ἄσῃν* L. In Eustathius 633, 39 on *Medea* 613, Eustathius reads *δράσουσι σ'* with several MSS against *δράσουσιν* of AV. In Eustathius 432, 6 on *Hippolytus* 525, Eustathius reads *ῶς* with AVL<sup>1</sup> sup<sup>1</sup> against *ὅς* of MBN. If the citation of Eustathius is primary, as some of them are, the citation has the value of a twelfth-century MS, provided there is an apparent accuracy in the quotation; if the citation is secondary, as some of them are, the citation has an even greater value, depending upon the quality of the source and accuracy of citation.



337 (1875, 48); 996 (52, 23; 792, 19; 1312, 20); 1090 (358, 31). *Orestes* 87 (146, 12; 809, 36; 1856, 15); 396 (22, 5); *Medea* 120-1 (55, 27); 219-21 (415, 11); 422 (634, 13); 426 (634, 13); 632-3 (568, 24). *Hippolytus* 104 (245, 15); 387 (723, 16); 1189 (599, 24); 1207 (495, 27); 1321-2 (488, 15); *Helen* 59 (30, 34).

A third group of citations are those formal quotations which show an error or inaccuracy when compared with the accepted text of Euripides. In this group the variation is often minor and the quotations otherwise precise even to small details. In the following list, the discrepancy in the quotation of Euripides by Eustathius has been noted in each case for the purpose of permitting a true idea of the manner of quotation: *Phoenissae* 184 (Eustathius 462, 4) *μεγαλάνορα ὑπερηγορίαν* for *μεγαλαγορίαν* (-*ανορίαν* codd.) *ὑπεράνορα*; 501 (569, 14) *ἴσον* for *ἴσον*; 889 (55, 17; 154 34) *ἐστί* (but correctly in 55, 17) for *ἐστι*; *τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* for *τὰγαθοῦ*; 944-5 (500, 34) word order interchanged; 1105 (473, 4) *πυκναῖς* for *πυκναῖσιν*; *ἀσπίσι* for *ἀσπίσιν*; 1128 (473, 4) two words omitted; 1141-2 (344, 14) one word omitted; 1159 (786, 23) *δέ* omitted; 1300 (1021, 42) *φρένα* for *φρέν'*; 1748 (554, 34) *ὀδυρμῶν* for *ὀδυρμάτων*. *Hecuba* 14 (48, 8) two words omitted; 342-4 (129, 13) syncopated; 359-60 (415, 11) syncopated; 607 (55, 18) *τ'* omitted; *Orestes* 42 (519, 43) *δ'* omitted; 55-6 (250, 39) one word omitted; 193 (1428, 22) article added, substitutes Attic for Doric form; 265 (904, 6) *εἰς* for *ἐς*; 981 (1266, 42) *δέ* omitted; 1005 (1713, 7) *τε* omitted; 1205 (727, 34) *δ'* omitted; 1189 (4, 33) *συνλάβετε* for *ξυνλάβεθ'*. *Medea* 13-4 (734, 15) *συμ-* for *ξυμ-*; 618 (682, 47) *γάρ* omitted; *Hippolytus* 374 (82, 35) *γῆς* for *χῶρας*; 914 (156, 15) *γε* omitted; 1126 (468, 42) *ἄκτῆς* for *ἄκτᾶς*; 1329 (1743, 24) *ἀφιστάμεθ'* for *-μεσθ'*; 1340 (737, 5) *γάρ* omitted. *Ion* 59-60 (281, 45).

The next group is a group of adapted quotations, in which Eustathius did not intend to quote accurately. This is clearly proved by the loose manner of citation, and by the way parts of the quotation (in noun and verb construction) are adapted or accommodated to the syntactical requirements of the sentence of Eustathius into which it has been incorporated. These quotations are usually exact in every detail, otherwise, and sometimes appear *verbatim*: *Phoenissae* 1 (Eustathius 447, 1); 210 (1003, 60); 636-7 (776, 53); 805 (650, 49); 1116-7 (182, 27); 1185\*

(683, 60) 1514 (125, 30); 1572\* (612, 20). *Hecuba* 8 (649, 55); 65\* (1815, 11); 71 (173, 16); 294-5 (723, 57); 458 (1556, 29); 570\* (216, 6); 641 (42, 3); 924-5 (454, 15); 926 (690, 42). *Orestes* 12 (1200, 14); 40 (53, 6); 115 (492, 8); 211-2 (982, 44); 234 (1404, 56); 393 (1294, 50); 396 (383, 15); 426 (1051, 53); 554 (1498, 57); 933\* (319, 46). *Medea* 187 (160, 13); 679 (1303, 34); 1123 (1515, 21); 1176 (643, 39). *Hippolytus* 69 (436, 34); 121 (353, 16); 136 (438, 25); 214 (210, 44); 646 (427, 27); 762 (427, 27); 843 (640, 6); 1135 (599, 22); 1168 (500, 8); 1229 (427, 27); 1234 (598, 27); 1237 (384, 4); 1254 (633, 34); 1254 (832, 31); 1302 (502, 32). *Alcestis* 607-8 (707, 38).

There is a further group of citations which may be termed "allusions," in which Eustathius refers to the use of a word or to a situation, but does not quote the passage at all. These are: *Phoenissae* 28 (Eustathius 160, 5); 160 (1367, 25); 574 (666, 36); 838 (419, 5); 1124-5 (269, 35); 1407 (331, 34); general references, Eustathius 381, 20; 394, 11. *Hecuba* 3 (840, 33); 3 (643, 29); 101 (918, 50); 288 (152, 45); 320 (462, 16); 421 (1361, 18); 451-2 (1695, 40); 458 (1557, 54); 525 (1956, 34); 525 (1653, 27); 555 (25, 42); 600 (519, 41); 699 (384, 23); 699 (1405, 49); 922 (904, 59); 945 (379, 35); general references, Eustathius 242, 22; 694, 14; 953, 3; 1214, 64; 1288, 33; 1361, 18; 1519, 40; 1805, 36. *Orestes* 5 (1700, 22); 213 (22, 34); 265 (1528, 28); 275 (1636, 49); 1287 (1374, 65); 1639-41 (20, 14). *Medea* 352 (170, 45); 906\* (217, 3); *Hippolytus* 231 (361, 22 and 26); 452 (262, 23); 643 (646, 2); 736 (405, 34); 763 (690, 41); 1168 (401, 10); 1254 (633, 22); general references, Eustathius 161, 45; 170, 9; 1081, 19; 1565, 8; 1688, 20; 1932, 14. *Cyclops* 104 (1455, 34). *Ion* 171 (131, 22); 453 (1861, 43); *Iph. Aul.* 216 (342, 36). *Iph. Tau.* 439 (918, 50). *Troïades* 1257 (1242, 45). General references, to the *Cyclops*, Eustathius 1850, 38; to *Iph. Aul.*, 57, 31 and 185, 5; to *Helen*, 401, 10; to *Heracidae*, 284, 34; to *Hercules*, 815, 11; to *Troïades*, 975, 31.

The citations of the fragments reveal much the same methods of citation as those of the extant plays. The references are as follows:

Fragments whose sources are found in Eustathius alone: *Fr.* 106 Nauck (Eustathius 656, 58; 1234, 42; 1640, 60; 1681, 42);

107 (1607, 4; 1902, 1); 366 (1720, 26); 628 (1564, 35); 693 (107, 31); 762 (959, 43); 775 (1731, 55); 927 (566, 15).

Formal quotations: Fr. 15, 2 (Eustathius 173, 1); 146 (1632, 9); 189 (1192, 48); 200, 3 (240, 42); 207 (1799, 54); 282, 1-2 (1299, 20); 327, 6 (892, 39); 379 (1775, 19); 467 (1532, 16); 579 (236, 30); 631 (1170, 59); 639 (789, 16); 830 (1090, 51); 888 (1084, 2; 1397, 19); 892 (868, 34); 895 (1596, 43); 896 (883, 62); 898, 9-13 (978, 23); 899 (1301, 33); 1014 (641, 59); 1015 (1412, 16); 1086 (887, 5); 1111 (695, 44; 903, 51; 1003, 24).

Adapted quotations: Fr. 15, 2 (Eustathius 399, 11); 73 (1430, 63); 367 (1058, 5); 473 (1356, 63); 495 (1837, 1); 516 (770, 22); 631 (1170, 53); 907 (867, 64); 968 (1467, 31).

Allusions: p. 621 Nauck (763, 12); Fr. 369, 1 (1793, 40); 633 (1761, 40); 680 (592, 21); 1098 (1910, 48).

There are then a large group of citations to Euripides which cannot be identified with a specific passage or play, but refer generally to Euripides. I have included here with the references the subject of each citation, which will illustrate pretty well the scope of the subjects of the whole group of citations from Euripides. These are: on his beginning his dramas *in medias res*, as Homer begins his epics, Eustathius 7, 37; on the distinction of *δέμας* and *σῶμα*, Eustathius 61, 40; on the use of *τρίβος*, 74, 3; on the use of *μέτα*, 74, 45; on the manner of supplication in Euripides, 129, 3; on the use of *λελησμένος*, 264, 26; of *ῥχημα*, 375, 6; on the repetition of *πολλὰ μορφαὶ τῶν δαιμονίων* (in *Al.* 1162, *An.* 1285, *Bac.* 1386, *Hel.* 1704), 476, 31; on the use of *πέπλος*, 599, 45; on Sthenoboea, 632, 6; on the use of *νάπη* and *νάπος*, 668, 34; on Agamemnon, 674, 55; on the Euripidean use of *φῶς ἡλίου*, 729, 55; on the use of beaks of ships as trophies, 750, 35; on the use of *χρῆν*, 751, 53 and 1179, 39; on Euripides' blame of the Trojans, 822, 3; on the similarity of a passage in Homer to an Euripidean prologue, 1006, 5; on Euripides' loquaciousness, 1128, 21; on the use of *λίνος* and *αἶλινος*, 1164, 9; on Euripides' life, 1205, 20; on *ἀστράγαλοι*, 1289, 61 and 1379, 39; on the two aspects of *αἰδώς*, 1338, 28; on the use of *ἦνεγκα*, 1435, 66; a comparison of Homeric and Euripidean *anagnorisis*, 1495, 7; also, 1593, 45; 1834, 22.

Finally, there is a citation from the Euripidean recension of Homer—the addition of a line after *Il.*, 2, 866, Eustathius 366,

13; three citations of passages in comedy mentioning Euripides: Plato Com., Fr. 30 (Eustathius 813, 47); Diphilus, Fr. 60 (Eustathius 1205, 20); Aristophanes' *Frogs* 91 (Eustathius 1226, 16); and a line assigned to Euripides by Eustathius which is to be identified with Aeschylus' *Choephoroe* 773 (Eustathius 1013, 12).<sup>2</sup>

The quotations of the text of Euripides, as I mentioned above, furnish a number of variant readings. In the list of these variants below, I have included only those displaying some degree of possibility or probability, or supporting a probable reading, and, with a few exceptions, those which are unique to Eustathius:

- Hecuba* 260 (1179, 38) ἀνθρωποκτονεῖν (with P) for ἀνθρωποσφαγεῖν (codd. and Eustathius 1647, 37)
- “ 337 (1875, 48) ὥς τ' for ὥστ'
- “ 360 (415, 11) τύχοιμι for τύχοιμ' ἄν
- “ 996 (52, 23; 792, 19; 1312, 30) τοῦ (with P) for τῶν
- “ 1090 (358, 31) εὖοπλον for ἐνοπλον
- Phoen.* 370 (432, 12) ἔχω for ἔχων
- “ 805 (650, 49) ἐπίσημον (with P) for ἐπίσαμον
- “ 1116 (182, 27) ξύν (with P) for σύν
- Orestes* 87 (146, 12; 809, 36; 1856, 14) ἦκεις for ἦκετον
- “ 234 (1404, 56) ἡδύ (with P) for γλυκύ
- “ 396 (22, 5) ξύνεσις for σύνεσις
- “ 933 (319, 46) Δαναοὶ δέ (δαναοὶ δέ P) for Δαναΐδαι
- “ 1005 (1713, 7) πελειάδος for πλειάδος
- Medea* 120 (55, 27) ὀργήν for ὀργάς
- “ 219 (415, 11) ἔστιν ἐν for ἐνεστιν
- “ 220 (415, 11) ἐκμάθη (ἐκμάθοι L) for ἐκμαθεῖν
- “ 422 (634, 13) ὑμνοῦσαι (ὑμνέουσαι v) for ὑμνεῦσαι
- “ 426 (634, 13) ὕμνοι (with B<sup>2</sup> suprascr.) for ὕμνον (ὕμνοις V, corr. v)
- “ 632 (568, 24) ἐφίης (ἐφίης V L) for ἐφείης
- “ 633 (568, 24) οἰστόν for οἰστόν

<sup>2</sup>I have ventured to describe in some detail the manner in which Eustathius cites Euripides on account of the uncertainty which surrounds Eustathius' method generally. It is reasonable to suppose that Eustathius cited other authors in general in the same fashion as has been illustrated in the case of Euripides.

- Hipp.* 104 (245, 15) μέλοι for μέλει  
 " 387 (723, 16) ταῦτά (ταῦτ' L) for ταῦτ'  
 " 1189 (599, 24) ἀρβύλησιν (with B. N. Haun.) for ἀρβύ-  
 λαισιν  
 " 1207 (495, 27) οὐρανόν for οὐρανῶ  
 " 1321 (488, 15) μάντεως for μάντεων  
 " 1322 (488, 15) ἐνειμας (with P H) for παρέσχεσ (γ'  
 ἐνειμας L P<sup>2</sup>)  
*Alcest.* 608 (707, 38) ἐς (εις V B) for πρός  
*Helen* 59 (30, 34) λέχος for λέκτρ'  
*Ion* 59 (281, 45) Χαλκωδοντιάδαις (χαλκωδοντίδαις L corr.)  
 for χαλκωδοντίδαις P et prim. L.  
 Fr. 693 (107, 31) φίλον Eust., om. rell.  
 Fr. 693 (107, 31) ἔκτεινε (with *Etym. Flor.*) for ἐγείρει  
 Fr. 146 (1632, 9) ἔρροι for ἔρρει  
 Fr. 892 (868, 34) καίτοι for ἐπεί  
 Fr. 1014 (641, 59) οὐκ ἔτη for οὐκέτι

An examination of the citations of Euripides by Eustathius will convince one of the extent and depth of Eustathius' familiarity with Euripides, and, on the whole, of a rather remarkable accuracy in his quotation of the text of Euripides. The distribution of the citations of Euripides, as stated above, points very clearly, in my judgment, to the fact that Eustathius used a MS of Euripides containing the five plays from which the bulk of the citations are made.

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## APOLLO AND THE SUN-GOD IN OVID.

A century ago Karl Otfried Müller perceived that Apollo was not the Greek sun-god and that the two deities were not commonly identified until Hellenistic or Roman times.<sup>1</sup> His discovery was so contrary to the prevailing view of his times that it gained acceptance but slowly through the course of the nineteenth century, in the latter part of which it had to make its way against the solar-myth theories of Max Müller and his school, who gave a new lease of life to the concept of Apollo as primarily a sun-god.<sup>2</sup> But Otfried Müller's theory has the evidence on its side, and today no one can seriously dispute that Apollo was not originally a sun-god.<sup>3</sup> Those who like a solar Apollo can do no more than follow Gruppe in giving as early a date as possible to the identification of Apollo with the sun. Even so, they must admit that the identification was not common until Hellenistic times at the earliest.

But everyone has thought that by the first century B. C. the literary identification of the two gods was complete. To Gruppe, for instance, the identification of Apollo with the sun is so frequent in Latin poets that he considers it unnecessary to cite

<sup>1</sup> *Die Dorier*, I, pp. 286-291. I am indebted to Professors I. M. Linforth and G. M. Calhoun for valuable criticisms and suggestions made during the preparation of this article, which is a revision of a paper that I read before the annual meeting of the Philological Association of the Pacific Coast on November 25, 1938, at Palo Alto. A résumé of the paper appears in *P. A. P. A.*, LXIX (1938), pp. xxxvi f.

<sup>2</sup> F. Max Müller, *Contributions to the science of mythology* (London, New York; Longmans, Green; 1897), I, pp. 91, 123, 404. On Apollo interpreted as a sun-god or light-god see also W. H. Roscher, *Apollon und Mars* (Leipzig, Engelmann, 1873), pp. 16-18, and "Apollon," *Myth. Lex.*, I, pp. 422 f.; P. Decharme, *Mythologie de la Grèce antique* (Paris, Garnier, 1884), pp. 99 f.; F. Froehde, "Ἀπόλλων," *Beiträge zur Kunde der indogermanischen Sprachen*, XIX (1893), pp. 231 f.; F. Preller, *Griechische Mythologie* (Berlin, Weidmann, 1894), I, pp. 230 f.; Rapp, "Helios," *Myth. Lex.*, I, p. 1996.

<sup>3</sup> See K. Wernicke, "Apollon," *P.-W.*, II, 19-21; Jessen, "Helios," *ibid.*, VIII, 75 f.; L. R. Farnell, *Cults of the Greek States* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1896-1909), IV, pp. 136-144; O. Gruppe, *Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte* (Munich, C. H. Beck, 1906), pp. 1240-1244; H. J. Rose, *Handbook of Greek Mythology* (New York, Dutton; London, Methuen; 1928), pp. 33 f., 134.

passages in evidence.<sup>4</sup> Of the Latin poets, Ovid in particular, who has so much to say about Apollo, is all but universally supposed to have treated Apollo and the sun as one and the same god.<sup>5</sup> A few commentators neither affirm nor deny this, but speak of Apollo in their remarks on Ovid's Apolline stories and of Sol in their notes on solar stories.<sup>6</sup> But the great majority of commentators do not hesitate to affirm that Ovid identifies the two gods; and this view runs through all schooltexts and handbooks.

At first sight it would seem impossible to deny that in Ovid's eyes Apollo is the god who every day drives the sun-chariot across the sky, preceded by Aurora and attended by the Hours. For Ovid is largely responsible for the prevalence in modern times of the idea that Apollo was a sun-god. His influence upon Renaissance and later poets, who abound in allusions to Apollo as the sun, is well known.<sup>7</sup> Bulfinch and Gayley based their handbooks of mythology chiefly upon Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, and they have given several generations of schoolchildren an almost ineradicable conviction that Apollo is the sun-god. If the question should be asked whether Ovid calls the sun-god Apollo or gives Apollo the name Sol and solar attributes, the immediate response of almost any classical scholar, I think, would be that he does. Let us not answer so hastily, but rather look to see

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 1240, note 3; see also Farnell, *op. cit.*, p. 137; Wernicke, *loc. cit.*, 19.

<sup>5</sup> See the following editions of Ovid's works: *Metamorphoses*: M. Haupt (Berlin, Weidmann, 1903), p. 64; F. J. Miller (London, New York; *L. C. L.*; 1916), II, pp. 438, 484, 492. *Fasti*: R. Cornali (Turin, Loescher, 1897-1902), II, p. 24; J. G. Frazer (London, Macmillan, 1929), III, pp. 91 f.; V, p. 2. *Tristia, Ex Ponto*: A. L. Wheeler (London, New York; *L. C. L.*; 1924), p. 493. Among the numerous school editions that identify Apollo and the sun-god may be mentioned the following: *Selections*: J. N. Anderson, C. W. Bain, Golling-Fritsch, Charles Knapp (*Vergil and Ovid*), Greenough-Kittredge-Jenkins (*Virgil and other Latin poets*). *Metamorphoses*: Siebelis-Polle-Stange, Meuser-Egen, J. Lejard, F. Harder, R. S. Lang (Book XII). *Fasti*: G. H. Hallam.

<sup>6</sup> See V. Fabricius, *De diis fato Joveque in P. Ovidii Nasonis operibus quae supersunt* (Leipzig, G. Fock, 1898), pp. 4, 7, 19-22; F. W. Kelsey, *Selections from Ovid* (Boston, Allyn and Bacon, 1897), pp. 30 f.; A. Lange, *Methodischer Lehrer-Kommentar zu Ovids Metamorphosen* (Gotha, Friedrich Andreas Perthes, 1892), I, pp. 93-119.

<sup>7</sup> See E. K. Rand, *Ovid and his influence* (New York, Longmans, Green, 1928), pp. 150-167.

whether Apollo was unmistakably recognised as a sun-god by Ovid, whether he clearly links Apollo with the myths, epithets, functions, and attributes of the sun-god, or the sun-god with those of Apollo.

At the outset the distinction between Apolline and solar stories in Ovid's works must be made clear. The Apolline stories involve the god whom the Greeks called Phoebus Apollo and whom they did not regard as a sun-god; either these stories are found in extant Greek writings of the centuries before Ovid's time or the god that appears in them is clearly identified by Ovid with the Apollo of Greek Apolline stories.<sup>8</sup> The solar stories are those that involve the god whom the Greeks called Helios Hyperion. In each group we must notice what epithets are given to the god, what his provinces and attributes are, with whom he is associated, and where he is chiefly worshipped.

The Apolline stories that Ovid treats at some length are:<sup>9</sup> the slaying of Python (*M.*, 1, 438-451); Daphne (*M.*, 1, 452-567; see *S.*, 25; *P.*, 2, 2, 80); Coronis and the birth of Aesculapius (*M.*, 2, 542-632; see *F.*, 1, 291); Mercury's theft of Apollo's kine (*M.*, 2, 676-686; *F.*, 5, 692); Cadmus' consultation at Delphi (*M.*, 3, 8-18, 130); Niobe (*M.*, 6, 146-312; see *T.*, 5, 1, 57 f.); Marsyas (*M.*, 6, 383-400; *F.*, 6, 703-708); Cyparissus (*M.*, 10, 106-142); Hyacinth (*M.*, 10, 162-219); contest with Pan (*M.*, 11, 153-179); building of the walls of Troy (*M.*, 11, 194-210; see *H.*, 1, 67; 15, 180); Chione and Daedalion (*M.*, 11, 301-345); death of Achilles (*M.*, 12, 580-611; see *M.*, 13, 501; *H.*, 8, 83); Aeneas' consultation of the Delian Apollo (*M.*, 13, 630-679); the Cumaean Sibyl (*M.*, 14, 129-153); the oracle to the Romans on Aesculapius (*M.*, 15, 626-643); Apollo and the raven (*F.*, 2, 247-266). Several other stories are briefly summarised or alluded to: Apollo's metamorphosis into a crow in Egypt (*M.*, 5, 329 f.); the seduction of Isse and other maids (*M.*, 6, 122-

<sup>8</sup> Such stories as those of Cyparissus, Aeneas' consultation of the Delian oracle, Apollo and the Cumaean Sibyl are not found in earlier Greek writers. No doubt the Latin poets took some of them from Alexandrian writers whose works no longer exist.

<sup>9</sup> For citations of Ovid's works I shall make use of the following abbreviations: *A.*, *Amores*. *A.A.*, *Ars Amatoria*. *F.*, *Fasti*. *H.*, *Heroides*. *I.*, *Ibis*. *M.*, *Metamorphoses*. *P.*, *Epistulae ex Ponto*. *R.*, *Remedia Amoris*. *S.*, *Epistula Sapphus*.

124); metamorphoses of Cephisus' grandson and of Eumelus' son (*M.*, 7, 388-390); the tuneful walls of Megara (*M.*, 8, 14-16); Orpheus' head and the Lesbian serpent (*M.*, 11, 56-60); the oracle to the Romans on the Idaean mother (*F.*, 4, 263 f.); Ilus' consultation on the Palladium (*F.*, 6, 425-428); the death of Aesculapius (*F.*, 6, 759-762); the tending of Admetus' flocks (*A. A.*, 2, 239-241); Apollo as defender of Troy (*T.*, 1, 2, 5); Psamathe and Crotopus (*I.*, 571 f.).

Ovid calls the god of these stories Phoebus forty-six times, Apollo eleven times, Delius six times, Latona's son five times; arquitekens, Delphicus, Paeon, Smintheus, twice each; Cynthius, intonsus, and fatidicus deus, once each.<sup>10</sup>

Apollo appears as the god of the bow (*M.*, 1, 441, 457-460, 519, 559; 2, 603, 615 f.; 6, 227-266; 10, 108, 170; 12, 596, 606; 13, 501; 15, 634. *H.*, 8, 83), as the god of prophecy (*M.*, 1, 491, 517 f.; 3, 8-18, 130; 10, 209; 13, 650, 677-679; 15, 630-641. *F.*, 2, 262; 4, 263 f.; 6, 425-428), as the god of music and poetry (*M.*, 1, 518, 559; 2, 601, 682 f.; 6, 384; 8, 15 f.; 10, 108, 170, 205; 11, 155, 165-171, 317. *F.*, 6, 707. *H.*, 15, 180), as god of medicine (*M.*, 1, 521-524; 2, 617 f.; 10, 187-189; 15, 626-643), and as a herdsman-god (*M.*, 2, 679-685; 6, 122-124. *F.*, 5, 692. *A. A.*, 2, 239-241).

His attributes are the bow as archer-god, the lyre as god of music, the tripod as god of prophecy, and the laurel (*M.*, 1, 450, 558 f.; 2, 600; 11, 165; 15, 634. *P.*, 2, 2, 80). He has long, flowing locks (*M.*, 1, 450, 564; 12, 585). His birds are the raven or crow (*M.*, 2, 544 f., 596, 632; 5, 329. *F.*, 2, 249-266) and the hawk (*M.*, 6, 123; 11, 344). He wears a purple mantle while playing the lyre, which is inlaid with gems and Indian ivory (*M.*, 11, 166 f.). He once wore a lion's skin (*M.*, 6, 123).

He is the son of Jupiter (*M.*, 1, 517; 12, 586. *F.*, 6, 761) and of Latona (see Appendix), the brother of Diana (*M.*, 5, 330; 6, 160, 215 f.), the father of Aesculapius (*M.*, 2, 629 f.; 15, 639-643. *F.*, 1, 291; 6, 761), Orpheus (*M.*, 10, 167), and Philammon (*M.*, 11, 316 f.). His loves among women are Daphne, Coronis, Isse, Chione, the Cumaean Sibyl, and Psamathe; among men, Cyparissus and Hyacinth. He is associated with Neptune in the building of the walls of Troy (*M.*, 11, 202; 12, 587), and he

<sup>10</sup> For all citations on names and epithets see Appendix, *infra* pp. 443 f.

entrusts the child Aesculapius to Chiron (*M.*, 2, 630). Favored mortals are Cadmus (*M.*, 3, 8-18), Daedalion (*M.*, 11, 339-343), and Admetus (*A. A.*, 2, 239).

Delos is his birthplace (*M.*, 6, 191 f. *F.*, 5, 692), and is especially favored by him (see Appendix on epithet *Delius*). He also loves Delphi, seat of his great oracle (*M.*, 1, 515; 10, 167 f.; 11, 165, 304; 15, 631), and he is the lord of Claros, Tenedos, and Pataros (*M.*, 1, 516). He also favors Troy (*M.*, 11, 194-205; 12, 587. *H.*, 1, 67; 15, 180. *T.*, 1, 2, 5) and Megara (*M.*, 8, 14-16).

Apollo is often busy on earth in the daytime; this would be difficult if he had to spend the whole day driving the sun-chariot. When Apollo and Hyacinth begin their game, Titan is midway in his course (*M.*, 10, 174). Here is a clear distinction between Titan in the sky and Apollo in Laconia.

We see, in short, that in Ovid's narration of the Apolline stories the god differs in no way from the conception of him that is current in the Greek literature of earlier centuries.

Ovid tells the following major stories that involve the sun-god: Phaethon (*M.*, 1, 750-2, 400); the love of Mars and Venus (*M.*, 4, 169-189. *A. A.*, 2, 561-588); Leucothoe and Clytie (two stories woven together, *M.*, 4, 190-270). To these may be added the brief participation of the sun-god in three other stories: Medea's flight from Corinth on the dragon-chariot given her by the sun (*M.*, 7, 398); Ceres' consultation of the sun in her search for Proserpine (*F.*, 4, 581-584); the sun's turning back in his course at the sight of Thyestes' crime (*A. A.*, 1, 327-330. *T.*, 2, 391 f. *P.*, 4, 6, 47 f. *I.*, 427 f.). These are few in comparison with the Apolline stories; but the Phaethon story is very long, the three told in the fourth book of the *Metamorphoses* cover a considerable section of the book, and one of them is also told at moderate length in the *Ars Amatoria*; so that it is possible to learn a good deal about the sun-god from them.

He is called Sol twenty-two times, Phoebus six times; Hyperione natus and Titan, twice each; auctor lucis, lux mundi, volucrum moderator equorum, once each. He is never called Apollo, and the only name that is common to the gods of the two groups of stories is Phoebus.

The god of the solar stories is above all the driver of the sun-chariot (see the Phaethon story *passim*; also *A. A.*, 1, 330. *T.*, 2, 392. *P.*, 4, 6, 48. *I.*, 428); only he of all beings can guide



the horses of the sun (*M.*, 2, 57-62). He is the god that sees everything:

oculis quibus adspicit omnia (*M.*, 2, 32)

omnia qui video, per quem videt omnia tellus (*M.*, 4, 227).<sup>11</sup>

But he never looks upon the realm of the dead (*M.*, 2, 46). He has a palace in the far east where the sun rises, beyond the Aethiopians and the Indians (*M.*, 1, 773-779).

His chief attribute is the crown of rays (*M.*, 2, 40 f., 124); he wears purple raiment and sits upon an emerald throne when in his eastern palace (*M.*, 2, 23 f.). Such is his brilliance when garbed as the sun-god that Phaethon cannot approach him. His palace is fashioned of gold, bronze, and ivory; on the doors the twelve signs of the Zodiac are represented, as well as a sketch of the whole universe (*M.*, 2, 1-18). His animals are the horse that draws his chariot, the serpent (*M.*, 7, 398), and the swan, as seen in the Cygnus story (*M.*, 2, 367-380). The poplar tree, identified with the Heliades, is associated with him (*M.*, 2, 344-366; see 10, 91, 263).

This god is the son of Hyperion (*M.*, 4, 192, 241); therefore he is called Titan. He is the brother of the moon-goddess (*M.*, 2, 208), the father of Phaethon, Circe (*M.*, 4, 205), and the Heliades (*M.*, 2, 340). His loves are Clymene (*M.*, 1, 753-756; 2, 43; 4, 204), Leucothoe (*M.*, 4, 196-255), Clytie (*M.*, 4, 206-208, 234 f., 256-270), Rhode (*M.*, 4, 204), and Perse (*M.*, 4, 205). His attendants are the Day, Month, Year, Centuries, Hours, and Seasons (*M.*, 2, 25-30, 118 f.). He is closely associated with Aurora (*M.*, 2, 113, 144), Lucifer (*M.*, 2, 115), and the minor deities of the sea, into which he sinks at evening: Tethys looses his horses in the morning (*M.*, 2, 156 f.) and receives him at night in the west (*M.*, 2, 68 f.); and the figures of Triton, Proteus, Aegaeon, Doris, and the Nereids, are carved upon his palace doors (*M.*, 2, 8-14).

In all this the Sol or Phoebus that rules the sun is recognisable as the Helios of Greek myth. There is little resemblance between this god and the Apollo of the first group of stories out-

<sup>11</sup> See also *M.*, 4, 172, 195. *F.*, 4, 581-584. Apollo knows everything as god of oracles; Sol sees everything from his position in the heavens. There is no indication, either in language or context, that there is any identification of function in this respect.

side of the fact that both are called Phoebus. We must now study the many passing references and allusions that Ovid makes to Apollo and to the sun when he is not telling a story about them. These brief passages can be divided into those that obviously refer to a solar deity or to the Greek Helios and those that do not.

The non-solar god is called Phoebus forty-eight times, Apollo twenty-one times, Paeon four times, Leucadius three times, Actiacus and Clarius, twice each; Delphicus, laurigerus, intonsus deus, saluber, stirps Letoia, canorus, flavus, domesticus, once each. Again he appears often as the god of the bow (*M.*, 8, 31. *A.*, 3, 3, 29. *R.*, 705. *P.*, 4, 8, 75 f. *S.*, 23), of oracles (*M.*, 13, 410; 15, 143-145. *F.*, 1, 20; 2, 713; 3, 855 f. *A.*, 3, 2, 51. *A.*, 2, 496; 3, 789. *T.*, 4, 8, 43; 5, 12, 15. *I.*, 125 f., 262), of music and poetry (*A.*, 1, 1, 11 f. and 16; 1, 3, 11; 1, 15, 35 f.; 2, 18, 34; 3, 8, 23; 3, 12, 18. *A. A.*, 1, 25; 2, 493 f.; 3, 142, 347. *R.*, 76, 251 f., 489 f., 705, 767. *T.*, 3, 2, 3 f.; 5, 3, 57. *P.*, 4, 8, 75 f. *S.*, 23), and of medicine (*M.*, 15, 533-535, 742. *F.*, 3, 827. *R.*, 76, 704. *T.*, 3, 3, 10; 4, 3, 78). His attributes are the bow, lyre, tripod (*A. A.*, 3, 789), and laurel (*F.*, 3, 139; 6, 91. *A. A.*, 2, 495 f. *R.*, 75. *T.*, 3, 1, 39; 4, 2, 51). He has beautiful and unshorn locks as the god of manly beauty (*M.*, 3, 421. *F.*, 2, 106. *A.*, 1, 1, 11; 1, 14, 31. *T.*, 3, 1, 60). There are references to his mother Latona (*T.*, 3, 2, 3), his sister Diana (*M.*, 15, 550. *F.*, 6, 111. *A.*, 2, 5, 27. *R.*, 200. *P.*, 3, 2, 48), his sister Minerva (*A. A.*, 1, 745), his sons Aesculapius (*M.*, 15, 533, 742), Orpheus (*M.*, 11, 8), and Miletus (*M.*, 9, 444, 455, 663). He loved the maidens Deione (*M.*, 9, 443 f.) and Cassandra (*M.*, 13, 410. *T.*, 2, 400). He is associated with the Muses and Bacchus (*A.*, 1, 3, 11; 3, 8, 23; 3, 12, 17 f. *A. A.*, 3, 347 f. *T.*, 3, 2, 3 f.). Mopsus is a favored mortal (*M.*, 8, 350-354). Favored cities and localities are Delphi (*M.*, 15, 144. *F.*, 3, 856. *A.*, 1, 15, 35 f. *T.*, 4, 8, 43), Delos (*A. A.*, 2, 80), Claros (*A. A.*, 2, 80. *F.*, 1, 20), Tenedos, Chryse, Cilla (these three in *M.*, 13, 174), Miletus (*M.*, 9, 443-449), Actium (*M.*, 13, 715. *S.*, 165 f. *T.*, 3, 1, 42; 5, 2, 76), Apollonia-on-Pontus (*T.*, 1, 10, 35), and Rome, where he is worshipped on the Palatine (*M.*, 15, 865. *F.*, 4, 951. *A. A.*, 3, 119, 389. *T.*, 2, 25; 3, 1, 60).

The scattered passages that refer to the sun-god are very

numerous and mostly of one type: poetic references to the course of the sun across the sky or to the passage of days, as often in the *Fasti* in passages like the following couplet that describes the transition from April 2 to April 4:

Ter sine perpetuo caelum versetur in axe,  
ter jungat Titan terque resolvat equos (*F.*, 4, 179 f.).

A few passages are references to Circe or Pasiphae as daughters of the sun, and the like.

In these passages the sun-god is called Phoebus twenty-nine times, Sol twenty-one times, Titan fifteen times, Hyperion four times, nitidus (deus) three times; Cynthus and magnus, twice each; candidus, celer deus, pater Heliadum, once each. As in the myths he is the driver of the sun-chariot (e. g. *F.*, 1, 652; 2, 73 f.; 3, 109, 415 f., 518; 4, 180, 688) and the god that sees everything (*M.*, 13, 852 f.; 14, 375). He cannot abide the approach of an underworld goddess, Tisiphone (*M.*, 4, 488), and he never penetrates the caverns of Sleep (*M.*, 11, 594 f.). He has two homes, one in the east and one in the west (*H.*, 9, 16), and he starts his course from Ocean's stream (*F.*, 3, 415). He wears a crown of rays (*F.*, 1, 385). The day that he bears in his car is purple (*F.*, 3, 518; see also *M.*, 15, 193), whence the color of his raiment. He is the brother of the moon-goddess, called Luna, Phoebe, or Titania (*M.*, 1, 11. *F.*, 3, 110. *H.*, 11, 45. *I.*, 107, 210), and of Diana, who is identified with the moon (*M.*, 2, 454; 15, 196). He is the father of Circe (*M.*, 13, 968; 14, 10, 33, 346, 376, 382, 438. *R.*, 276), Pasiphae (*M.*, 9, 736. *H.*, 10, 91), and the Heliades (*F.*, 6, 717), and the grandfather of Medea (*M.*, 7, 209). He is associated with the Year (*F.*, 1, 164), Aurora (*M.*, 15, 191), and Lucifer (*M.*, 15, 189. *T.*, 3, 5, 55 f.). He is worshipped at Rhodes (*M.*, 7, 365) and at Helio-polis in Egypt (*M.*, 15, 406 f.).

From the entire analysis of both myths and allusions we see that there are few points of resemblance between the two gods. Both are called Phoebus and Cynthus; Diana is called sister of both; both wear purple raiment; the gems and Indian ivory of Apollo's lyre suggest the riches of the sun's palace in the orient; and the serpent is linked with both. Only the mutual epithets and the link with Diana are significant; for a few resemblances in attributes can be found between any two gods.

It was also the practice of Virgil and other Latin poets to apply the name Phoebeus to the sun-god.<sup>12</sup> This epithet, we know from Greek literature, properly belongs to Apollo; it means "bright," "pure," "radiant." As Otfried Müller and Farnell have shown, it has nothing to do with the sun.<sup>13</sup> Yet its meaning makes it a fit epithet for the sun-god too. Perhaps the practice of calling the sun Phoebeus had already arisen among Alexandrian poets, though I know of no instance; whereas the Latin poets do so very often. Perhaps such expressions as Aeschylus' ἡλίου φοίβη φλογί (*Pr.* 22) had an influence upon the poets who started this practice.

When Ovid calls the sun *nitidus* or *candidus* he is simply translating *Phoebeus* into Latin. But he no more thought Apollo and the sun the same because he called both Phoebeus than he thought Pyrrha, Diana, Latona, and Circe, the same because he called each Titania.<sup>14</sup>

More serious is the fact that Ovid calls the sun-god Cynthus in identical lines in the *Fasti* (3, 346, 353). The text appears sound; there are only variations of spelling in late and inferior manuscripts.<sup>15</sup> Now to call the god Cynthus appears to be equivalent to calling him Delius, and this would seem to be an identification of Apollo with the sun. Yet it is difficult to suppose that Ovid means to identify the two gods in this one passage, when he treats them so differently elsewhere. It is important to observe that the name used here is Cynthus, not Apollo or Delphicus or Latona's son. Elsewhere Ovid uses this name but once for Apollo (*A. A.*, 2, 239), and it is occasionally given to Apollo by other Latin poets.<sup>16</sup> We must inquire whether it is not possible that Ovid thought Cynthus a suitable epithet for a sun-god not identified with Apollo.

We have noticed that he calls Apollo *Cynthus* only once; but he calls Diana *Cynthia* six times.<sup>17</sup> If one makes an analysis of Ovid's treatment of Diana and of the moon-goddess, one sees

<sup>12</sup> See e. g. *Aen.*, 4, 6.

<sup>13</sup> See the citations in notes 1 and 3 *supra*.

<sup>14</sup> See *M.*, 1, 395; 3, 173; 6, 346; 14, 382, 438.

<sup>15</sup> See Merkel's critical apparatus in his edition of the *Fasti* (Berlin, G. Reimer, 1841).

<sup>16</sup> See Virgil, *Ecl.*, 6, 3; *Georg.*, 3, 36.

<sup>17</sup> *M.*, 2, 465; 7, 755; 15, 537. *F.*, 2, 91, 159. *H.*, 17, 74.

that though Ovid usually treated the two goddesses as though they were distinct, he does nevertheless positively identify them. In *M.*, 15, 196 he calls the moon *nocturna Diana*. In *M.*, 3, 173 *Diana*, in the course of the Actaeon story, is called *Titania*. It is more likely that she is called this because the moon-goddess was one of the Titan race than because her mother Latona was a Titaness and is called *Titania* (*M.*, 6, 346). The moon is called *Titania* for the same reason that the sun is called *Titan*. In *H.*, 17, 74 the moon is called *Cynthia*. But most important of all is *M.*, 2, 454, in the course of the Callisto story, where *Diana* is treated in her usual character of virgin huntress. The goddess, fatigued with the chase and the heat, comes to a cool grove and pleasant stream:

cum dea venatu fraternis languida flammis  
nacta nemus gelidum. . . .

There can be no doubt that the brother referred to is the sun. But it is probable that Ovid uses *fraternis flammis* with reference to *Diana's* lunar character only, since the moon has been mentioned in the preceding verse: *orbe resurgebant lunaria cornua nono*; and a little earlier (*M.*, 2, 208) he has used a like phrase of the sun's relation to the moon:

inferiusque suis fraternos currere Luna  
admiratur equos, . . .

Ovid's identification of *Diana* with *Luna* does not imply that he identified *Apollo* with *Sol*. For *Diana* had become closely associated with the moon and *Hecate* in the *triformis dea*. In *F.*, 1, 387 she is called *triplex Diana*; see *H.*, 12, 79: *per triplicis vultus arcanaque sacra Dianae*. Virgil speaks of *tergeminaeque Hecaten, tria virginis ora Dianae*.<sup>18</sup> Ovid and Virgil both call *Diana Trivia*.<sup>19</sup> *Hecate* seems to be the connecting link between *Artemis* and *Selene*; both became identified with her. She is the original *triformis dea*, called so as the goddess of cross-roads, though later this name was taken to mean a triune goddess who was *Selene* in the heavens, *Artemis* on earth, and *Hecate*

<sup>18</sup> *Aen.*, 4, 511.

<sup>19</sup> *M.*, 2, 416. *P.*, 3, 2, 71. *Aen.*, 7, 516, 774; 10, 537; 11, 566, 836. See Catullus 34.



beneath the earth.<sup>20</sup> In Ovid a fourth goddess, Phoebe, is fused with these three.<sup>21</sup>

So Ovid apparently looks upon Diana as the sister of both Apollo and Sol. There is some inconsistency in this, since the parents of Apollo and Sol are quite different and belong to different generations. But the inconsistency is not conspicuous and it is not Ovid's; he has merely accepted what tradition brought him.

Now the sun and Diana-Luna are paired as Phoebus and Phoebe and as Titan and Titania. So, since Ovid and other Latin poets use Cynthia frequently as a name for Diana, and in *H.*, 17, 74 Ovid gives the name directly to the moon-goddess, while they use Cynthus much more rarely for Apollo, it seems probable that Ovid calls the sun Cynthus because his sister is called Cynthia. He sets the pair Cynthus and Cynthia beside the two just mentioned.

Now if it should seem that Cynthus must refer to Apollo and could not be understood of any other god, I must point out that Apollo by no means has a monopoly upon this epithet. In fact, it is his in poetry only. In actual worship upon the island of Delos only Zeus was worshipped as Cynthus, and, I might add, only Athena as Cynthia, both upon the summit of Mount Cynthus.<sup>22</sup> Delian inscriptions show no epithet for the great Apollo of Delos; elsewhere he was called Delius.<sup>23</sup> Now it is interesting that among the dedications to Zeus Cynthus found among the ruins upon the summit of Cynthus was one inscribed to Zeus Helios by a certain Isidorus in the second century B. C.<sup>24</sup> Here

<sup>20</sup> See Heckenbach, "Hekate," P.-W., VII, 2782; Farnell, *op. cit.*, II, 509-512; see the oracle quoted in Euseb., *Praep. evang.*, 4, 23, 7.

<sup>21</sup> See Hesiod, *Th.*, 136, 404.

<sup>22</sup> See the inscriptions in André Plassart, *Les sanctuaires et les cultes du mont Cynthe* (Paris, Boccard, 1928), pp. 95-140; also many inscriptions in *I. G.*, XI, 2, among the accounts of the Delian *hieropoiei*.

<sup>23</sup> For Delian practice see numerous inscriptions in *I. G.*, XI; on the epithet Delius see Wernicke, *loc. cit.*, 48 f.

<sup>24</sup> Plassart, *op. cit.*, p. 119: an altar with the inscription: Διὶ Ἡλίῳ ἐν[χῆν] | Ἰσιδωρος Ἀντιμάχου --- | ὕπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῆς [γυναικὸς] | καὶ τῶν τέκνων | (κτλ.). See *ibid.*, p. 68 for discussion. On p. 119, note 1, and p. 123, note 2, Plassart calls attention to two inscriptions that bear witness to the worship of Helios by orientals resident upon Delos in the second century B. C.

we find that Helius is a substitute for Cynthius. It is not impossible that Helius had a place among the cults of Delos important enough to be known to Ovid or to his source. Or, even if his Delian cult was unimportant, Ovid's source may have been some Lycophron making a deliberately obscure reference to the sun.

It may be objected that it is simpler to suppose that Ovid is influenced by syncretism when he calls the sun Cynthius. There can be no doubt that Ovid was aware of the syncretism that identified Apollo and Helius; he would have known it from Callimachus if from no one else. And like all Roman poets he was strongly influenced by the Alexandrians, whose love of erudite and recondite allusion is notorious. But the religion of the philosophers, in which syncretism plays an important role, has no place in Ovid's poems. He presents either the religion of the Roman people, as in much of the *Fasti*, or the popular mythology of the Greeks, as in most of the *Metamorphoses*. This mythology he presents in its usual form, uncolored by any philosophical doctrine. In his presentation of Greek myth we need expect no more syncretism than is to be found in pseudo-Apollodorus.

In any case, the evidence comes to this: only *F.*, 3, 346, 353, and *M.*, 2, 454 can be used as evidence that Ovid ever identified Apollo with the sun-god, and they are not conclusive. Everywhere else Ovid clearly distinguishes the two gods.

We can see how Ovid brings Apollo's character as archer, musician, physician, or prophet into his Apolline stories, even where it has nothing to do with the story that is being told. Surely he would have often alluded to Apollo's solar character in the same way, if he had considered Apollo a sun-god. Surely he would have referred to Apollo's crown of rays as he so often refers to his bow or lyre or laurel. Again, if he thought the sun-god to be the same as Apollo, he would have felt free to call the sun Apollo or Paeon or Delius. He would have referred in passing to the laurel or bow or lyre when talking about the sun-god. In the many places in the *Fasti* where Ovid refers to the sun-god and his steeds he always calls him Sol or Phoebus or Titan. No recourse can be had to metrical considerations; it is unthinkable that in all his treatment of the sun-god Ovid was never able to work the name Apollo into his verse or any reference to Apollo's

usual attributes, or that in all his treatment of the god of oracles, medicine, and music, he never found it possible to call him Sol or Titan or to refer to his crown of rays or to his chariot and steeds. For the English poets who have thought that Apollo and the sun were the same have done just this sort of thing. See e. g. Shakespeare, *Winter's tale*, 4, 3, 29 f.:

. . . and the fire-rob'd god  
Golden Apollo, (became) a poor humble swain.

Tennyson, *Lucretius*, 124-127:

Look where another of our Gods, the Sun,  
Apollo, Delius, or of older use  
All-seeing Hyperion—what you will—  
Has mounted yonder; . . .

Browning, *Apollo and the fates*, 1 f.:

Flame at my footfall, Parnassus, Apollo  
Breaking ablaze on thy topmost peak.<sup>25</sup>

It seems likely that in Ovid's time the identification of Apollo with the sun had not yet gone beyond the adherents of certain philosophical sects, such as the Stoics, who favored syncretism and symbolical interpretations.<sup>26</sup> The first literary evidence of this identification is Euripides' *Phaethon*, fragment 781 (Nauck), 11-13:<sup>27</sup>

ὦ καλλιφεγγὲς Ἥλι', ὥς μ' ἀπώλεσας  
καὶ τόνδ'· Ἀπόλλων δ' ἐν βροτοῖς ὀρθῶς καλεῖ,  
ὅστις τὰ σιγῶντ' ὀνόματ' οἶδε δαιμόνων.

These lines, far from proving that Apollo was generally identified with Helios in the fifth century B. C., prove the opposite. And Euripides, fond of syncretism, never recurs to this particular syncretism in his extant plays. It is much the same with Callimachus, fragment 48 (*Hecale* 8 Mair):

<sup>25</sup> See also Browning, *Aeschylus' soliloquy*, 146; very interesting is Spenser, *Faerie queene*, 3, 11, 36-39.

<sup>26</sup> See Plutarch, *De Pythiae oraculis*, 400 C D, and the citations in Gruppe, *loc. cit.*

<sup>27</sup> I. M. Linforth, in his "Two notes on the legend of Orpheus," *T. A. P. A.*, LXII (1931), pp. 11-17, makes it clear that there is no evidence for an identification of Apollo and the sun in the lost *Bassarides* of Aeschylus.

οἱ νῦ καὶ Ἀπόλλωνα παναρκέος Ἡελλίοιο  
 χῶρι διατμήγουσι καὶ εὐποδα Δηωίνην  
 Ἀρτέμιδος.

The poet seems to be criticising those who make these distinctions. Yet we must admit that the identification of Persephone (Δηωίνη) with Artemis was never popular. Here again we have the influence of erudite syncretism. And in spite of Callimachus' remarks here, he does not give Apollo a solar character in his hymn to Apollo, where he speaks of Apollo as archer, prophet, musician, physician, and shepherd.<sup>28</sup>

The question arises whether the identification of Apollo with the sun ever became widespread, either in cult or in popular mythology, down to the end of paganism. A hundred years after Ovid's time, in Plutarch's *De Pythiae oraculis* (400 C D), the question is raised whether or not Apollo is the sun; even among the learned adherents of the schools of philosophy there was some uncertainty about this. And in the whole *Bibliotheca* of the pseudo-Apollodorus, which perhaps appeared around Plutarch's time,<sup>29</sup> there is no indication that Apollo is a solar deity. Whether he was ever popular as a solar deity is a question that I hope to discuss at another time.

<sup>28</sup> Very interesting evidence on Apollo's original character has come to light. B. Hrozný, in his article "Les quatre autels 'Hittites' hiéroglyphiques d'Emir Ghazi et d'Eski Kišla, et les divinités Apulunas (?) et Rutas," *Archiv Orientální*, VIII (1936), pp. 171-199, maintains that a god's name on several Hittite hieroglyphic inscriptions is to be read *Apulunas*. The second syllable only is uncertain, but he has arguments to support his conjecture. This god is the protector of altars and sacred places, the guardian of doors and gates. This is very interesting in view of Apollo's epithets *θυραῖος*, *προπύλαιος*, *προστατήριος*; see Wernicke, *loc. cit.*, 53, 64. Hrozný also identifies Rutas, companion of Apulunas, with Artemis, through the conjectural intermediate form *Ruta-mis*, "my Rutas." I am indebted for my knowledge of this evidence to Professor Henri Grégoire of the University of Brussels.

<sup>29</sup> See J. G. Frazer, *Apollodorus* (London, New York; *L. C. L.*; 1921), I, Introduction, p. xvi.

## APPENDIX.

The names and epithets of Apollo and Sol and the citations of the lines of Ovid's poems in which they occur are listed here. Citations in italics indicate the occurrence of the name or epithet in a brief reference or allusion to the god; other citations indicate its occurrence in a story about the god.

## 1. Apollo

- Actiacus: *M.*, 13, 715. *S.*, 166.  
 Apollo: *A.*, 1, 14, 31; 1, 15, 35; 3, 3, 29. *A. A.*, 2, 493. *F.*, 6, 91.  
     *H.*, 8, 83. *I.*, 262. *M.*, 1, 473; 3, 421; 7, 389; 9, 455; 10, 209;  
     11, 8, 155, 306, 339; 13, 174, 631, 715; 15, 533, 638, 639. *P.*, 4,  
     8, 75. *R.*, 251, 489, 767. *S.*, 23. *T.*, 1, 2, 5; 1, 10, 35; 3, 3,  
     10; 5, 3, 57; 5, 12, 15.  
 arquitenens: *M.*, 1, 441; 6, 265.  
 canorus: *A. A.*, 3, 142.  
 Clarius: *A. A.*, 2, 80. *F.*, 1, 20.  
 Cynthius: *A. A.*, 2, 239.  
 Delius: *M.*, 1, 454; 5, 329; 6, 250; 11, 174; 12, 598; 13, 650.  
 Delphicus: *F.*, 3, 856. *M.*, 2, 543, 677.  
 domesticus: *M.*, 15, 865.  
 fatidicus deus: *F.*, 2, 262.  
 flavus: *A.*, 1, 15, 35.  
 intonsus (deus): *M.*, 12, 585. *T.*, 3, 1, 60.  
 Latoius: *M.*, 11, 196. Latonia proles: *T.*, 5, 1, 57. Latonigena: *M.*, 6,  
     160. Latous: *M.*, 6, 384. proles Latoia: *M.*, 8, 15. stirps Letoia:  
     *T.*, 3, 2, 3.  
 laurigerus: *A. A.*, 3, 389.  
 Leucadius: *S.*, 166. *T.*, 3, 1, 42; 5, 2, 76.  
 Paeon: *A. A.*, 2, 1 bis. *F.*, 4, 263. *M.*, 1, 566; 14, 720; 15, 535.  
 Phoebus: *A.*, 1, 1, 11 and 16; 1, 3, 11; 2, 5, 27; 2, 18, 34; 3, 2, 51; 3,  
     8, 23; 3, 12, 18. *A. A.*, 1, 25, 745; 2, 241, 509 bis; 3, 119, 142,  
     347, 389, 789. *F.*, 1, 291; 2, 106, 247, 261, 713; 3, 139, 827; 4, 951;  
     6, 111, 112, 707 bis, 761. *H.*, 1, 67; 15, 180. *I.*, 126, 463, 571. *M.*,  
     1, 451, 452, 463, 490, 553; 2, 545, 608, 628; 3, 8, 10, 18, 130;  
     5, 330; 6, 122, 215; 8, 31, 350; 9, 444, 663; 10, 132, 162, 178, 197,  
     214; 11, 58, 164, 303, 310, 316; 13, 410, 501, 632, 640, 677; 14,  
     133, 141, 150; 15, 550, 631, 642, 742, 865. *P.*, 2, 2, 80; 3, 2, 48.  
     *R.*, 76, 200, 704, 705, 706. *S.*, 25, 165, 181, 183, 188. *T.*, 2, 25 and  
     400; 4, 2, 51; 4, 3, 78.  
 saluber: *R.*, 704.  
 Smintheus: *F.*, 6, 425. *M.*, 12, 585.



## 2. Sol

auctor lucis: *M.*, 4, 257 f.

candidus: *M.*, 15, 30.

celer deus: *F.*, 1, 386.

Cynthus: *F.*, 3, 346, 353.

Hyperion: *F.*, 1, 385. *M.*, 8, 565; 15, 406, 407.

Hyperione natus: *M.*, 4, 192, 241.

lux mundi: *M.*, 2, 35.

magnus: *M.*, 13, 852. *R.*, 276.

nitidus (deus): *F.*, 3, 44. *M.*, 14, 33. *T.*, 3, 5, 55.

pater Heliadum: *F.*, 6, 717.

Phoebus: *A.*, 1, 5, 5. *A. A.*, 1, 330; 2, 697. *F.*, 1, 164, 651; 3, 361, 416; 4, 390, 688; 5, 17, 420, 694; 6, 199. *H.*, 10, 91; 11, 45; 13, 103. *M.*, 1, 338, 752; 2, 24, 36, 110, 399; 3, 151; 4, 349, 715; 5, 389; 6, 486; 7, 324, 365; 11, 595; 14, 416; 15, 191, 418. *R.*, 256, 585.

Sol: *A.*, 2, 1, 24. *A. A.*, 2, 573 bis, 575. *F.*, 1, 163; 4, 581, 583. *H.*, 6, 86; 9, 16; 20, 86. *I.*, 107, 210, 428. *M.*, 1, 751, 767, 771; 2, 1, 32, 154, 162, 394; 4, 170 bis, 214, 235, 238, 270, 488, 633; 9, 736; 11, 353; 13, 853 bis; 14, 10, 33, 346, 375; 15, 30. *P.*, 4, 6, 48. *R.*, 276. *T.*, 1, 8, 2; 2, 392; 3, 5, 55.

Titan: *F.*, 1, 617; 2, 73; 4, 180, 919. *H.*, 8, 105. *M.*, 1, 10; 2, 118; 6, 438; 7, 398; 10, 79, 174; 11, 257; 13, 968; 14, 376, 382, 438. *S.*, 135.

volucrum moderator equorum: *M.*, 4, 245.

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## LIVY AS SCRIPTURE.

For the Gallic invasion of Rome, Florus, the title of whose book sets forth that it is an epitome of Livy,<sup>1</sup> gives the following extraordinary explanation (I, 13, 3): *ea certe fuit vis calamitatis ut in experimentum inlatam putem, scire volentibus dis an Romana virtus imperium orbis mereretur*. Though Livy nowhere expressly explains the invasion in these terms the thought is not an unfair representation of Livy's ideas. Camillus who is the voice incarnate of Roman idealism is made to say (V, 51, 8): *igitur victi captique ac redempti tantum poenarum dis hominibusque dedimus ut terrarum orbi documento essemus*. How different is this from the Old Testament concept of Assyria as the rod of Jehovah's anger and the staff in their hand as His indignation against the backsliding children of Israel (Isaiah X, 5), or of the Canaanites being left in Palestine after the conquest to prove Israel by them (Judges III, 1)? Godless foreigners from a remote country are brought to invade Rome to *prove* the people and to serve as a rod of chastisement; Roman history is divinely directed to provide instruction to all mankind. The cosmic importance of Roman history, its use to illustrate the workings of heaven, the legitimate pride which that history confers upon those that share in it, and the consequent obligation to prove worthy of it are ideas implied in almost every page of Livy. The primarily patriotic intent of Livy's history is, indeed, quite universally recognized, but the quality of Livy's patriotism and the means which he employs to convey it can better be appreciated by noticing its kinship with the only other ancient history which employs analogous means for an analogous end.

For it is well to realize that of the patriotic historiography which he typifies Livy provides the first example in classical antiquity. Both Herodotus and Thucydides show Athenian sympathy, but neither regards Athenian superiority as something to be naturally assumed by author or reader. Herodotus' most explicit statement on the subject, that the Athenians were the saviors of Hellas,<sup>2</sup> is put down only as a probability after

<sup>1</sup> Florus used other sources besides Livy; cf. Otto Rossbach's Introduction to his Teubner text, p. lviii (Leipzig, 1896).

<sup>2</sup> VII, 139, 5.

close reasoning; and if Thucydides had not told us so we should never have suspected that he was himself a general (and therefore presumably strongly biassed) in the war of which he writes.

Polybius and Dionysius of Halicarnassus provide instructive comparisons with Livy because for considerable stretches they offer parallel accounts for his third and first decades respectively. Polybius is a great admirer of Roman achievement, to be sure, and he tells us much of fate and fortune and the natural gifts of individuals and peoples; but his purpose is to fit Rome into the scheme of general history, and he is addressing Greeks primarily. It is significant that Livy, when he is apparently following Polybius, leaves out the numerous political and military observations and reflections. Significant also in this connexion is a principle of Polybius:<sup>3</sup> "We must therefore disregard the actors in our narratives and apply to the actions such terms and such criticisms as they deserve." Dionysius of Halicarnassus had a fuller prospect of Roman achievement, and yet the point of his whole work seems to be that such achievement redounds to the credit of Greece, for, as he tells us (I, 89) with the air of bestowing the supreme compliment, Rome is a Greek city.

Of course Livy learned from the Greek historians, as he learned from Greek tragedy and epic. His pathetic scenes are ascribed, with much probability, to the influence of the Peripatetic school. But Livy is Roman in a sense that even his fellow-Augustans are not. In their productions the Roman stream is fused with the Greek; in Livy the specifically Roman remains untouched, the Greek element is added without impinging on the integrity of what is Roman. There can be no doubt that Livy's Roman predecessors were thoroughly patriotic; national modesty would surely be alien to Cato or Ennius. But in none of Livy's predecessors, if only because none wrote a work of such scope, did patriotism of such a degree and such an extent inform the whole of Roman history. For another history written out of a comparable conviction of the central importance of its subject, covering a comparable sweep of time, similarly based on a grand tradition and calculated to arouse the bearers of that tradition to the sense of obligation which it implies, we have nowhere else to turn than to the narrative portion of the Old Testament. The

<sup>3</sup> I, 14, 8, translation of W. R. Paton, *L. C. L.*

analogy to Scripture seems to me to provide a suggestive approach to criticism of Livy as well as to one aspect of Roman mind and temper. The analogy may become convincing if we see how closely the means which Livy employed to attain his end can be paralleled in the Bible. It may be instructive to list, with the minimum of illustration, some of the techniques in which Livy differs from the Greek historians and is rather like the writers of the Old Testament narrative.

1. Livy suppresses his own personality almost to the Homeric minimum of *οἶον νῦν βροτοί*. When he does appear it is in connexion with some critical remark on his sources, or, very rarely, some moral reflection. These remarks are never intruded into a narrative but are put at the beginning or end of some unit, as is the case with the Praefatio or the lesser prefaces. One instance will illustrate Livy's practise.<sup>4</sup> After the account of the Battle of Zama, Polybius praises, in his own person of course, Hannibal's skilful generalship in the battle (XV, 15, 3). In his parallel account Livy does not himself express this opinion but ascribes it to Scipio and other experts (XXX, 35, 5). At the very opening of Greek history writing we have the opposite practise stated as a program by Hecataeus of Miletus:<sup>5</sup> "I write these things as they seem true to me, for the accounts of the Greeks are many, and as I think, ridiculous."

The Biblical author intrudes upon his account only to notice a situation that prevails "unto this day" (especially frequent in Joshua and Judges; cf. also Genesis XXVIII, 19: "but the name of that city was called Luz at the first"), or for a reference to the book of the wars of the Lord (Numbers XXI, 14) or to the book of Jasher (Joshua X, 13) or to the chronicles of the kings of Judah (I Kings XV, 7) or of Israel (I Kings XVI, 27).

2. The gauge of truth which determines what stories should be told or what version of a given story should be preferred is frankly the extent to which the story or version documents the Augustan ideal of what a *vir vere Romanus* should be. In VIII, 38-39, for example, Livy gives a circumstantial account of a

<sup>4</sup> This and other examples of the same thing are given in Ivo Bruns, *Die Persönlichkeit in der Geschichtsschreibung der Alten* (Berlin, 1898), pp. 17 ff.

<sup>5</sup> 1a in F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* (Berlin, 1923), p. 7.

great victory over the Samnites. In VIII, 40 he admits in so many words the difficulty in choosing among authorities and the probability that the records have been vitiated by fictitious family traditions; but this critical scepticism had not deterred him from giving the favorable account in the preceding chapters.

In the Bible stories are also chosen or emphasized according as they document the narrator's purpose. Omri, for example, was probably the most capable king of Israel, for the Assyrian inscriptions still call Israel "the house of Omri" a century after its fall. But one would never guess it from the few verses devoted to him in I Kings XVI; the narrator is not interested in a man who wrought evil in the eyes of the Lord and made Israel to sin.

3. A kindred principle is involved in the aetiological stories so frequent in the early books of Livy. Places holy and accursed, institutions religious and secular, formulaic expressions are given authority by reference to a story in antiquity. The story of the combat of the Horatii and the Curiatii and of the trial of the surviving Horatius for slaying his sister (I, 24-26) not only provides an archetypal case for a complicated legal procedure, but also explains the sanctity of certain spots. Indeed, sometimes two several stories (both, therefore, probably wrong) account for the sanctity of the same spot; that is the case with the Lacus Curtius (I, 13, 5 and VII, 6, 3).

Similarly, stories are told of the patriarchal period to justify current usages. Jacob's vision at Bethel (Genesis XXVIII) gives patriarchal authority to the sanctuary at that place. Abraham's purchase of the Machpelah (Genesis XXIII) defends Israel's proprietary right against the encroachments of Edom.

4. Here might be mentioned the highly suspect artificial chronology which accounts for the period between the arrival of Aeneas in Italy and the traditional date of the founding of the city, and for the period between that date and the expulsion of the Tarquins. This chronology was of course not invented by Livy, but he reproduces it without question.

The fact that Solomon, David, and Saul are each credited with a rule of forty years, and that the period of the Judges is so frequently divided into multiples of forty years, suggests a conjectural systematization to fill the period between the traditional date of the Exodus and the reign of Solomon.



5. Livy's patriotic intent may be clearly apprehended in his treatment of the national heroes, who receive a kind of reverence which the Greek historians do not give even a Solon or a Lycurgus, a Themistocles or a Pericles. The Roman analogues of these Greeks are represented as not merely lawgivers, statesmen, generals; their lives constitute a kind of hagiographa. Numa, Camillus, even Scipio Africanus are hedged about with a kind of sanctity. Horatius Cocles, Mucius Scaevola, Cloelia, to take characters from a single episode (II, 10, 13), are impossible as human beings; each is a rather lifeless embodiment of a properly lofty republican patriotism. Polybius (VI, 55) has Horatius die in the Tiber, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus (V, 33) has Cloelia and her companions effect their escape by prevailing upon the Etruscans to turn their backs while the girls bathe. Such human possibilities as baths and drowning are somehow not to be thought of in connexion with Livy's beatification of these heroes. How Roman and how Augustan was Livy's emphasis on the hagiologic character of the gallery of ancient worthies is to be seen from the precisely parallel action of Augustus himself in putting before the eyes of Livy's readers an actual gallery of all the Roman triumphators from Aeneas down, done in bronze, placed in a double row of niches in the walls of his magnificent Forum dominated by the Temple of Mars Ultor, "with the name and *cursus honorum* of each general engraved in the plinth and his *res gestae* on a marble slab fixed to the wall below."<sup>6</sup>

Almost any approved figure in the Bible will illustrate the tendency to exalt the national heroes; perhaps the Judges, especially the five "major" ones, will serve best for Livian analogies.

6. For those that are accepted as national heroes there is a tendency to exaggerate the merits and gloss over the failings in order to produce a uniformly favorable picture. This tendency may be seen, for example, in the characterizations of the three heroes of the Second Punic War, Fabius Cunctator, Marcellus, and Scipio Africanus, for each of whom, however, Livy incidentally provides enough unfavorable information to render suspect the wholly favorable picture it is his manifest intention

<sup>6</sup> See Platner-Ashby, *Topographical Dictionary of Ancient Rome* (Oxford, 1929), p. 221, where full references to literature and inscriptions are given.

to give. The wisdom of Fabius' persistence in his good plan has been questioned,<sup>7</sup> and Plutarch, though he follows the same laudatory tradition of all the Fabii as does Livy, does report some sharp dissent.<sup>8</sup> Marcellus was undoubtedly a competent general, but Livy minimizes his excessive cruelty (at Leontini, Enna, Syracuse) and his rashness (which caused his untimely death), and exaggerates his prowess; at Capua, for example, a great victory is reported with very little basis in fact.<sup>9</sup> It is not to be expected that Livy should be critical of the Scipionic legend,<sup>10</sup> but he is ready to go beyond it. At Ticinus Publius Scipio's life, he tells us, was saved by the Africanus to be. Livy knows that Coelius ascribes the rescue to a Ligurian slave, but says he would prefer to have the other version true (XXI, 46, 10). In XXXV, 15 Livy reports the patently apocryphal colloquy between Scipio and Hannibal at Ephesus, where Hannibal politely insists that he would have claimed precedence over even Alexander and Pyrrhus if he had beaten Scipio. This is of a piece with Livy's claim (IX, 17) that any number of republican heroes were as competent generals and better men than Alexander.

Perhaps the Patriarchs can best illustrate the tendency to spare the saints (compare the "sparing of the Twelve" in Matthew and Luke as against Mark). Genesis XX (Abraham, Sarah, Abimelech) is a doublet, with a purposely higher moral tone, of Genesis XII, 10-20 (Abram, Sarai, Pharaoh).

7. Conversely, and perhaps to underline the merits of the saints, unsuccessful generals are exaggerated into villains. In the same war Flaminius and Varro are the scape-goats. Flaminius was certainly not the rash incompetent Livy makes him out to be.<sup>11</sup> The principal charge against him (and the exculpation for the defeat at Trasimene) was his mad godlessness, illustrated by his taking up the consulship at Ariminum instead of at Rome

<sup>7</sup> See B. L. Hallward, *The Cambridge Ancient History*, VIII (1930), p. 49.

<sup>8</sup> *Fabius*, I.

<sup>9</sup> Hallward, *op. cit.*, p. 75: "... a slight skirmish which appears as a serious battle in the Livian *aristeia* of Marcellus."

<sup>10</sup> Discussed fully in R. M. Haywood, *Studies on Scipio Africanus* (Baltimore, 1933; *The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science*, Series LI, No. 1).

<sup>11</sup> Hallward, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

(XXI, 63); but this is plainly disproved by Polybius III, 77, 1. Varro was certainly not alone to blame for Cannae.<sup>12</sup> If he had been the thanks he received (XXII, 61, 14) would have been unthinkably ironic, and he would surely not have been continued in important commands year after year (XXV, 6, 7; XXVII, 35, 2). Even traditional villains are given a more heroic stature in Livy. Tullia who incites Tarquin to murder her father Servius is merely petulant in Dionysius (IV, 28-40); Livy (I, 46-48) raises her imperial ambition to become a model for Lady Macbeth.<sup>13</sup>

The case of Omri, cited above, and of the others who walked in the ways of Jeroboam the son of Nebat illustrate the vilification, unfair by absolute standards, which unsympathetic characters suffer.

8. For how late in the Republic Livy found it feasible to aggrandize his heroes it is hard to say. Certainly for Augustus, at least in the first Decade,<sup>14</sup> his attitude is nothing less than reverent.<sup>15</sup> This attitude is to be noticed not only in the direct references to Augustus, not only in the scope and purpose of the whole work which supports and justifies the Augustan program of reform, but also in numerous subtler touches, calculated to conform to Augustus' predilections. From the Monumentum Ancyranum as well as from Horace and Vergil we know that Augustus liked to think of himself as a soldier; we also know that in actual warfare he was something less than a model general.<sup>16</sup> Perhaps that is why Livy writes *tum* in II, 6, 8: *decorum erat tum ipsis capessere pugnam ducibus*. Of such immoral generals as Sextus Tarquin (I, 54, 4) and Hannibal (XXI, 4) it is told that they shared in the toils of the common soldiery; such conduct, it is implied, must not be expected of an

<sup>12</sup> Hallward, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

<sup>13</sup> See my note "Clytemnestra in Elizabethan Dress," *Class. Weekly*, XXXII (1939), pp. 255 f.

<sup>14</sup> The three references to Augustus are I, 19, 3; IV, 20; and XXVIII, 12, 9, of which the last shows no particular enthusiasm.

<sup>15</sup> See Gertrude M. Hirst, "The Significance of *Augustior* as applied to Hercules and to Romulus: a Note on Livy I, 7, 9 and I, 8, 9," *A. J. P.*, XLVII (1926), pp. 347-357; reprinted in her *Collected Classical Papers* (Oxford, 1938), pp. 1-11.

<sup>16</sup> References for Augustus' fecklessness in battle are collected in my *Sextus Pompey* (New York, 1930), p. 147.

Augustus. After the death of Romulus, of whom Augustus considered himself a sort of avatar, the people complain (I, 17, 7): *multiplicatam servitutem, centum pro uno dominos factos*. The benefits conferred by the "good" kings are emphasized; the institution of monarchy is criticized only in its abuse.<sup>17</sup>

Special consideration is given David, who is regarded as the real founder of the Hebrew kingdom. We are not allowed to forget that besides being a successful warrior and a great monarch he was "the anointed of the God of Jacob and the sweet psalmist of Israel" (II Samuel XXIII, 1).

9. Not only significant persons but significant events also are made more impressive by the infusion of supernatural elements. Before the Battle of Allia, Livy tells us (V, 37) that (a) the Romans were so blinded as to make no special preparations, and (b) the Gauls moved down from Clusium at prodigious speed. Now as to (a), from Dionysius of Halicarnassus, XIII, 19 and Plutarch, *Camillus*, XVIII we learn that the Romans mobilized all their resources and that they had 40,000 men at Allia; that accounts for their despair after their defeat. As to (b) the Gauls did not, as a matter of fact, move particularly quickly. The military tribunes whose election caused the Gauls to fly to arms (V, 36, 11-12) entered office July 1 (V, 32, 1); Clusium was three days from Rome (Polybius II, 25, 2); the Battle of Allia was fought July 18 (VI, 1, 11). The miraculous element introduced here makes Rome's failure less shocking, as it frequently makes Rome's success more significant. This is particularly the case when without such an element the incident might be passed over as trivial or ordinary. So, for example, the raven that helped Valerius against his Gallic adversary (VII, 26) both raises the achievement to a higher significance and warns the Romans against saying in their heart, My power and the might of mine hand hath gotten me this wealth.

In the Bible all events are significant, in that all illustrate the workings of God in history. Direct intervention may be illustrated from Joshua's battle at Gilboa, where "the sun stood still and the moon stayed until the people had avenged themselves upon their enemies" (Joshua X, 13). A good parallel for Valerius and the Gaul is David and Goliath.

<sup>17</sup> See especially II, 1.

10. Livy's treatment of Roman defeats makes very clear his unquestioning conviction of Rome's superiority and Rome's destiny. With such a conviction the defeats, as being contrary to nature, must be explained; and the explanations are almost in the nature of theodicy. It is true that Herodotus sees the finger of God in the Greek victory over the Persians; but in that case it is not a question of implementing the destiny of Athens but rather of chastising the overweening frowardness of the Persians. The Roman defeats have been studied in a recent dissertation,<sup>18</sup> where they have been classified according as they resemble Allia, Caudium, or Cannae. The explanations also fall into types; they emphasize not such external factors as geography and strategy but rather the qualities of heart and spirit, the moral force, in which, as in discipline and courage, Romans are axiomatically superior. Where the fight is *puro ac patenti campo ubi sine ullo insidiarum metu vera virtute geri res posset* (XXIV, 14, 6) there can be no question of Roman victory. The significant point, which the dissertation should have made, is that when the Romans do submit to fight in an unfavorable field with the possibility of ambush and are in consequence defeated they are driven to do so by an outside power: before the Gallic invasion, *iam urgentibus Romanam urbem fatis* (V, 36, 6); and before Cannae, *Cannas urgente fato profecti sunt* (XXII, 43, 9).

The hand of God does not fall short, and therefore defeats of the Hebrews must also be explained. That at Ai, for example, took place because Achan had stolen of the accursed thing (Joshua VII). The nations whom Joshua does not conquer are left that by them Israel may be proved (Judges II, 22). In Livy XXXIX, 1 the Ligurians serve an analogous purpose: *is hostis velut natus ad continendam inter magnorum intervalla bellorum Romanis militarem disciplinam erat*.

But these parallels and the numerous others that can be cited<sup>19</sup> may be superficial, and might be overbalanced by a larger number of significant dissimilarities. It is out of the startling conformity of my next three rubrics to the spirit which pervades all

<sup>18</sup> Heinz Bruckmann, *Die Römische Niederlagen im Geschichtswerk des T. Livius* (diss. Münster, 1936).

<sup>19</sup> E. g., the exposed twins and Moses, the laws of Numa and of Moses, the rape of the Sabines and the marriages of the Benjamites (Judges XXI).



the historical portions of the Old Testament that a conviction of the essential similarity of the two works may arise.

11. The Romans have as it were a monopoly on moral traits besides courage, discipline, and ability to rule; such, among others, are (a) *fides* and *pietas* and (b) *clementia*, which the Augustan propaganda put forth as peculiarly Roman virtues.<sup>20</sup> (a) Every war, especially where there might be reason to suppose otherwise, is painstakingly shown to be a *bellum iustum*. Whenever Roman dealing in standing by a treaty might be brought into question, a vigorous effort is made to justify Roman conduct on legal grounds. A good example is IX, 5, 2, in reference to the nullification of the *pax Caudina*: *itaque non, ut vulgo credunt Claudiusque etiam scribit, foedere pax Caudina, sed per sponsionem facta est*. When the Campanians at their request and to the great benefit of Rome are received into alliance despite the existing treaty with the Samnites, careful negotiations must be undertaken to justify such a course; *tamen tanta utilitate fides antiquior fuit* (VII, 31, 1). Gabii is, indeed, taken by a ruse, but that was done by an irresponsible Tarquin, *minime arte Romana, fraude ac dolo* (I, 53, 4). When Camillus returned to the Faliscans their children whom the schoolmaster would have betrayed, they yielded voluntarily, not merely out of gratitude but because they recognized the worth of Roman *fides*: *vos fidem in bello quam praesentem victoriam maluistis, nos fide provocati victoriam ultro detulimus* (V, 27, 13). The outside world generally recognizes *fides* as a Roman quality; so the Spartan Nabis says (XXXIV, 31, 4): *cum vos intueor, Romanos esse video, qui rerum divinarum foedera, humanarum fidem socialem sanctissimam habeatis*. (b) When the Alban traitor Mettius is cruelly, albeit justly, punished by being torn apart between two chariots, Livy hastens to add that this was the only example of such punishment in Roman history; *in aliis gloriari licet, nulli gentium mitiores placuisse poenas* (I, 28, 11). During the darkest weeks of the Hannibalic war their Latin allies remained loyal to the Romans because Roman government had been just and merciful, and the Latins did not object to rendering obedience to a people whom they recognized as their betters: *haud abnuebant . . . melioribus parere* (XXII, 13, 11). The scope

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Erich Burck, "Livy als Augusteischer Historiker," *Die Welt als Geschichte*, I (1935), pp. 446 ff.

of Roman justice is so generous as to include lands across the sea; that, it is sometimes implied, is the basis of Roman foreign policy. So the Greek audience understood it when Flamininus proclaimed the freedom of Greece (XXXIII, 33, 5).

12. By corollary, the lesser breeds without the law are assumed to be not only deficient in these traits but generally inferior. It is not so remarkable that Syrians are *vilissima genera hominum et servituti nata* (XXXVI, 17, 5), for even Aristotle<sup>21</sup> speaks of "slaves by nature." Roman conviction of grace is more striking when it expresses contempt for Athenians, as in XXXI, 44, 9: *Athenienses quidem litteris verbisque quibus solis valent bellum adversus Philippum gerebant*. It may well be that the account of the development of Roman theatrical performances (VII, 2-3) is especially calculated to eliminate any sense of indebtedness to Greece.<sup>52</sup> An account like that of the duel between Titus Manlius and the Gaul (VII, 10) is clearly intended to point the contrast between the sober, restrained Roman, with confidence resting on assured competence, and the gaudy, undisciplined Gaul, who emphasizes his childishness by putting his tongue out at his opponent. So the Fabii who go on an embassy to the Gauls are, because of their impulsiveness, spoken of as *Gallis magis quam Romanis similes* (V, 36, 1); similarly Timasitheus, who belonged to the piratical Liparensians, is spoken of as *Romanis vir similior quam suis* (V, 28, 3). *Fides* is not to be expected from non-Romans; *Punica religio* is a proverbial oxymoron, which ingenuous Romans sometimes, but always to their subsequent regret, accept at face value. A case in point is that of the 6,000 who escaped from Trasimene (XXII, 6, 12), though it is difficult to see why Maharbal need have given his word in the first place to men who were completely in his power.

13. The Romans are, in a word, in the natural order of things, children of destiny, lords of creation, fated to prevail over all other peoples. Livy cannot marvel at Roman expansion as Polybius does any more than he could marvel at water running down hill. From the beginning heaven guided Rome to its destiny (I, 4, 1): *debeatur, ut opinor, fati tantae origo urbis maximique secundum deorum opes imperii principium*. Rome's

<sup>21</sup> *Politics*, I, 1254 B.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. Henri Bornecque, *Tite Live* (Paris, 1933), p. 119.

first king, immediately upon his translation to heaven, sends word (I, 16, 7): *abi, nuntia, inquit, Romanis caelestes ita velle ut mea Roma caput orbis terrarum sit; proinde rem militarem colant, sciantque et ita posteris tradant nullas opes humanas armis Romanis resistere posse*. From the circumstances of its occurrence I think it is no exaggeration to say that this quotation is intended to serve as a sort of text for Livy's whole enterprise. It is made to apply to Roman expansion, as at XXVI, 37, 5: *iam velut despondente fortuna Romanis imperium orientis*. It is made to apply to the Roman habit of rising to victory after defeat, as XXVI, 41, 9: *et fato quodam data nobis sors est, ut magnis omnibus bellis victi vicerimus*.

The temper of Livy's history as shown particularly by these last three rubrics may be illuminated by the suggestive analogy of Scripture. Jehovah's exclusive choice of Israel, the moral superiority of Israel, the unworthiness of the heathen, the destiny of Israel to inherit the promised land and there to dwell secure, the obligation that rests upon Israel to continue worthy of its special favor—these ideas are explicitly and repeatedly enforced, in Deuteronomy in particular; quotations are too numerous to choose from and too familiar to require citation. Now it is under the direct influence of the Deuteronomist that the entire history of Israel was written.<sup>23</sup> Each of the kings, for example, is appraised only on the basis of his adherence to the Deuteronomic requirement of worshipping at the sole legitimate sanctuary at Jerusalem. The Deuteronomic ideas are the controlling factors in Hebrew history as told in the Old Testament; to the extent to which similar ideas exercise a similar control upon his history Livy may be looked upon as the Old Testament of the Romans. To Livy as to the Old Testament the paradox propounded by a distinguished Biblical scholar applies:<sup>24</sup> *Die alttestamentliche Geschichte ist ein Problem des Glaubens, und umgekehrt, der alttestamentliche Glaube ist ein Problem der Geschichte*.

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<sup>23</sup> Cf. e. g. J. Bewer, *The Literature of the Old Testament in its Historical Development* (New York, 1922), p. 215.

<sup>24</sup> A. Weiser, "Glaube und Geschichte im Alten Testament," *Beiträge zur Wissenschaft vom Alten und Neuen Testament*, N. F. IV, 4 (1931), p. 19.

## DRUSUS CAESAR'S TRIBUNICIAN POWER.

Everyone is familiar from Tacitus' *Annals* with the facts that Drusus Caesar received the tribunician power at Tiberius' request of the Senate in A. D. 22, and that he died in A. D. 23.<sup>1</sup> Many coins and inscriptions show that when he died he bore the title *tribunica potestate iterum*. So much has always been abundantly clear. But *when* in 22 the power was conferred, and *when* in 23 he died, were questions not satisfactorily answered. And those questions were linked by the iteration in coins and inscriptions of the tribunician title.

The date of Drusus' death became precisely known many years ago by the discovery of the *Fasti Oppii Maiores* (cf. *infra*), but that new evidence has escaped the notice of some, and no one, seemingly, has observed its bearing on the related problem of the date of the tribunician power. And some available evidence on the latter question has apparently been overlooked. There has been assumption which was not justified; there has been argument which was sometimes unfounded; and there has been conjecture which is no longer necessary; still other writers have ignored the problem of dates altogether.

Dessau assumed that the conferring of the authority upon Drusus coincided with its renewal to Tiberius, and dated Drusus' death "post k. Iulias (sc. tribunica potestate iterum)." <sup>2</sup> That assumption, in which he was followed by Gardthausen,<sup>3</sup> was not justified and can now be proved erroneous.

Mattingly wrote: "Drusus received the tribunician power in A. D. 22—the exact date is not known; as his coins with TR. P. II run parallel to Tiberius' with TR. P. XXIII, it is tempting to suppose that he started his second term of power on his father's day, June 27. He died early in 23." <sup>4</sup> But there seems

<sup>1</sup> Tac., *Ann.*, III, 56; IV, 8.

<sup>2</sup> *Prosop.* <sup>1</sup>, II, p. 177; cf. *Gesch. d. röm. Kaiserzeit* (1926), II, i, p. 32, "Da starb Drusus . . . in der zweiten Hälfte des Jahres 23 n. Chr., zu Beginn des zweiten Jahres seiner nominellen Mitregentschaft."

<sup>3</sup> *P. W.*, X, 433.

<sup>4</sup> *B. M. C.* (1923), I, cxxxvii; cf. Sutherland in *J. R. S.*, XXVIII (1938), p. 131, n. 12, "Mr. Mattingly . . . has conjectured that Drusus was TR P early in 22, becoming TR P II on his father's day 27th June, A. D. 22, and thus continuing until his death early in 23."

to be no such parallel; for the coins of Tiberius showing TR. P. XXIII<sup>5</sup> bear none of Drusus' titles, and coins of Drusus showing TR. P. II either have none of Tiberius' titles,<sup>6</sup> or carry TR. P. XXXIII and belong a decade later.<sup>7</sup>

Marsh<sup>8</sup> has only the year date for Drusus' death, and none for the tribunician power. Ciaceri<sup>9</sup> has even less. Hammond writes: "Drusus was consul with his father in 21 A. D. and at his father's request obtained the *tribunicia potestas* from the Senate. He was poisoned by Sejanus in 22 A. D." [*sic*].<sup>10</sup> Kornemann<sup>11</sup> has the precise date of Drusus' death as the new *fasti* record it, but for the tribunician power only the year date.

It is possible, however, by Tacitean evidence to date the tribunician power of Drusus more narrowly than within the year 22 merely.

Early in A. D. 21 Tiberius left the capital to sojourn in Campania.<sup>12</sup> During his absence he communicated with the Senate by letter; and we know of numerous such communications. Those which fall in the year 21<sup>13</sup> we may pass over, to mention specifically those of the following year. The Emperor wrote regarding the aediles' statement of the need for sumptuary legislation,<sup>14</sup> again to ask the tribunician power for Drusus,<sup>15</sup> and a third time to modify the adulatory decrees of the Senate passed together with the conferring of the authority on Drusus, and answer a question from the House about the rights and responsibilities of the *Flamen Dialis*. Together with this last letter the Senate had a letter from Drusus, who also was in Campania, acknowledging the grant of the *tribunicia potestas*.<sup>16</sup> Finally, Tacitus records

<sup>5</sup> *B. M. C.*, Tiberius Nos. 70-84, 91-94.

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, Nos. 95-101.

<sup>7</sup> *Op. cit.*, Nos. 171-173 and p. 144 n.

<sup>8</sup> *The Reign of Tiberius* (1931), pp. 165, 161.

<sup>9</sup> *Tiberio Successore di Augusto* (1934).

<sup>10</sup> *The Augustan Principate* (1933), p. 74. The same author's recent article, "The Tribunician Day during the Early Empire" in *Mem. Amer. Acad.*, XV (1938), pp. 23-61, deals with reigning Emperors and so does not include Drusus.

<sup>11</sup> *Doppelprinzipat und Reichsteilung* (1930), pp. 42 f.

<sup>12</sup> Tac., *Ann.*, III, 31, 2.

<sup>13</sup> *Op. cit.*, III, 32, 1; 35, 1; 38, 2; 47, 1; 51, 2.

<sup>14</sup> *Op. cit.*, III, 52, 4-54.

<sup>15</sup> *Op. cit.*, III, 56, 1.

<sup>16</sup> *Op. cit.*, III, 59, 2 f.

that the serious illness of Livia prompted Tiberius' hurried return to Rome, and remarks upon the relations between mother and son; "neque enim multo ante [he adds] cum haud procul theatro Marcelli effigiem divo Augusto Iulia dicaret, Tiberi nomen suo postscripserat."<sup>17</sup> And this dedication is dated for us by the *Fasti Praenestini* as having occurred on 23 April.<sup>18</sup>

It is, then, clear that Tiberius returned to Rome not long after 23 April, in May perhaps, hardly, one would suppose from the wording of Tacitus, later than June; that Drusus had received the tribunician power some little time at least before that return; and that the investiture can be confidently dated within the first four or five months of A. D. 22, with probability March or April. We cannot, in the state of our evidence, do better; yet this is some gain.

As has been mentioned above, we now know that Drusus died on 14 September, 23;<sup>19</sup> the day was formerly supposed to have been the date of the elder Drusus' death in 9 B. C.<sup>20</sup> Drusus became *tribunicia potestate iterum* in the spring of 23, continuing so until his death in September, as coins and inscriptions show. It thus becomes clear that there was no coincidence or connection of the original grant of the power to Drusus, or its renewal, with the annual renewal of the same power to Tiberius, whether Tiberius' day was 26 June (Hirschfeld) or 1 July (Mommsen).<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> *Op. cit.*, III, 64, 1 f.

<sup>18</sup> *C. I. L.*, I<sup>2</sup>, p. 236.

<sup>19</sup> *C. I. L.*, VI, 32493; cf. Leuze in *Jahresber. für Altertumswiss.*, CCXXVII (1930, III), pp. 102, 139.

<sup>20</sup> *C. I. L.* I<sup>2</sup>, p. 329.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Hammond in *Mem. Amer. Acad.*, XV (1938), pp. 24 f. and references there.



## PTOLEMAIS AND THE ARCHON SORTITION CYCLES.

The welcome discovery by Meritt that Phyle was a divided deme between 307 and 201 B. C., associated with the two tribes Demetrias and Oineis,<sup>1</sup> and also Pritchett's new reading of the demotic of Phyle in *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1706 (line 143),<sup>2</sup> have greatly assisted in the interpretation of this archon list which was so ably edited by Dow.<sup>3</sup> In other words, the polemarch of 228/7 B. C. may have come from either Demetrias or Oineis, and so, too, might the polemarch of 215/4 B. C. were he not restricted to Demetrias by the fact that the fourth thesmothetes came from Oineis, double representation of tribes in the board of nine archons not being permitted. Under these circumstances, a new tabulation of the tribal affiliations of the boards of archons listed in *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1706, seems desirable for the purpose of clarifying the system of rotation. For convenience, and in order to avoid confusion in this period of transition when the new tribe Ptolemais came into being and so disturbed the tribal sequence, I follow Ferguson's example in retaining the sequence numbers of the twelve tribes which had officiated since 307 B. C., designating Ptolemais as P.<sup>4</sup> Retaining all permissible alternatives, and without any prejudice as to the date of the creation of Ptolemais, these tribal affiliations would be as follows: <sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Meritt, *Hesperia*, IX (1940), pp. 72-77, no. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Pritchett, *A. J. P.*, LXI (1940), pp. 192-193.

<sup>3</sup> Dow, *Hesperia*, II (1933), pp. 418-446, pls. XII-XIV.

<sup>4</sup> Ferguson, *Athenian Tribal Cycles*, pp. 50-51. Dow (*Hesperia*, III [1934], pp. 176-177) followed a more complicated scheme, though likewise avoiding confusion, by listing only the ten original tribes with sequence numbers and designating the two Macedonian tribes as A[ntigonis] and D[emetrias]. It will be recalled that the official position of Ptolemais was at the exact middle of the list, between 6 and 7 by my numbering.

<sup>5</sup> The list of archons is repeated from my *Athenian Archon List* (1939), except that . . . bios is omitted from 217/6 B. C., since the *stoichedon* arrangement would demand an earlier date if possible (*Archon List*, p. 163), and Pritchett now points out to me that this is in fact possible since the treasurer of military affairs is known to have

Archon	Epony- mos	Basi- leus	Pole- march	Six Thesmothetai						
229/8	Heliodoros	2	8	7	4	1/5	6	10	11	12
228/7	Leochares	12	1/5	2/8	1	4	7	9	2/10	11
227/6	Theophilos	2/10	11	8	2	1/3	1/5	6	9	1/2/12
226/5	Ergochares	7		6	1/3	2	3	P/9	10	11
225/4	Niketes	6	10	1/3	2	4	7	8	P/9	12
224/3	Antiphilos	P/11	2	1/12	1	1/3	9	6		
223/2	?? Kalli - - -									
222/1	Archelaos									
221/0	Thrasyphon	[2 ?]					4/9	8	10	P/10/11
220/19	Menekrates	8	9	2/12	1	2/10	4	6	P/12	11
219/8	Chairephon	12	4	11	1/2					
218/7	[K]all[i] . . . .]									
217/6									11	12
216/5	Hagnias	4	7	6	2/12	3	5	P/11	9	11
215/4	Diokles	1	5	2/8	4	P	7	8	9	12
214/3	Euphiletos	5	10	8	1	1/3	P	9	11	12
213/2	Herakleitos	9						7		

Scrutiny of this list, even before the readings were as complete as they are now, had revealed that the arrangement is based on simultaneous observance of three different laws.

(A) The law discovered by Sauppe in 1864, to the effect that no single tribe should have double representation in any given

acted as disbursing officer as early as 239/8 B.C. (Crosby, *Hesperia*, VI [1937], p. 445); thus 233/2 or 231/0 would be preferable for . . . bios. As for the tribes, I include as a possible restoration Dow's attractive suggestion that Thrasyphon (221/0) belonged to Demetrias (*Hesperia*, II [1933], p. 444; *A. J. A.*, XL [1936], pp. 59-62, 70). For the subdivision of Oion (eponymos of 227/6) and Phyle (polemarchs of 228/7 and 215/4) see Meritt, *Hesperia*, IX (1940), pp. 75-76, 78; cf. Pritchett, *A. J. P.*, LXI (1940), pp. 187, 190. For the possible subdivision of Anakaia (second thesmothetes of 220/19, fifth of 228/7), of Atene (polemarch of 220/19, first thesmothetes of 216/5), and of Phlya (fourth thesmothetes of 226/5, fifth of 225/4), see below. I admit for the present that half of Amphitrope (sixth thesmothetes of 227/6) might have belonged to either of the Macedonian tribes, as suggested by Pritchett (*A. J. P.*, LXI [1940], p. 191). On the other hand, Dow's similar suggestion in the case of Heliodoros of Diomeia (*Hesperia*, III [1934], pp. 180-181) may now be rejected; I had definitely proposed Demetrias (*Archons*, pp. 37, 447, 448, 450 n. 3; accepted by Ferguson, *Cycles*, p. 64 n. 1, p. 143 n. 1), and this is now confirmed by two new inscriptions, Agora I 3311 and 4221 (Meritt, *Hesperia*, IX [1940], pp. 75, 78). Furthermore, we may reject as purely academic the appearance of Ptolemais in 229/8 (polemarch), 228/7 (fourth thesmothetes), or 227/6 B.C. (basileus, fifth thesmothetes), since it can be demonstrated by means of the secretary cycles that Ptolemais did not exist in any case before the year of Ergochares (*Archons*, p. 194; *Archon List*, p. 83 n. 97).

year.<sup>6</sup> A few assumed exceptions have been gradually eliminated, the latest to survive being the assumed duplication of the polemarch from Atene (2) and the second thesmothetes from Anakaia (assumed to be 2 by the Beloch law B) in 220/19 B. C.<sup>7</sup> This I overcame by the argument that Atene was a subdivided deme (2/12), half retaining the original affiliation, an argument which has been accepted by Ferguson, Meritt, and Pritchett.<sup>8</sup> On the other hand, Dow argues that Atene was not subdivided but was transferred wholly to Demetrias (2), pointing out that the half which might be supposed to have remained in Antiochis (12) is not mentioned in a complete roster of the latter tribe (*I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 910 + Agora I 600).<sup>9</sup> It must be recalled, however, that this roster is of the year 169/8 B. C. when half, at least, of Atene belonged to Attalis; and it is reasonable to suppose that after both halves of this deme were reunited in Antiochis in 201 B. C. it was transferred in its entirety to Attalis the next year. We may, nevertheless, retain for the present both possibilities for Atene (on the understanding that the Beloch law may have been violated in the case of the second thesmothetes), but all other alternatives which would cause unavoidable duplication of tribes may be eliminated (e. g., eponymos of 227/6; basileus of 228/7; polemarchs of 224/3, 215/4; first thesmothetes of 226/5; second of 224/3, 214/3; fourth of 216/5; sixth of 227/6, 221/0).

(B) The law discovered by Beloch in 1884—rather a scribal procedure than an actual institution of government—in accordance with which the six thesmothetai were listed in any given year in a sequence according to the official tribal order. It was immediately apparent, however, that some exceptions must exist, as in 224/3 B. C. under any circumstances, and also in 225/4 B. C. if Ptolemais already existed, and in 220/19 B. C. if Ptole-

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.*, 22, 5; 55, 1; 59, 7; 63, 1.

<sup>7</sup> For the history of these exceptions, see Dinsmoor, *Archons of Athens* (1931), pp. 447-450, 462.

<sup>8</sup> *Archons*, pp. 448, 462; Ferguson, *Cycles*, p. 51 n. 2; Meritt, *Hesperia*, IX (1940), pp. 75-76 nn. 11, 14; Pritchett, *A. J. P.*, LXI (1940), pp. 189-190, 192-193.

<sup>9</sup> Dow, *Hesperia*, III (1934), p. 180; *Prytaneis*, pp. 129-133, no. 71.

mais did not yet exist. The latter possibility may be rejected, however, for it is hardly conceivable that a deme would have been named in honor of Berenike after the death of Ptolemy III and her own murder by her son Ptolemy IV; and it is evident from the calendar equation in a decree of Thrasyphon (*I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 839) that the thirteen tribes were all in existence from the beginning of his year.<sup>10</sup> On the other hand, even with Ptolemais functioning in 220/19 B. C., there must be a disturbance of the sequence unless we admit that Anakaia was a divided deme, the second thesmothetes coming from Demetrias (2). I had followed Kirchner in adopting this subdivision of Anakaia, and Ferguson and Pritchett have agreed with me;<sup>11</sup> as in the case of Atene, however, Dow has objected, assuming that Anakaia remained entirely in Hippothontis (10) and that the disturbance in sequence was a scribal error.<sup>12</sup> For the present, therefore, we may retain both possibilities for Anakaia (2/10). Likewise in 225/4 B. C., where the sequence might be perfect if we assumed that Ptolemais did not yet exist, or even if we regarded Phlya as a deme subdivided between Ptolemais and Kekropis (9) as Johnson suggested,<sup>13</sup> it seems desirable to admit both possibilities. We may, however, eliminate all alternatives which cause disturbances in sequence other than the definite instance in 224/3 B. C. and the two possibilities in 225/4 and 220/19 B. C. (marked by asterisks in the following table), as follows: first thesmothetes in 216/5, second in 229/8 and 227/6, third in 227/6 and 221/0, fifth in 228/7, and sixth in 227/6 and 221/0 B. C.

A combination of the evidence from laws A and B clarifies our table and yields the following result:

<sup>10</sup> *Archons*, p. 190.

<sup>11</sup> *Archons*, pp. 447-448; Ferguson, *Cycles*, p. 50; Pritchett, *A. J. P.*, LXI (1940), p. 193.

<sup>12</sup> Dow, *Hesperia*, III (1934), p. 180.

<sup>13</sup> Johnson, *A. J. P.*, XXXIV (1913), p. 383; retained as a possibility by Dow, *Hesperia*, III (1934), p. 176 n. 1, p. 182 n. 1. I had argued against this (*Archons*, pp. 449-450, 463 nn. 1, 5; *Archon List*, p. 161 n. 181), however, and I still feel that the analogy of the following year is sufficient basis for regarding it as a scribal error, possibly incurred through such reasoning as I formerly suggested (*Archons*, p. 463).

	Archon	Epony- mos	Basi- leus	Pole- march	Six Thesmothetai					
					4	5	6	10	11	12
229/8	Heliodoros	2	8	7	4	5	6	10	11	12
228/7	Leochares	12	5	2/8	1	4	7	9	10	11
227/6	Theophilos	10	11	8	2	3	5	6	9	12
226/5	Ergochares	7		6	1	2	3	P/9	10	11
225/4	Niketes	6	10	1/8	2	4	7	8	*P/9	12
224/3	Antiphilos	P/11	2	12	1	3	*9	6		
223/2	?? Kalli - -									
222/1	Archelaos									
221/0	Thrasyphon	[2 ?]					4	8	10	11
220/19	Menekrates	8	9	2/12	1	2/*10	4	6	P	11
219/8	Chairephon	12	4	11	1/2					
218/7	[K]all[i . . . .]									
217/6									11	12
216/5	Hagnias	4	7	6	2	3	5	P	9	11
215/4	Diokles	1	5	2	4	P	7	8	9	12
214/3	Euphiletos	5	10	8	1	3	P	9	11	12
213/2	Herakleitos	9						7		

(C) The law discovered by Ferguson in 1932, showing that the three chief archons were arranged according to sortition cycles of twelve or thirteen years. This was ascertained by means of the observation that duplications of tribes among the three chief archons occur at such lengthy intervals that they must have resulted, not from pure chance, but from a definite law of distribution.<sup>14</sup> For instance, in the list of eponymoi it is evident that there would have been a terminus between 228 and 221 B. C. if we accept Dow's attractive theory that Thrasyphon belonged to Demetrias (2), the tribe duplicated by Heliodoros;<sup>15</sup> but in any case the terminus would lie between 227 and 219 B. C. to avoid duplication of Antiochis (12). Again, in the list of basileis, the terminus would lie between 227 and 215 B. C. in order to avoid duplication of Pandionis (5), and also between 224 and 214 B. C. to avoid duplication of Hippothontis (10). Since it is evident that inextricable confusion would have resulted unless both cycles were rotating with identical terminal dates, we ascertain that in order to fit both the eponymoi and the basileis the terminus must have been between 224 and 219 B. C., or perhaps even between 224 and 221 B. C. if we accept the attribution of Thrasyphon to Demetrias (2).

<sup>14</sup> Ferguson, *Cycles*, pp. 50-54; accepted exactly by Dow (*Hesperia*, III [1934], p. 177), and in principle by myself—in fact I had already formed a similar conclusion—but with some doubt as to the exact location of the breaks (*Archon List*, pp. 4-5 with n. 7, p. 74 n., p. 160). Now Meritt has shown that Phyle was subdivided and that a break in 227 B. C. is unnecessary, though he retains Ferguson's second break in 223 B. C. (*Hesperia*, IX [1940], p. 76; cf. Pritchett, *A. J. P.*, LXI [1940], pp. 192-193).

<sup>15</sup> For Thrasyphon and Heliodoros of Diomeia, see n. 5 above.

But we have also to fit in the cycle of the polemarchs, also rotating on the same basis. Considered alone, the list of polemarchs yields a choice between four solutions: (a) with the polemarchs of 228/7 and 220/19 B. C. both coming from Demetrias (2), like that of 215/4 B. C., we have two breaks between 227 and 220 and between 219 and 215 B. C.; (b) with the polemarch of 228/7 B. C. coming from Oineis (8) and that of 220/19 B. C. from Demetrias (2), we obtain two breaks, one exactly in 227 B. C. (to avoid duplication of Oineis) and the other between 219 and 215 B. C.; (c) with the polemarch of 228/7 B. C. coming from Oineis (8) and that of 220/19 B. C. from Antiochis (12), we again obtain two breaks, one exactly in 227 B. C. and the other between 223 and 220 B. C. (to avoid duplication of Antiochis); (d) with the polemarch of 228/7 B. C. coming from Demetrias (2) and that of 220/19 B. C. from Antiochis (12), we require only one terminus, between 227 and 215 B. C. (to avoid duplication of Demetrias) and more closely between 223 and 220 B. C. (to avoid duplication of Antiochis). Since two of these solutions (a and b) are in any case improbable because they require a polemarch from Demetrias (2) in 220/19 B. C. and so confuse the official sequence of the thesmothetai, and since three of these solutions (a, b, and c) are improbable also because they require two breaks so close together as to constitute an interruption of the cycles, we may adopt the solution (d) which is in full agreement with the cycles of the eponymoi and basileis. We have seen that the latter require a terminus between 224 and 219 B. C.; the polemarchs (solution d) require a terminus between 223 and 220 B. C.; all three cycles are in absolute accord. And, if we accept the probability that Thrasyphon belonged to Demetrias (2), the terminus is even more closely defined as between 223 and 221 B. C.

In first discussing these sortition cycles, Ferguson had suggested a terminus in 227 B. C. (regarding this as the end of an ordinary cycle of twelve years) and an actual break or interruption in 223 B. C., explained as the result of the creation of Ptolemais in 224/3 B. C. Meritt was able to dispense with two breaks in such close proximity by assigning the polemarch of 228/7 B. C. to Demetrias (2), and, regarding the polemarch of 220/19 B. C. as belonging to Antiochis (12), located a single break between 223 and 220 B. C. So far, Meritt's modification



is identical with mine. But for the location of the break he prefers the very year 223 B. C. suggested by Ferguson on the ground that it could then be explained by the creation of Ptolemais in 224/3 B. C. Pritchett adopts the initial year as a fundamental point in his discussion, and as the chief reason for arguing that the polemarch of 220/19 B. C. came from Antiochis (12).

I have always argued, however, in favor of placing the creation of Ptolemais, not in the archonship of Antiphilos (224/3) where the sole evidence consists in the confused order of the thesmothetai and in the fact that the Ptolemaia seem to have been celebrated in his year, but rather two years earlier in the archonship of Ergochares (226/5), where we have actual evidence in the calendar itself.<sup>16</sup> Pritchett now suggests that my date of the creation of Ptolemais "would leave unexplained the break in the archontes' cycle."<sup>17</sup> This criticism might be valid if it were an actual break; but I regard it merely as a natural terminus between the cycles, which need not have been actually interrupted in the case of the archons since, as we know, the rotation of the secretaries of the Council was unaffected by the new creation. Let us examine the situation more closely.

Assuming that Ptolemais was created shortly after the beginning of 226/5 B. C., it would seem that, if the cycle had previously been intended to terminate in 224 B. C., the normal procedure would have been to give Ptolemais immediately one of the three chief offices—though this would have been a measure of last resort, since Ptolemais would have occupied only a portion rather than the whole of this year,<sup>18</sup>—a second in 225/4 B. C., and, prolonging the cycle by one year because of the increased number of tribes, to take the third chief archon from Ptolemais in 224/3 B. C., thus terminating the cycle at what is now known to be actually the earliest possible terminus. But it is clear that in 225/4 B. C. the three chief archons all came from other tribes; evidently there was no immediate hurry. Presumably, therefore, the single unknown demotic of 226/5 B. C., that of the basileus,

<sup>16</sup> Dinsmoor, *Archons*, pp. 193-195, 460-463 (with my earlier date 229/8); *Archon List*, pp. 160-161, 231-232 (returning to the orthodox date 226/5).

<sup>17</sup> Pritchett, *A. J. P.*, LXI (1940), p. 193 n. 23.

<sup>18</sup> For similar arguments against awarding fractions of years to "privileged" tribes on other occasions, Aiantis in 263/2 and Ptolemais in 201/0 B. C., see *Archon List*, pp. 73, 173.

was not from Ptolemais, because there would have been no urgent need for this makeshift alteration in the course of the year; and another argument against a basileus from Ptolemais is the fact that the fourth thesmothetes belonged to a deme (Phlya) which evidently passed entirely from Kekropis (9) to Ptolemais,<sup>19</sup> so that, without duplication of tribes, disturbance of official sequence, or unfair discrimination, the thesmothetes might have regarded himself as representing both tribes at different portions of the year. The basileus of 226/5 B. C., therefore, would have represented (by elimination) either Aigeis (4) or Antiochis (12)<sup>20</sup>—for Pandionis (5) and Oineis (8) are to be excluded since they held the same office only two and three years earlier, in the same cycle. Thus the cycle evidently continued for at least three years after 224 B. C., with Antiphilos representing Ptolemais in 224/3 B. C., and presumably the basileus and polemarch coming from this tribe in 223/2 and 222/1 B. C., or vice versa. Thus the terminus would have been no earlier than 221 B. C. And since, in order to fit the cycles of the three offices, it could have been no later than 220 B. C., or preferably 221 B. C. in order to agree with the probable tribe of Thrasyphon, we may now regard 221 B. C. as the actual line of demarcation, restoring the list as follows:<sup>21</sup>

	Archon	Epony- mos	Basi- leus	Pole- march	Six Thesmothetai					
					4	5	6	10	11	12
229/8	Heliodoros	2	8	7	4	5	6	10	11	12
228/7	Leochares	12	5	2	1	4	7	9	10	11
227/6	Theophilos	10	11	8	2	3	5	6	9	12
226/5	Ergochares	7	[4/12]	6	1	2	3	P/9	10	11
225/4	Niketes	6	10	1/3	2	4	7	8	*P	12
224/3	Antiphilos	P	2	12	1	3	*9	6		
223/2	?? Kalli - - -		[P ?]							
222/1	Archelaos			[P ?]						
221/0	Thrasyphon	[2]			[1]	[3]	4	8	10	11
220/19	Menekrates	8	9	12	1	2	4	6	P	11
219/8	Chairephon	12	4	11	1/2					
218/7	[K]all[i . . . . .]									
217/6									11	12
216/5	Hagnias	4	7	6	2	3	5	P	9	11
215/4	Diokles	1	5	2	4	P	7	8	9	12
214/3	Euphiletos	5	10	8	1	3	P	9	11	12
213/2	Herakleitos	9						7		

<sup>19</sup> For the improbability that Phlya was a divided deme see n. 13 above.

<sup>20</sup> The few letters of the demotic read by Dow in line 32 seem to be A . . . A or A . . . . A, which would equally well fit Ankyle (4) or Anaphlystos (12), but hardly Aigilia (12).

<sup>21</sup> It will be noted that the two demes of which the subdivision has hitherto been left in question, Anakaia (nn. 5, 11, 12) and Atene (nn. 5, 8, 9), may now be definitely regarded as subdivided.

Counting back thirteen years from 221 B. C. we come to 234 B. C. as the beginning of an archon cycle, and twelve years earlier still we obtain an initial year in 246 B. C. This is the very year in which, according to my new arrangement of the archons, we find an unexplained break in the secretary cycles, which at that point begin a new system of rotation with Aigeis (4).<sup>22</sup> Thus the interpretation of *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1706, seems to offer additional confirmation for the break of the secretary cycles in 246 B. C. and so for my present dating of the archon Diomedon in 246/5 B. C. and, indirectly, for my present arrangement (system B) of the secretary cycles before the end of the Chremonidean War, with a secretary from Potamos (1) in the archonship of Demokles in 278/7 B. C.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Twenty-four years earlier still, in 270 B. C., the initial year of an archon cycle would coincide with that of the priestly cycle of Asklepios, but whether this rotation should be carried back without a break, to a beginning in 307 or 306 B. C., is questionable.

<sup>23</sup> Pritchett's new attribution of Potamos to Demetrias (2) as well as to Antigonis (1) and Leontis (6) weakens the force of one of the eliminations which led me to adopt system B (Pritchett, *A. J. P.*, LXI [1940], pp. 187, 193 n. 23), and would in itself permit a return to system A. I still feel, however, that the other factors involved necessitate the retention of system B.

## THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ATTIC STRATEGOI.

Mr. H. B. Mayor, in a recent paper,<sup>1</sup> has argued that the Athenian Strategoi, whose election by the Assembly is placed early in the seventh prytany,<sup>2</sup> entered office shortly thereafter as soon as they had passed the dokimasia. This theory, for which no absolutely decisive evidence is claimed,<sup>3</sup> dates the replacement of the old Board of Ten by the new generals some time before the start of the campaigning season instead of at the beginning of the civil year, as has been generally supposed, or of the councillor year, as Wade-Gery has recently postulated.<sup>4</sup> Mayor's arguments seem very plausible, but it may be well to consider literary and epigraphical evidence, neglected by him, which bears upon the case.

A difficulty with Mayor's theory can be clearly seen from a study of the Samian revolt of 440 B. C. Thucydides (I, 115) says that Byzantium revolted simultaneously with Samos. Byzantium paid tribute for the last time in the spring of 440 B. C.,<sup>5</sup> so the Samian war began after the collection of tribute in that year and continued through the greater part of 440/39 B. C.<sup>6</sup> This agrees with the statement in the scholia to Aristophanes, *Vespae*, 283: τὰ περὶ Σάμον ἰθ' ἔτει πρότερον ἐπὶ Τιμοκλέους (441/0 B. C.) γέγονε καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐξῆς Μορυχίδου (440/39 B. C.).<sup>7</sup> Thucydides (I, 117) gives the names of five Athenian leaders who arrived at Samos with the final reinforcements to Pericles from Athens.<sup>8</sup> These men, including Phormio, Hagnon, and Thucydides, were notable commanders, and, although they are not

<sup>1</sup> *J. H. S.*, LIX (1939), pp. 45-64.

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle, *Αθ. Πολ.*, 44, 4, and Aristophanes, *Nubes*, 581 ff. Cf. W. Schwahn, *R. E.*, Supplement VI, col. 1074.

<sup>3</sup> *Loc. cit.*, pp. 45 and 64.

<sup>4</sup> *Class. Quart.*, XXVII (1933), p. 28.

<sup>5</sup> Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor, *Athenian Tribute Lists*, I, p. 250.

<sup>6</sup> Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 2, p. 215, and Meritt, *Athenian Financial Documents*, p. 45. Meritt has determined from the evidence of *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 293, that the war against Byzantium and Samos lasted through only a small part of 441/0 B. C. and through the greater part of 440/39 B. C.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Diod., XII, 27 f., and Plutarch, *Pericles*, 24-28.

<sup>8</sup> A sixth general for this year, *Ἐπιτέλης*, is supplied from *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 943; cf. Accame, *Rivista di Filologia*, LXIII (1935), p. 343.

designated as strategoi, it is held, apparently without exception, that they partly represent the board of generals for the second and final year of the war.<sup>9</sup> The names of all ten members of another strategic board associated with Pericles against Samos are also known,<sup>10</sup> and since this list cannot be reconciled with the names given by Thucydides, it must be assigned to the year when the war began. In addition, there is still a third college of generals, differing from the other two, which Wade-Gery has successfully identified as a list of the men who swore to the terms of peace when the treaty was ratified at the close of the war.<sup>11</sup> Meritt has pointed out that the probable date for its ratification would be the Panathenaic festival in the summer of 439 B. C.<sup>12</sup> At any rate, this alliance must have been consummated shortly after the conclusion of the war, for the Samian capitulation was complete and there was no need for a lengthy discussion of terms (Thuc., I, 117). Thus, there are three different boards of strategoi within a period extending from the spring of 440 B. C. to the summer of 439 B. C. Only the orthodox theory that the term of office for the strategoi started in the middle of the present Gregorian year seems to fit the recorded facts.

Another objection to Mayor's theory results from a study of the language employed in Attic inscriptions of the fourth and later centuries in connection with the various military officials. Aristotle states ('Αθ. Πολ., 44, 4) that generals, hipparchs, and all other military ἀρχαί were elected simultaneously; so any theory which concerns the generals must with reason be extended to the other elected military magistrates. Whenever a temporal expression is required to designate the term of office of strategoi, hipparchs, and taxiarchs, the phrase ἐπὶ τοῦ δεῖνα ἄρχοντος is invariably employed. The abundant examples of such phraseology in carefully worded official documents imply simultaneity of office.<sup>13</sup> In *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1155 (339/8 B. C.), there is inscribed

<sup>9</sup> See Kirchner, *P. A.*, s. vv.; Krause, *Attische Strategenlisten*; Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 2, pp. 215 and 261; and, in particular, Meritt, *Athenian Financial Documents*, pp. 50-52.

<sup>10</sup> Aristides, II, p. 183, and III, p. 485 [ed. Dindorf]. Cf. Beloch, *op. cit.*, p. 261, and Meritt, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

<sup>11</sup> *Class. Phil.*, XXVI (1931), pp. 309-313.

<sup>12</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 53. Cf. Wade-Gery, *Class. Phil.*, XXVI (1931), p. 312, note 3.

<sup>13</sup> Some exceptions to this rule are cited by Ferguson, *A. J. P.*, LIX

the phrase οἱ στρατευσάμενοι ἐπὶ Λυσιμαχίδου ἄρχοντος καὶ ὁ ταξίαρχος ---; in *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 500 (302/1 B. C.) the phrase οἱ ταξίαρχοι οἱ ἐπ' Εὐξενίππου ἄρχοντος; in *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1485 and 1486 (307/6 B. C.), τοὺς ἱππάρχους τοὺς ἐπ' Ἀναξικράτους ἄρχοντος. The title to a third century catalogue reads as follows: οἱ στρατιῶται οἱ ἐπὶ --- ἄρχοντος ἀνέθηκαν στεφανώσαντες τὸν στρατηγὸν ---.<sup>14</sup> In *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 3201 (346/5 B. C.), a taxiarch is crowned as ταξι-αρχήσας ἐπὶ Ἀρχίῳ ἄρχοντος. Strategoi are frequently honored as στρατηγήσας ἐπὶ τοῦ δέινα ἄρχοντος (*I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 2854, 2856, 2857, etc.). Of an earlier date is the statue-base for Thrasyboulos of Kollytos: ἐπὶ Ἀστέῳ ἄρχοντος Θρασύβουλος Θράσωνος Κολλυτεὺς στρατηγῶν ---.<sup>15</sup> The list might be considerably expanded.<sup>16</sup>

In naming the generals for the year 425 B. C. in accord with the theory of a separate strategic year, Mayor (pp. 61-62) culls names from two Boards, as listed under the orthodox theory,—those of the years 426/5 and 425/4 B. C. For the year 424 B. C., no list is offered by Mayor, although he does, in the course of his discussion, name four generals for this year: Nicias, Lamachus, Hippocrates, and Thucydides. However, there remain eight other strategoi, seven explicitly named as such by Thucydides and an eighth added by Aristophanes, who must be assigned to the campaigning season of 424 B. C. In Thucydides, IV, 53, Nicostratus and Autocles are joined with Nicias in the description of the occupation of Cythera (June, 424).<sup>17</sup> In IV, 65, Eurymedon, Pythodorus, and Sophocles are named as the strategoi who ratified the terms of the Conference of Gela, held during the summer of 424 B. C. In IV, 75, Demodocus and Aristides are listed along with Lamachus as generals in command of the collecting of the tribute. Finally, Aristophanes (*Nubes*, 581 ff.) tells of Cleon's election after his military success at Sphacteria.<sup>17a</sup> This total of twelve military generals for Mayor's strategic year offers a real difficulty: it does not

(1938), pp. 235-236. These exceptions apply to examples which approximate, but do not precisely span, the archon's year.

<sup>14</sup> *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1958; cf. *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 682, lines 31 and 45.

<sup>15</sup> *Hesperia*, VIII (1939), no. 2 (373/2 B. C.).

<sup>16</sup> See Kahrstedt, *Untersuchungen zur Magistratur in Athen*, p. 72.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 324, line 21 (Meritt, *Athenian Financial Documents*, p. 138).

<sup>17a</sup> Cf. Wade-Gery, *Class. Quart.*, XXIV (1930), p. 33, note 3.



seem to be fair to assume that in two particular cases Thucydides uses the term *strategos* in the sense of a minor independent commander; nor will the suggestion that one of the twelve was chosen to fill the place of Hippocrates after the latter's death at Delium satisfy,<sup>18</sup> for this occurred in November, 424 B. C., much later than the known activities of any of the other eleven generals. In connection with this same year, another obstacle to Mayor's theory arises, for he must assign Eurymedon and Cleon to the same Board of Ten. Wade-Gery has argued that both were from the same tribe, Pandionis,<sup>19</sup> and has expostulated against any exception to the "one per Tribe" rule during the Archidamian War after Pericles' death.<sup>20</sup> These difficulties do not exist under the orthodox theory.

Mayor's plea for a new strategic year is based in large part on his interpretation of the events of the year 425 B. C. (pp. 50-63). A reëxamination of his position seems hardly necessary, for a very satisfactory analysis of the chronology of this year has been given by Wade-Gery and Meritt (*A. J. P.*, LVII [1936], pp. 377-394). Without special pleading, they assign the beginning of Demosthenes' generalship to the last of June. The word *ιδιώτης* (Thuc., IV, 2, 4) and the phrase *τῶν τε ἐν Πύλῳ στρατηγῶν ἕνα* (IV, 29, 1) are given their natural meaning. Demosthenes' generalship of 427/6 B. C. expired after his failure in Aetolia.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Adcock, *C. A. H.*, V, note on Table facing p. 252. Adcock, of course, has in mind for Hippocrates' successor a general active in the first half of 423 B. C.

<sup>19</sup> *Class. Quart.*, XXIV (1930), pp. 33-39. Cf. Meritt, *A. F. D.*, p. 129; West, *A. J. P.*, XLV (1924), p. 145, note 18; and Adcock, *C. A. H.*, V, ad Table facing p. 252.

<sup>20</sup> Aristotle, *Ἀθ. Πολ.*, 61, 1. Cf., however, Accame, *Rivista di Filologia*, LXIII (1935), pp. 341-355; Ferguson, *A. J. P.*, LIX (1938) pp. 232-233; and Busolt-Swoboda, *Gr. Staatskunde*, II, p. 891. Accame has objected that both Phormio and Hagnon were from Pandionis in the year 430/29 B. C. and Hipponicus and Nicias from Aigeis in 427/6 B. C. The latter has been conclusively demonstrated as incorrect by Meritt (*Hesperia*, V [1936], p. 410) and the former has been questioned by Wade-Gery (*Class. Quart.*, XXIV [1930], p. 33, note 2). In spite of Wade-Gery's more recent assignment of Phormio (*P. A.*, 14958) to Pandionis in *Class. Phil.*, XXVI (1931), pp. 312-313, the identification is not adopted by Beloch or Adcock.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. *C. A. H.*, V, p. 228. The clause *τὸν ἐς τὴν Αἰτωλίαν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγήσαντα, ὅπως σφίσις ἡγεμῶν γίγνηται* (III, 105, 3) may not fairly

Concerning the passage quoted by Mayor from Aristophanes' *Acharnenses*, many interpretations have been offered which are in accord with the orthodox theory. Adcock (*C. A. H.*, V, Table facing p. 252) assumes that Lamachus was general for the entire Attic year 426/5 B. C.; West (*A. J. P.*, XLV [1924], p. 147) suggested that Lamachus was chosen at a bye election; more probable is van Leeuwen's and Starkie's interpretation that Lamachus was a taxiarch (lines 566 ff.) and that the reference to the strategos in line 593 is a parody of the *Telephus*.<sup>22</sup> This latter is apparently the interpretation of Croiset (*Aristophanes and the Political Parties at Athens*, translated by J. Loeb, p. 54) and of G. Murray (*Aristophanes*, p. 34). Mayor's effort, following Müller-Strübing, to identify the persons alluded to in *Acharnenses*, lines 603-606, with the strategoi of 425 B. C. does not appear successful. It is difficult to connect Διομειαλαζών with Eurymedon or Sophocles, for the word should be understood as referring to a person from the deme Diomeia, of the tribe Aigeis (II); but the general from Aigeis is already known for this year, and he is not either of these two. Moreover, there is a reference in line 602 to the salary drawn by these men, whom Dicaeopolis in line 610 calls ambassadors. Since the generals received no salary,<sup>23</sup> it is preferable to adopt the conventional interpretation that the allusion is to remunerative posts in foreign countries, to which no active service was attached.

As for Mayor's rejection (pp. 48-50) of a generalship for Alcibiades in 420/19 B. C., the best evidence still seems to be that of Plutarch (*Alcibiades*, 15, and *Nicias*, 10), who expressly states that Alcibiades was appointed general before the quadruple alliance of July, 420 B. C. Finally, Mayor's assertion (pp. 47-48) that according to the orthodox theory Laches, predecessor

be evoked by the advocates of either theory. It merely refers to Demosthenes' generalship in the early summer of 426 B. C.

<sup>22</sup> At any rate, when Dicaeopolis, in line 595, calls Lamachus a σπουδαρχίδης, office-seeker, it suggests that Lamachus was canvassing for the generalship at the approaching election, which regularly occurred shortly after the Lenaea. With comic anticipation, Lamachus had boasted (line 593) that he was a general.

<sup>23</sup> Busolt-Swoboda, *Gr. Staatskunde*, II, p. 1075; cf. [Xenophon], *Ath.*, I, 3.

of Pythodorus, was commanding the Sicilian fleet as "pro-Strategus" from July, 426 B. C. till February, 425 B. C. overlooks the conclusion of West (*A. J. P.*, XLV [1924], p. 155) and Adcock (*loc. cit.*) that Laches, of Kekropis (VII), was in fact a general in the Attic year 426/5 B. C.<sup>24</sup> Formerly, it was supposed by Beloch that Laches and Pythodorus were both of Tribe VII, and so could not be generals in the same year. But West has shown that Pythodorus was of Tribe VIII, and he and Adcock agree in assigning generalships to both men for 426/5 B. C.

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<sup>24</sup> In this connection Mayor might have used the evidence offered by McGregor (*A. J. P.*, LIX [1938], pp. 154-155) that in 422 B. C. Cleon sailed for his post in the Thraceward region before the official beginning of his term of office. This affords no difficulty to the acceptance of the orthodox theory.

# A NEW FRAGMENT OF A. T. L., D 8.

One of the results of the study which Meritt has devoted to the restoration and interpretation of the Athenian decree concerning the collection of tribute<sup>1</sup> is the right understanding of the *φόρο ἐγλογῆς* as local boards appointed in the various allied cities. If there were any need for further proof of the new interpretation,<sup>2</sup> this would have to come from the postscript of that decree, lines 59 and 60.<sup>3</sup> The addition of a still unpublished fragment, though revising Meritt's tentative restoration, does not seem to give the desired further proof. The fragment E. M. 5533 joins fragments 9 and 10 of D 8 along their lower edge in such a way that the lines of fracture on their left and right sides appear as continued on the new fragment (cf. Fig. 1).



Fig. 1.

[Φ]όρο ἐγλο[γῆς τῶ]  
 [πα]ρὰ τῶν πό[λεων].

<sup>1</sup> B. D. Meritt, *Documents on Athenian Tribute* (abbreviated to *D. A. T.*), pp. 3-42; Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists* (abbreviated to *A. T. L.*), I, pp. 122 ff., D 8, 166 f., and pl. XXV.

<sup>2</sup> Approval has been expressed in the following reviews of Meritt's book: S. Accame, *Riv. di Fil.*, XVI (1938), p. 409; G. Daux, *Rev. Arch.*, XII (1938), p. 291; S. Dow, *A. J. A.*, XLII (1938), p. 601; R. Flacelière, *R. E. G.*, LI (1938), p. 290; H. Nesselhauf, *D. L. Z.*, LIX (1938), col. 1033; J. H. Oliver, *Cl. W.*, XXXII (1938), p. 87; M. N. Tod, *Cl. Rev.*, LII (1938), p. 138; A. M. Woodward, *Annals of Archaeology and Anthropology*, XXV (1938), p. 64 and *J. H. S.*, LVIII (1938), p. 108; U. Kahrstedt, *G. G. A.*, CC (1938), pp. 159 ff.; G. Corradi, *Boll. di Fil. Class.*, X (1939), pp. 264 ff.; compare M. N. Tod, *J. H. S.*, LIX (1939), p. 249, note 159.

<sup>3</sup> See Meritt, *D. A. T.*, p. 23.

In restoring [φ]όρο ἐγλο[γῆς, Meritt retains the old restoration; the rest can now be restored with certainty, based upon a comparison with line 28 of *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 76: τὸ παρὰ τῶν πόλεον. Below the two lines of the postscript there is preserved an uninscribed space of 0.10 m., and it seems safe to assume that the new fragment belongs to the lower end of the stele, and that its letters are part of the last lines of the whole inscription. The width of the stele at the lower end of the new fragment can be restored to 0.62 m., and the seventh letter of each of the two lines of the postscript falls exactly in the middle of the stele, below the space between the eighteenth and nineteenth stoichoi of the decree. Thus both lines of the postscript are evenly spaced over the width of the stele.<sup>4</sup>

The postscript may be understood as meaning "Collectors of tribute from the cities," if we assume that ἐγλογῆς is nominative plural of ἐκλογεύς. Whatever may be the significance of the postscript, it is not a part of the decree itself, though it was presumably engraved at the same time and by the same hand as the preceding decree.<sup>5</sup> Lines 25 and 26 of the decree provide that the stele be erected by the same prytany under which the decree was passed.<sup>6</sup> This, as well as the uninscribed space below the postscript, may exclude the possibility that the names of the collectors (if they were to be elected in the allied cities) were intended to be inscribed below the postscript. The postscript itself does not indicate clearly whether the collectors were to be Athenians or citizens of the various cities, but it does not contradict Meritt's interpretation that the collectors were appointed by the Allies. Their official title may now be attested by the postscript as well as by the literary tradition and by the appointment of similar boards in the decree regulating the Offering of First-fruits at Eleusis.<sup>7</sup> It seems unlikely that

<sup>4</sup> Compare Meritt, *D. A. T.*, pp. 25 f.

<sup>5</sup> Similar postscripts accompany the decrees published as *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 39, 87 (see Meritt and Davidson, *A. J. P.*, LVI [1935], p. 70, line 36), 94 (see *I. G.*, I, suppl., pp. 66 f., no. 53 a), 106, 135 (see W. Bannier, *Berl. Ph. Woch.*, XLVII [1927], col. 668), 170, and 171; compare Thucydides, V, 56, 3. For the interpretation of the postscript of *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 39, see M. N. Tod, *Greek Hist. Inscr.*, p. 85.

<sup>6</sup> See Meritt, *D. A. T.*, p. 24. For a similar provision, see *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 139, 16 ff.; compare Schulthess, *R. E.*, VII, col. 1734, 3 ff.

<sup>7</sup> See Meritt, *D. A. T.*, pp. 14 ff.; *A. T. L.*, T 18, 44, 62, 66, and 100.

boards of collectors were first established for the collection of the First-fruits, and afterwards similar boards for the collection of the tribute. Thus, D 8 may have been passed several years before *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 76,<sup>8</sup> an assumption which confirms the date that Meritt now proposes (*A. T. L.*, p. 213, D 8; compare E. Weston, *A. J. P.*, LXI [1940], p. 349).

A few remarks may be added on the date of D 7; Meritt assumed that this document has to be dated prior to D 8.<sup>9</sup> This is not the place to discuss the content of this decree; yet I believe that the letter forms of the inscription indicate a date near the middle of the fifth century. To determine an upper limit, we may point out that only few public inscriptions (engraved in Attic script) of the period before 449 B. C. contain examples of four-bar sigma, and in these it appears almost exclusively in the headings.<sup>10</sup> We may conclude, therefore, that D 7 is definitely later than 449 B. C. In the seventh Tribute List, from the year 448/7 B. C., four-bar sigma is employed for the first time throughout the whole text of an Athenian public inscription; the eighth List, from the following year, brings, I think for the last time, a revival of the three-bar sigma. The first building accounts of the Parthenon (*I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 339; B. D. Meritt, *A. J. A.*, XXXVI [1932], pp. 472 f.) and of the statue

The Eleusinian decree provides that the First-fruits should be collected within Attika by the demarchs, thus possibly replacing the older board of *παράσιτοι* who had to collect the *lepòs oĩtos*; see Athenaeus, VI, p. 235 and Pollux, VI, 35.

<sup>8</sup> For the date of *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 76, see W. B. Dinsmoor, *Archons of Athens*, pp. 338 ff. and M. N. Tod, *Greek Hist. Inscr.*, no. 74.

<sup>9</sup> See *D. A. T.*, pp. 59 f. and *A. T. L.*, pp. 122, D 7, 164 f., 212 f., and pl. XXIV; approval has been expressed in the reviews listed in note 1. Only Nesselhauf wishes to date D 7 after D 8; yet his argument is, as I understand, based on a restoration which has now been abandoned by Meritt with regard to a recently found fragment (see *A. T. L.*, p. XI, Addendum and P. G. Stevens, *Hesperia*, Supplement III, p. 78, fig. 59).

<sup>10</sup> Tribute List of 453/2 B. C.; *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 19 and 929, 67 (see *I. G.*, I, 433, 67); decree concerning Sigeion, published by Meritt, *Hesperia*, V (1936), pp. 360 ff., no. 3. The building accounts, published as *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 335, are not well enough dated to be used as evidence for the occurrence of four-bar sigma before 449 B. C.; compare H. T. Wade-Gery, *J. H. S.*, LIII (1933), p. 79, note 28. The same applies to the inscription published as *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 37; compare A. Binneboessel, *Att. Urkundenreliefs*, pp. 40 f.



of Athena Parthenos (*I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 354), both dated in 447/6 B. C., have four-bar sigma; there is, however, no evidence to show that the texts of these two inscriptions were not cut on the stone some years after 447/6 B. C. No Tribute List from the year 449/8 B. C. is preserved, but *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 24 may belong to this year, and this inscription is similar to D 7, except for the three-bar sigma.<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, there may be mentioned *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 20, an inscription which cannot be dated with accuracy, but which contains in its heading a three-bar sigma, while four-bar sigma is consistently employed in the text of the decree.<sup>12</sup> As to other examples of the early use of four-bar sigma, I should like to refer to *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 940 and to the epigram on the public grave monument of the Athenians who fell in 447 B. C. at Koroneia.<sup>13</sup> *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 396 is

<sup>11</sup> For the restoration and date of *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 24, see M. N. Tod, *Greek Hist. Inscr.*, no. 40 and G. Welter, *Arch. Anz.* (1939), col. 14. Here should also be mentioned *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 44, where, besides early letter forms, four-bar sigma is employed. The inscription from Eleusis published by K. Kourouniotis, *Ἐλευσινιακά*, I, pp. 173 ff. and dated (in spite of the occurrence of three-bar sigma) after 446 B. C. may well be earlier; see G. M. Richter, *Ἀρχ. Ἐφ.* (1937), p. 25, n. 6; M. Segre, *Clara Rhodos*, IX (1938), p. 167, note 3. R. Vallois, *R. E. A.*, XXXV (1933), pp. 195 ff., brings the Eleusinian inscription into relation with the Eleusinian building accounts, *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 336, which (with its three-bar sigma) is most similar to *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 24; for Vallois' interpretation of ἀγαλμα, compare *Syll.*<sup>3</sup>, no. 142, note 4. All these inscriptions, including D 7 and the Attic monetary decree, should be understood as evidence for Perikles' foreign, finance, and building policy at the beginning of the 'forties; doubts as to the early date of the copy of the monetary decree found in Aphytis have been expressed by D. M. Robinson, *T. A. P. A.*, LXIX (1938), p. 43, note 1 (compare C. H. V. Sutherland, *Greece and Rome*, IX [1940], p. 68).

<sup>12</sup> An early date for *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 20 was suggested by M. N. Tod, *Greek Hist. Inscr.*, p. 57; compare H. T. Wade-Gery, *B. S. A.*, XXXIII (1935), p. 112, note 2. Compare also the public funeral list published as *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 937.

<sup>13</sup> See Kyparissis and Peek, *Ath. Mitt.*, LVII (1932), pp. 142 ff.; compare *Hesperia*, VIII (1939), p. 159, note 2. I wish to add that further study convinced me that *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 394 I, and possibly also *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 400 Ia, belong to the monument erected after the Athenian victory over the Boeotians at Oinophyta in 457 B. C.; compare, however, R. Vallois, *R. E. A.*, XXXV (1933), p. 196, note 1. In this case, there does not seem to remain a single public Attic inscription with three-bar sigma that can be dated with certainty after 447/6 B. C.; compare, however, the various ostraka illustrated by J. Carcopino, *L'ostracisme Athénien*, pls. 2 and 3, and J. Kirchner, *Imagines*, nos. 29 and 30.

another public inscription with four-bar sigma that may be dated in the year 447 B. C., if we should restore in it the name of Eretria (see U. Kahrstedt, *Staatsgebiet*, pp. 35 and 38; Graf Stauffenberg, *R. E.*, VI A, col. 1682, 39 ff.); compare, however, H. Nesselhauf, *Klio*, Beiheft XXX, pp. 136 f.; F. Hampl, *Klio*, XIV (1939), p. 39.

The preceding observations may be sufficient to show that a public decree in the writing of which four-bar sigma is employed can be dated as early as 448/7 B. C., provided, of course, that the forms of the other letters support such a date. That is the case with D 7. Some of its letter forms seem late, but are well attested for the early 'forties: alpha with its horizontal stroke near the bottom occurs on *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 34; lambda with its shorter stroke almost horizontally engraved occurs on *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 19, 20, 529, and on the Koroneia epigram (see note 13). Early features are: rho, which closes against the upright at an acute angle about two-thirds of the way down toward the bottom; upsilon, which is in many instances still made of two curving branches. For the shapes of alpha, rho, and upsilon compare the inscription published by W. K. Pritchett, *Hesperia*, IX (1940), pp. 97 ff., no. 18. The lower limit for the date of D 7 may be determined by its comparison with *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 39 and 50, decrees from the years 446 and 439 B. C.;<sup>14</sup> both inscriptions appear to be definitely later than D 7. We draw the conclusion that D 7 may be dated on the basis of its letter forms in one of the years following the middle of the fifth century, and not later than 445 B. C. A date more accurate than that will be suggested by Hill and Meritt in their forthcoming publication of the new fragment of D 7.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> For *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 39, see M. N. Tod, *Greek Hist. Inscr.*, no. 42; for *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 50, see Meritt, *Athenian Financial Documents*, pp. 48 ff.

<sup>15</sup> In publishing these observations I have enjoyed the encouragement of Professor Meritt who kindly allowed me to use his notes and photographs and discussed with me most of the questions involved.

## P. ABERDEEN 18.

Among a large group of papyri and ostraca of varied contents,<sup>1</sup> Mr. E. G. Turner has published as number 18 a two-line document which has a certain value for the history of the Nile at the close of the third century of our era.<sup>2</sup> It reveals how closely the progress of the river was scrutinized during the period of inundation.<sup>3</sup> With the guidance of daily records such as the Aberdeen papyrus precautions might be taken to avoid the grave consequences to the country's agriculture incident on a flood of too great or too meager proportions, and no time need be lost when the proper moment came to open the dikes for the reception of the flood waters.<sup>4</sup> A number of inscriptions and papyri give the maximal rise of the Nile in specific years,<sup>5</sup> but only P. Aberdeen 18 and P. Oxyrhynchus 1830 (6th century) record the observation of its rise from day to day. Mr. Turner was unable to establish conclusively that his text relates to the annual inundation, and the purpose of this note is to confirm his conjecture.

The text in question exists in two copies, and from the published plate I derive the following diplomatic transcript, which will serve as a control of discussion.

<sup>1</sup> *Catalogue of Greek and Latin Papyri and Ostraca in the Possession of the University of Aberdeen. Aberdeen University Studies*, No. 116 (Aberdeen, University Press), 1939.

<sup>2</sup> The date of the text is given explicitly as "9th year (of Diocletian) and 8th year (of Maximian)," i. e. 292 A. D.

<sup>3</sup> The administrative apparatus for the measurement of the flood in antiquity may be studied in Ludwig Borchardt, *Nilmesser und Nilstandsmarken*, *Abh. Berl. Akad.*, 1906, *Phil.-hist. Abh. nicht zur Akad. gehör.* Gelehrter, *Abh. I.*; the similar arrangements of modern Egypt, in J. Barois, *Irrigation in Egypt* (translated from the French by Major A. M. Miller), *Miscellaneous Documents of the House of Representatives for the second session of the fiftieth Congress*, Vol. 9 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1890).

<sup>4</sup> Some idea of the economic significance of the Nile in Egyptian life may be gained from Allan C. Johnson, *Roman Egypt to the Reign of Diocletian (Economic Survey of Ancient Rome)*, edited by Tenney Frank, Vol. II), pp. 7-19.

<sup>5</sup> See Turner's introduction to P. Aberdeen 18.

ΟΘΕΚΑΙΚΥΝΙΡΘϚΚΑΙΗϚΘΩΘΙΖΕΙϚΙΗ  
 ΔΑΚΒΓ<sup>+</sup>ΠΗΧΙΓΔΑΚΔΗΠΠΗΧΙΔΔΑΚΗ

The text is replete with unmarked abbreviations, and to these Mr. Turner's transcript is for the most part an excellent guide.

ὁ θε(ὸς) καὶ κύ(ριος) Νιῤ̄ θ (ἔτους) καὶ η (ἔτους) Θὼθ ιζ εἰς ιη  
 δακ(τύλους) β, γί(νονται) πήχ(εις) ιγ δάκ(τυλοι) δ, ἡπ(είρου) (?)  
 πήχ(εις) ιδ δάκ(τυλοι) η

Mr. Turner has equated Νιῤ̄ with Νίλος = Νείλος, but he is perturbed by the substitution of ρ for λ before a vowel and by the form of the mark of abbreviation.<sup>6</sup> I suggest that the first words of the text be read ὁ θε(ὸς) καὶ κύ(ριος) Νί(λος) πρ(οσβέβηκεν), "The God and Lord Nilus has risen." The abbreviation of the verb follows a known type in which the first letter of the word is placed above the second.<sup>7</sup> ἀναβαίνειν and ἀνάβασις are more usual for the rising of the Nile, but P. Oxyrhynchus 1830 employs both ἀναβαίνειν and προσβαίνειν<sup>8</sup> in this sense, and P. Maspero 2, II, 22 has the phrase ἡ τῶν νειλώων ὑδάτων πρόσβασις. In this way, all doubt is removed that the Aberdeen papyrus is a report on the rise of the Nile from September 14 to 15 of the year 292 A. D.

The text raises no further difficulty until we strike ἡπ(είρου) in line 2. From Thoth 17 to 18 the Nile rose 2 digits, making a total rise from the beginning of the flood season up to Thoth 18 of 13 cubits 4 digits. Then come the disturbing letters ΗΠ followed by a higher total. Mr. Turner is properly cautious in suggesting the resolution ἡπ(είρου); it is not easy to see what force the word could have here.<sup>9</sup> The difficulty is removed by

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19, n. 1.

<sup>7</sup> L. Mitteis and U. Wilcken, *Grundzüge und Chrestomathie der Papyrskunde*, I, i, p. xli. π above ρ occurs in P. London I for πράγματος and πρό; see Index 6 (b) in that edition. The cursive form of π is illustrated in Viktor Gardthausen, *Griechische Palaeographie*, II (Leipzig, 1913), p. 329.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. P. Petrie, II, p. 22, No. IX, 1, 7.

<sup>9</sup> P. Aberdeen, p. 20: "... the second total, introduced by the letters ηπ, creates difficulties. In expanding the letters to read ἡπ(είρου) I have supposed that it refers to the height of flood water either covering the valley, or perhaps accumulated in an artificial reservoir. The peculiar fact that this second total is higher than the first is to be

comparison of the Aberdeen papyrus with P. Oxyrhynchus 1830. Although the texts are separated by an interval of two or three hundred years, the Aberdeen papyrus is just such a skeleton report as might be expanded into a letter like that from Oxyrhynchus. The pertinent words of the latter<sup>10</sup> are εὐαγγελίζομαι . . . τὸν . . . τῆς Αἰγύπτου ποταμὸν προσβεβηκέναι . . . ἀπὸ ε τοῦ Μεσορῆ μηνὸς ἕως ζ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνέβη δακτύλους ιβ, ὡς εἶναι νέου ὕδατος πήχεις β δακτύλους κ . . . πέρνσι δὲ ταῖς αὐταῖς ἡμέραις ἀνέβη δακτύλους λζ, ὡς εἶναι νέου ὕδατος πήχεις ε δακτύλους ζ . . . The rise of the Nile in the last three days and its total rise from the beginning of the inundation are followed by the same data for last year. Similarly, in the Aberdeen papyrus, the total rise to date is followed by the total rise at the same time last year, and the mysterious letters should be resolved ἡ π(ερυσινή), sc. πρόσβασις.

With these corrections the text now has the following appearance:

ὁ θε(ὸς) καὶ κύ(ριος) Νί(λος) πρ(οσβέβηκεν) θ (ἔτους) καὶ η (ἔτους)  
 Θὼθ ιζ εἰς ιη  
 δακ(τύλους) β, γί(νονται) πήχ(εις) ιγ δάκ(τυλοι) δ. ἡ π(ερυσινή)  
 πρόσβασις) πηχ(ών) ιδ δακ(τύλων) η.

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explained on the hypothesis that artificial means, perhaps something like the ξνθεμα of P. Oxy. 1830, have been used." The character of the ξνθεμα itself is obscure. The Oxyrhynchus text suggests a reservoir, and this brings to mind a Nilometer of the kind found at Edfu and pictured by Borchardt, *op. cit.*, p. 26. For other guesses, see the editors' note. The problem is complicated by the very uncertain reading of line 9, which I cannot believe is correct.

<sup>10</sup> For the sake of convenience, editorial punctuation—square and curved brackets—has been omitted.

## REVIEWS.

W. JAEGER. Diokles von Karystos. Die griechische Medizin und die Schule des Aristoteles. Berlin, 1938. Pp. 244.

Jaeger's book is the first modern monograph on Diocles, whose fame in antiquity almost equalled that of Hippocrates. That recent scholars have neglected him may partly be due to the fact that only fragments of his writings are preserved.<sup>1</sup>

Against the common belief Jaeger tries to demonstrate that Diocles did not live before Aristotle. Rose's opinion to the same effect did not carry any conviction, for it was made as an aperçue rather than elaborated as a doctrine. Maass' splendid observation that Diocles avoids hiatus elucidated a detail of his style, but did not prove that he lived in the last third of the 4th century B. C., as Maass suggested (cf. Jaeger, pp. 13 ff.). By placing the scattered references to Diocles into the framework of Greek philosophy Jaeger puts on a new basis the discussion of the problems involved, for he shows for the first time to what extent Diocles' language and thought coincide with Aristotelian formulations and ideas. Jaeger then concludes that Diocles must have been dependent on Aristotle and that he must have been at least his contemporary, for otherwise Aristotle would be dependent on Diocles, and that too in regard to important metaphysical and ethical concepts as well as characteristic scientific terms and stylistic devices.

Such a line of reasoning, no doubt, contains an *a priori* assumption which is not incontestable. Aristotle in many respects is dependent on his predecessors, and if it were certain that Diocles lived earlier, one would have to resign oneself to the fact that it is Diocles who taught Aristotle. Yet, whereas scholars so far had concluded from ancient testimony that Diocles died around 350 B. C., certainly before Aristotle formulated his own philosophical system, Jaeger infers from the fragments that he died after 300 B. C. and before 288/7 B. C. (p. 119). In an article, published shortly after his book had appeared, Jaeger goes even farther and tries to prove that Diocles lived from 340-260 B. C.<sup>2</sup> In both cases Jaeger's thesis is based on the interpretation of the same two statements which alone, it seems,

<sup>1</sup> M. Wellmann, *Die Fragmente der Sikelischen Ärzte Akron, Philistion und des Diokles von Karystos* (Berlin, 1901).

<sup>2</sup> *Vergessene Fragmente des Peripatetikers Diokles von Karystos, Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, 1938, Phil.-hist. Klasse, No. 3, p. 17. (This paper I shall quote as II, whereas the book will be quoted as I).



provide direct information about Diocles' lifetime, the one coming from Theophrastus (*Περὶ λίθων*, chap. 5 = frag. 166 Wellmann), the other from Athenaeus (II 59a = frag. 125 Wellmann).

Frag. 166, although of secondary importance for Jaeger, must be considered first, because of certain difficulties which it involves. It reads thus: ἔλκει γὰρ (*scil.* τὸ λυγγούριον) ὥσπερ τὸ ἤλεκτρον, οἱ δὲ φασιν οὐ μόνον κάρφη καὶ ξύλον, ἀλλὰ καὶ χαλκὸν καὶ σίδηρον, ἐὰν ᾗ λεπτός, ὥσπερ καὶ Διοκλῆς ἔλεγεν. Originally Jaeger claimed that Diocles, who was still alive around 300 B. C., must have been dead at the time when these words were written (before 288/7 [I, p. 119]), since Theophrastus speaks of him in the imperfect. Later he maintains only, again on account of the use of the imperfect, that Diocles was not in Athens when Theophrastus wrote (II, p. 13), another possible explanation of the tense discussed by Jaeger in his book, but there rejected as unlikely (*loc. cit.*).

The possibility of such a flexible interpretation of the imperfect (cf. also I, p. 14), in my opinion, does not enhance confidence in the certainty of either the one or the other conclusion. Moreover, Pliny, in paraphrasing the passage, says (XXXVII, 53): *quod Diocli cuidam Theophrastus quoque credit*. Jaeger, referring to the somewhat deprecatory expression *Diocli cuidam*, says: "Dieser Unterschied in der Bewertung des Diokles bei Theophrast und Plinius würde allein schon fast genügen, um zu beweisen, dass es sich um den grossen peripatetischen Arzt handeln muss . . ." (I, p. 117); and he claims that Diocles "für ihn (*scil.* Pliny) keine greifbare Grösse mehr ist" (*loc. cit.*). Yet, since Theophrastus does not pass any judgment on Diocles' achievements, it is impossible to speak of differences in the evaluations pronounced by Theophrastus and by Pliny. Besides, it is hardly justifiable to cavil at Pliny's appreciation of Diocles' importance, for Pliny, who in other places mentions Diocles either simply by name or as the physician Diocles, calls him "the second in glory to Hippocrates" (XXVI, 10 = frag. 5 Wellmann). Since Pliny understood Theophrastus' statement to refer to a *certain* Diocles, this Diocles for Pliny could not be identical with the famous Diocles. Therefore it is dangerous, I believe, to use the fragment at all for determining the lifetime of Diocles of Carystus.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> There is at least one other fragment the genuineness of which is doubtful (frag. 99 Wellmann), cf. J. Heeg, *Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, 1911, pp. 991 ff. Wellmann's re-vindication of the fragment (*Hermes*, XLVIII [1913], pp. 464 ff.) is not convincing. Another physician Diocles is known from Galen (XIII, p. 87 Kühn, and Wellmann, p. 65, n. 1), not to speak of all the others by that name referred to in ancient literature. Cf. also D'Arcy Wentworth Thompson, *The Philosophical Review*, XLVIII (1939), pp. 212-213.

The chronological evidence thus seems restricted to frag. 125: Διοκλῆς δὲ κολοκύντας μὲν καλλίστας γίνεσθαι περὶ Μαγνησίαν, προσέτι τε γογγύλην ὑπερμεγέθη γλυκεῖαν καὶ εὐστόμαχον, ἐν Ἀντιοχείᾳ δὲ σικυόν, ἐν δὲ Σμύρνῃ καὶ Γαλατίᾳ θρίδακα, πήγανον δ' ἐν Μύροις. The mention of Antioch, Jaeger says—taking up an argument of Rose entirely overlooked and forgotten later on—proves that Diocles was still alive when that city was founded or even for some time thereafter; Diocles must have lived, therefore, until 300 B. C. (I, pp. 67 ff.). Yet, as Theiler pointed out to Jaeger, Galatia is mentioned in the same fragment, and the name Galatia cannot have been used earlier than 270 B. C. (cf. II, p. 16). Jaeger, therefore, finally assumes as Diocles' term of life the years 340 to 260 B. C. (II, pp. 17; 36), and he claims that Diocles must have lived long enough to polemize against Herophilus whose *floruit* lies between 270 and 260 B. C. (cf. II, pp. 15; 36 ff.).

How does such a hypothesis fit in with the indirect evidence? When in his book Jaeger discusses Vindicianus' (4/5th century A. D.) doxographical survey of medical problems in which certain theories of Diocles are formulated as answers to the doctrines of Herophilus, he writes: "Wir müssen also entweder Wellmanns Voraussetzung preisgeben, dass in dem Exzerpt wörtliche Zitate aus Diokles vorliegen, oder folgern, dass Diokles im 3. Jahrh. lange genug gelebt habe, um eine Schrift gegen Herophilus verfassen zu können, der von Galen und anderen antiken Zeugen ausdrücklich als jünger als Diokles bezeichnet wird und nach herrschender Annahme erst vom zweiten und dritten Jahrzehnt an 'geblüht' hat. Dieser Synchronismus hat natürlich etwas Verlockendes, wenn man schon einmal dabei ist, die ganze Chronologie und Entwicklungsgeschichte der griechischen Medizin von Hippokrates bis zum Beginn des hellenistischen Zeitalters umzustossen. Aber hier stehen wir im Begriff, den Boden sicherer Tatsachen zu verlassen und statt der überwundenen Schwierigkeiten neue zu schaffen" (I, p. 200). Indeed, the assumption that Diocles could have opposed views held by Herophilus is inconsistent with the testimonies of Celsus and Galen (frags. 4; 16 Wellmann) who agree that Diocles wrote before Herophilus.

Why does Jaeger now (II, p. 15) consider as genuine the so-called answers of Diocles to Herophilus which he himself had shown to be arranged by Vindicianus, as is typical of this late compilatory literature (I, pp. 200 ff.)? His main reason for changing his mind is the reference to Galatia (II, p. 16); and yet, Kaibel, in his edition of Athenaeus, had already remarked: γαλατεία C E, videtur corruptum; Kaibel's statement is probably due to stylistic considerations, as Jaeger explains (*loc. cit.*). Jacoby, too, regards καὶ Γαλατία as an obvious insertion which destroys the careful antithesis otherwise to be observed in these words (Jacoby *apud* Jaeger, *loc. cit.*, p. 16, n. 2). Moreover,

since the statement apparently means to tell where the best kind of lettuce is grown, it would be hardly appropriate to name two places of production (Smyrna and Galatia); also in the words immediately preceding and following only one place is mentioned for the best kind of vegetables referred to there (cf. E. Kind, *Philologische Wochenschrift*, LIX [1939], p. 528). Finally, Diocles, in giving the places of origin, usually speaks of cities, not of countries (Jaeger, II, p. 16). One must conclude, I think, that καὶ Γαλατία is a later insertion; additions in statements of this kind are certainly nothing extraordinary.

At any rate, the contention that Diocles lived long enough to write against Herophilus—a claim which is refuted by all indirect testimony—cannot be established by the evidence adduced by Jaeger.<sup>4</sup> Besides, the content of Diocles' teaching is in no way linked to the work done by Herophilus and his associates; on the contrary, Diocles' doctrine and method are characteristic of the bent of the older generation. To give one striking example: Diocles' anatomy is animal anatomy, not human anatomy (cf. I, p. 165), which is a distinctive feature of Hellenistic medicine. It is safe to say that none of the new medical concepts, as conceived by the physicians of the first half of the third century B. C., is echoed in the fragments preserved from Diocles' writings. Had he really lived and worked from 340-260 B. C. his system would be an outright anachronism. That it was is, of course, not impossible; yet this could be concluded only on the basis of irrefutable evidence.

If the chronological argument from the fragments allows of any conclusion at all, it proves that Diocles lived until 300 B. C., the time in which Antioch was founded, or shortly after, in other words perhaps from 375-295 B. C. Such a result is not incompatible with Pliny's and Galen's opinion that Diocles lived shortly after Hippocrates (frag. 5 Wellmann, *secundus aetate* (*scil.* Hippocratis); frag. 26 Wellmann, μικρόν ὕστερον Ἱπποκράτους),<sup>5</sup> for Hippocrates probably died around 380 B. C. The new date for Diocles' lifetime can also be reconciled with Celsus'

<sup>4</sup> Consequently it seems impossible to accept either Jaeger's identification of Diocles of Carystus with the Diocles mentioned in the will of Strato (II, pp. 10 ff.), or his new dates for the physicians of the 4th century B. C., which he bases on his chronology of Diocles (II, pp. 36 ff.). Furthermore, if Jaeger's thesis as formulated in his article is adopted, it becomes even more doubtful that the so-called letter of Diocles to Antigonos is genuine (I, pp. 70 ff.), for Diocles could hardly write to the king on an equal footing around 305/4 (I, p. 79) if he was at that time 35 years old and at the beginning of his career.

<sup>5</sup> I fail to understand Jaeger's statement that a *floruit* of Diocles shortly before or around 300 B. C. is in agreement with Pliny's expression: *Diocles secundus aetate famaque Hippocratis* (II, p. 12), nor can I see that Galen's μικρόν ὕστερον Ἱπποκράτους is already a misrepresentation of the tradition, because it puts Diocles immediately after Hippocrates (II, p. 37).

reckoning of generations (frag. 4, *post quem* (scil. Hippocratem) *Diocles Carystius, deinde Praxagoras et Chrysippus, tum Herophilus et Erasistratus*). Yet, I think one must admit that Diocles' lifetime then extends over a longer period or begins at a later date than one would have guessed from the indirect information.

Nevertheless, even if one is inclined to disregard the one direct testimony (frag. 125) entirely, since it certainly has been altered by addition, and since the foundation of Antioch seems a rather late *terminus post quem* for Diocles' death—even then it would be in accord with all the other ancient witnesses to assume that Diocles was a contemporary of Aristotle. Before Jaeger nobody ever seriously considered this possibility, for the close ideological and stylistic resemblance between the work of the two men had not been observed and the question of their mutual dependence consequently was no issue. Now that this observation has been made, one becomes aware that nothing prevents assuming Diocles to have been of the same age as Aristotle or somewhat younger.<sup>6</sup> On the contrary, the evidence points in this direction, for according to all sources Diocles was later than Hippocrates; there is no indication that the two were contemporaries, they are always distinguished as belonging to different generations. The chronological argument then, rightly considered, is in favor of Jaeger's first thesis of a close proximity of Diocles and Aristotle. This again makes it unnecessary to explain their agreement by presuming that Aristotle borrows from Diocles.

All these considerations do not, of course, indicate the extent of the reciprocal influence of the two men, or whose influence was the stronger and more important. It stands to reason that Diocles, in the methodological discussions in which he shares the views of Aristotle,<sup>7</sup> is dependent on him. Tradition does not suggest any philosophical originality of Diocles, and the fragments show a combination of different trends rather than a strongly personal point of view. Diocles may also have taken over the terminology, which in many respects closely resembles that of Aristotle (I, pp. 16 ff.).<sup>8</sup> Allowance must be made, however, for some exception to the contrary even in regard to this relation. Too little is known about Diocles to exclude the possibility of his having some philosophical ideas of his own or devising some stylistic novelty.<sup>9</sup> The statement of Diocles (II,

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Jaeger, I, p. 12: "Einen durchschlagenden Grund für . . . frühe Datierung des Diokles gibt es in der Tat nicht."

<sup>7</sup> ποιότης (?), ὁμοιον, ἀρχαὶ ἀναπόδεικτοι, ἀρμόττον (I, pp. 25 ff.; 37 ff.); the concept of teleology (pp. 51 ff.).

<sup>8</sup> ἐνδέχεσθαι (I, p. 23); ποσαχῶς λέγεται (p. 24); συμβάλειν εἰωθε (p. 31).

<sup>9</sup> Especially if he had been a ῥήτωρ (frag. 99 Wellmann, and Jaeger I, p. 2). But Wellmann's emendation was rejected and the genuineness of the fragment disputed by Heeg (cf. *supra* n. 3).

pp. 5 ff.) in which he disagrees with Aristotle in the explanation of winds shows that, in spite of all his dependence on Aristotelian philosophy, Diocles was able to judge for himself even in questions of natural philosophy. Nor is there any reason why it should have been necessary for him to learn what he learned by a careful study of the published *Ethics* as well as from the oral lectures which he had heard.<sup>10</sup>

Yet, if it is reasonable to assume Diocles' dependence on Aristotle in these matters, a similar subordination of Diocles the zoologist and physician is not probable. It is hardly a "Skandalon der historischen Vernunft" (I, p. 177) that Diocles' work is represented as one of the sources of Aristotle's zoological writings. In the first place, Diocles discussed questions of zoology not only in his meager dietetical books, as Jaeger at one place says (I, p. 176), but also in his treatise on anatomy, the first ever written (Galen, II, p. 282 Kühn = frag. 23 Wellmann). This book, then, could have been a source of information for Aristotle, as Jaeger elsewhere admits (I, pp. 183-4), and a source of special importance if Aristotle himself did not write on anatomy (I, p. 165, n. 1). Such a work presupposes systematic knowledge and most probably contained a description of animal parts (contrary to Jaeger, *loc. cit.*); there is certainly no proof that it was unsystematic or lacking in description. Moreover, even disregarding the problem of the Coan zoological system (I, pp. 167 ff.), Aristotle himself testifies to his knowledge of forerunners in the field; he cannot have been the first to establish a system of zoology.<sup>11</sup> This fact in no way detracts from the remarkable qualities of his work or from the incomparable greatness of his achievement. Even where he takes over his knowledge, he maintains his independent attitude. Jaeger was doubtless correct when in his book he interpreted *De Generatione Animalium* II 7, 745 b 33-746 a 28 as a polemic against Diocles' divergent opinions (I, p. 166) and suggested that there may be many other such polemics in the Aristotelian writings (I, p. 167).<sup>12</sup> Still, even controversy does not exclude dependence, in the case of Aristotle any more than in the case of Diocles, the natural scientist.

<sup>10</sup> I, p. 59: "Nun scheint mir aber aus unserer Untersuchung zugleich unwiderleglich hervorzugehen, dass Diokles die ethische Lehre des späten Aristoteles nicht nur aus mündlichem Vortrag, sondern in ihrer genauen schriftlichen Formulierung gekannt hat, wie sie in der Nikomachischen Ethik uns vorliegt."

<sup>11</sup> Cf. I. V. Carus, *Geschichte der Zoologie* (1872), pp. 57 ff.; 77. If Buffon, Cuvier, and Alexander v. Humboldt are inclined to see in Aristotle the first whom tradition mentions, the originator of zoology and its system (I, pp. 167-8), Aristotle himself answers (*Poetics*, 1448 b 27-30): τῶν μὲν οὖν πρὸ Ὁμήρου οὐδενὸς ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν τοιοῦτον πoλήμα, εἰκὸς δὲ εἶναι πολλοῦς.

<sup>12</sup> Attention must be called, however, to the fact that this interpretation of these passages cannot be reconciled with the chronology set up in Jaeger's later article.



As for Diocles the physician—no general considerations make it probable or acceptable that he, the son of a physician, wherever his opinions coincide with those of Aristotle, even in medicine, must be borrowing from him, or that in these instances both go back to the same source (I, pp. 218-19). To be sure, it would be hopeless to collect all the cases of their agreement and to divine which one is following the other (Jaeger, *loc. cit.*). Yet there are also cases in which Diocles deviates from Aristotle (e. g. I, p. 166); and certainly, if Diocles even as a physician had nothing to offer Aristotle he could not have been "the second in glory to Hippocrates" and one of the doctors whom Aristotle praises by saying: "those physicians who have subtle and inquiring minds have something to say about natural science and claim to derive their principles therefrom."<sup>13</sup> Finally, Aristotle asserts that philosophers should discuss the causes of death and disease only up to a certain point (*μέχρι του*); he does not say that they have to become physicians themselves (*ibid.*). Why, then, should he not have learned from Diocles?

To sum up: Jaeger has shown, I believe, that Diocles was a contemporary of Aristotle and deeply influenced by Aristotelian philosophy, the first physician of the "synthetic type" (I, pp. 5; 220), integrating, as a true Aristotelian, the achievements of the whole past (I, p. 224). These results of Jaeger's interpretation, results of the greatest importance, must be protected and upheld against certain exaggerations to which he himself is liable in determining the rôle of Aristotle as compared with that of Diocles; they must be kept safe against the new position which Jaeger has later taken in regard to the chronological questions. Only then will a more appropriate appreciation of Diocles' achievements be reached.<sup>14</sup>

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ETTORE BIGNONE. *Studi sul Pensiero Antico*. Naples, Luigi Loffredo, 1938. Pp. viii + 355. L. 15.

This interesting volume represents a collection of articles dealing with Antiphon the sophist, Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and Ennius. All of these articles had already appeared in Italian periodicals. In fact, one of them, "Il pensiero platonico ed il Timeo," was published as far back as 1910; and I feel some doubt as to whether it was really wise to include it, almost

<sup>13</sup> *De Respiratione* 480 b 22 ff., Hett's translation (Loeb Classical Library [1935], p. 479).

<sup>14</sup> When this was already in page-proof there appeared (*Philos. Rev.*, XLIX [July, 1940], pp. 393 ff.) an article of Jaeger's summarizing the views expressed in his book and paper here reviewed.



unaltered, in a book issued in 1938. It is certainly impressive to see that Professor Bignone in 1910 concentrated on the connection between the ideas and the visible world, the transition from the realm of Being to that of Becoming, the function of the Demiurge, the problem of the mythical form, in other words on those questions which have ever since dominated the discussion. And yet, one inevitably feels that the investigations of scholars like Whitehead, Demos, A. E. Taylor, Cornford, Eva Sachs, and Stenzel have in the meantime shed so much new light on these questions that Bignone's discussion can claim interest only as a stage in the history of these studies but not as a contribution pointing beyond the conclusions of these scholars and emphasizing aspects hitherto neglected.

The articles on the sophist Antiphon which form the bulk of the work include more references to books and papers published after their first appearance (in 1917 and 1919 respectively), but even they can hardly be said to be "up to date." In fact, Professor Bignone who complains again and again that his contributions have been overlooked by scholars outside Italy (which is certainly a pity) repays in kind, so to speak, by failing to take into account not only Aly's elaborate plea for an identification of the two Antiphons (*Formprobleme der griech. Prosa*, Leipzig, 1929) but also such important discussions of sophistic thought as that in Jaeger's *Paideia*. It would be unfair, however, to dwell on these omissions since they hardly impair the essential value of Bignone's own work. I will not go into the details of his treatment of the papyri of Antiphon's Ἀλήθεια, partly because he does not actually "edit" them in such a way that other scholars could form their own independent judgments (and, needless to say, for that purpose one would have to reexamine the papyri themselves) and partly because the main importance of Bignone's papers does not seem to lie in their contributions to textual criticism. There is a great deal of force, however, in his arguments that the extant sections of the Ἀλήθεια are *deductiones ad absurdum* of propositions (concerning Justice) with which Antiphon himself did not agree and that while refuting some narrow legalistic conceptions of Justice he provides a better foundation for that concept in his idea of *concordia* (ὁμόνοια). This *concordia* he finds realized in the cosmos and would like to see pervading the political community as well.

As a background to Antiphon's theories, Professor Bignone writes the history of the conflict between νόμος and φύσις in Greek thought, beginning with Heraclitus, who makes a good starting point, and taking us down to the Hellenistic schools. This is a fine piece of work, and I am inclined to agree with him that the most daring and shocking theories (i. e. those extolling might against right and celebrating the "superman") were put forward not by the sophists proper but by men like Callicles and Thrasymachus who actually advocate them in

Plato's dialogues. Professor Bignone well shows the demoralizing atmosphere of the Peloponnesian War as a factor favoring the growth of this mentality. I regret only that he fails to make full use of the important testimony of Attic tragedy. Both Euripides and Sophocles offer ample material for the conflict between Law and Nature, Might and Right, State and Individual (even Euripides' attacks on the traditional gods are closely connected with his attitude toward νόμος). Yet Professor Bignone has only a short reference to the famous passage, Soph., *Ant.* 450 ff. (p. 16), which has figured in this context ever since Hegel. There is further evidence for "nature" and the right of the stronger in Plato, *Laws* IV, 714 f., X, 889 f., where Plato gives accounts as well as criticisms of these theories; and it is unfortunate that Professor Bignone has paid no attention to them. It might be maintained that the Stoic identification of Law, Reason, and Nature has its historical basis in Plato and should not be treated without reference to him.

At times Professor Bignone strikes the reader as too subtle in his argumentation and overconfident in his suggestions. I cannot, for instance, follow him in his theory that Antiphon's work and views were the source of certain passages in Sophocles' *Ajax* (notably the famous monologue, 646 ff.); and in his attempt to reconstruct the "systems" of Protagoras, Hippias, and other sophists he seems to me to go further than our material warrants. I doubt whether we can really know as much as Professor Bignone thinks he knows about the difference between Antiphon's and, say, Protagoras' views, and we should not regard it as an axiom that a sophist must always be consistent with himself. Generally speaking, in a field where our knowledge depends so largely on chance and accidents of transmission it would be wise to be less dogmatic than Professor Bignone is. He rightly points out what a great difference even such small pieces as the fragments of the *Ἀλήθεια* make to our knowledge of the thought of that period; but I am not sure that the lesson to be drawn from this has always been present to his mind.

Thus, there is room for scepticism in evaluating Professor Bignone's results; but scepticism too may be overdone, and we should be carrying the principles of caution too far if on the basis of general considerations (about the fragmentary character of our evidence, etc.) we rejected Professor Bignone's arguments against the identification of Antiphon the sophist and Antiphon the orator. For the gulf between the orator's conservative and reactionary outlook and the sophist's "progressive" belief in the equality of all human beings cannot be argued away. This is as sound an argument as has ever been put forward by a classicist, and I agree with Professor Bignone that it is stronger than the stylistic differences between the *Ἀλήθεια* and the orations which, as he rightly remarks, may be explained in several different ways.

Chapter V contains new material for Aristotle's *Protrepticus*; and chapter VI is one of those "*conferme*" to his "*Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro*" of which Bignone has published a considerable number since the appearance of that important book (1936). As the readers of this review will know, Professor Bignone has in that book, on the basis of Jaeger's reconstruction of Aristotle's early dialogues, undertaken to show how important these works were both for the growth and for the manner of presentation of Epicurus' philosophy. To all intents and purposes chapter V also is a "*conferma*," and it would be more pleasant for the reviewer (as well as fairer to the author) if we could discuss both chapters in connection with the book. This, however, would lead us too far afield. Therefore, I must content myself with stating my general impression that while the chapters are full of stimulating suggestions Professor Bignone frequently appears to carry speculation too far. In particular, it seems hazardous to hunt for new fragments or echoes of the *Protrepticus*. Anyone aware of the extent of protreptic literature will realize that the writers of *προτρεπτικοί* were almost forced to keep their discussions within the range of the same basic ideas, and to repeat certain commonplaces over and over with but slight variations. Therefore, unless we are shown very close and characteristic agreements between Aristotle on the one hand and Cicero, Boethius, and Gregory Nazianzen on the other, we shall be reluctant to believe in a direct indebtedness. Nor does Professor Bignone always give sufficient attention to the purpose and context of the passages in these writers. Take the following instance: Aristotle said in the *Protrepticus* that the young ought to philosophize; Epicurus (let us grant for the purpose of argument) replied: Not only the young but also the old ought to philosophize. Gregory, in his famous oration on baptism (XL) argues that not only the young but also the old ought to be baptized. Obviously, this was his honest conviction as a Christian and responsible leader of the Church, and there is no justification for inferring from a very superficial similarity that Gregory "*ha presente il Protreptico di Aristotele e la sua fortuna*" (the last words, by the way, show that Professor Bignone credits Gregory with interests more typical of a modern philologist than of an ancient theologian however learned). Some other arguments in these chapters are no better than this; but a few of Professor Bignone's suggestions are worth considering, and I think that he is definitely right in regarding Sen., *De brev. vit.*, I, 2 as a reference to the *Protrepticus*. Yet, this is a passage in which Aristotle is actually quoted by name.

The last chapter of the book deals with "Ennio ed Empedocle." Eduard Norden had (*Ennius und Vergil*, pp. 10 ff.) used the lines: *Corpore Tartarino prognata paluda virago cui par imber*

*et ignis, spiritus et gravis terra* (521 ff., Vahlen) in conjunction with others to prove that Ennius was the source of the Allecto episode in the *Aeneid*. Professor Bignone does not dispute this but suggests a new interpretation of *cui par*, etc. The idea is not that the four elements have in equal amounts participated in the makeup of the *virago Discordia* but rather that *Discordia* has a standing "on a par" with the four elements. This seems to do justice to the wording of these lines and also to agree more definitely with Empedocles on whom Ennius is generally recognized to depend in this passage. The same interpretation was put forward, between the first and the second publication of Bignone's paper, by Hermann Fränkel (*Hermes*, LXX [1935], pp. 62-64) but neither of the two scholars seems to have been aware of the other's work.

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- A. SEVERYNS. *Recherches sur la Chrestomathie de Proclus*. Première Partie: Le Codex 239 de Photius: Tome I: Étude paléographique et critique; Tome II: Texte, traduction, commentaire. Paris, E. Droz, 1938. Pp. xvi + 404; 3 plates; pp. 298. 200 fr. (Fac. de Phil. et Let. de l'Univ. de Liège, LXXVIII and LXXIX.)

In these two volumes M. Severyns presents the first part of the results of a study of Proclus which has occupied him for more than fifteen years. As the subtitle indicates, this portion of M. Severyns' work is almost entirely devoted to Photius and his *Bibliotheca*, particularly to Codex 239, i. e. the portion of the *Bibliotheca* in which Photius reports the reading of two books of Proclus' *Chrestomathy*. M. Severyns begins with a short account of the creation of the *Bibliotheca*. This work of Photius might almost be considered as a part of the "minutes" of a kind of reading club which had existed for some time at Byzantium under the leadership of Photius. In 855 Photius and some other members of the club were included in an embassy sent to the Caliph of Bagdad. They continued their readings on the journey and the *Bibliotheca* represents the reports of these readings prepared by Photius to be sent to his brother Tarasius at Byzantium. M. Severyns holds that the entire text was dictated by Photius to a secretary. He bases this conclusion on the interesting observation that although Photius often modifies the passages from Greek authors which he includes in his work, "toutes ces modifications sont opérées avec tant d'adresse que le texte de la *Bibliothèque* garde toujours fidèlement l'allure et le style de l'original." This, argues M. Severyns,

reveals the work of a man of learning and taste, and is due to Photius and not to a scribe working for hire. If Photius was willing to take all this trouble when dealing with extracts, which he might simply have marked in his books for the secretary to copy, he would have certainly made personally the résumés and commentaries. This hypothesis also explains why the early entries are short compared with the later (the first sixty entries occupy nineteen pages, the second sixty 368). The first ones were partly made by Photius before he got his secretary and were later dictated with a few additions from memory; the later ones are more expansive because the secretary was at hand. The dictations were not revised because they were destined only for Photius' brother, who was in a great hurry to get them. Frequently in the course of his work M. Severyns returns to these peculiar circumstances under which the *Bibliotheca* was created and emphasizes the importance of the influence which they had upon the subject matter and style and upon the condition of the MSS.

Severyns believes that Orth is wrong in explaining the preface of the *Bibliotheca* as an addition made when it was published by Photius. Severyns maintains that it is a "lettre d'envoi" which Photius sent to his brother along with the manuscript of the *Bibliotheca*. Later other members of the reading club, having heard of the work, asked to have copies, and the letter was put at the head of these copies.

After this introduction Severyns proceeds to the main section of his work, which is divided into three parts: I. Étude Paléographique, II. Étude Critique, III. La Tradition Indirecte. These three divisions occupy more than 300 pages and it is, of course, impossible even to list here the multitude of details in which Severyns has corrected his predecessors, discovered new facts, and presented new interpretations and ideas. There is a vast amount of detailed information about the MSS of Photius and the manuscript tradition. So far as one can say who does not himself have a first-hand knowledge of these MSS, this information seems to be presented with good sense and extreme care. It is almost impossible to avoid wondering at times, however, whether all this material needed to be presented, or, at any rate, presented at such great length. M. Severyns himself is conscious of this possible objection, but assures us that the minuteness with which he has treated some of his material is justified by the importance of the conclusions to which it leads. The main conclusions at which M. Severyns arrives are these: Of the two MSS, A and M, shown by Martini to be the sources of all other extant MSS of Photius, A was made by an ignorant but extremely conscientious scribe, and a number of his mistakes doubtless go back to his model. In spite of its many errors A is far the best guide we have for reconstructing the original text



of Photius. The beginning of A is defective and the end is lacking; in these portions A must be replaced by B, a copy of A made in the thirteenth century by the most learned of all the scribes or correctors who worked on Photius' *Bibliotheca*. Except for these portions, however, B, though deserving of more consideration than it has sometimes received, is inferior to A, because the learned "corrections" of its scribe really obscure the early MSS tradition. M was itself copied by a scribe only a little less ignorant than the scribe of A. But at some earlier period an ancestor of M was "corrected" rather extensively by some learned reader, who is mainly responsible for the considerable divergences between the two families as we have them. M. Severyns has succeeded in identifying this learned corrector as the Byzantine scholar and book-lover Arethas, pupil of Photius. The numerous mistakes in A and the numerous "corrections" in M are the more readily understandable if we bear in mind that the original manuscript of the *Bibliotheca* was probably a very mediocre one, in view of the peculiar circumstances under which the work was composed. It is obvious that the next editor of Photius will find the discoveries of Severyns indispensable and, in fact, revolutionary.

The first volume closes with a brief summary of the history of the MS tradition as M. Severyns has reconstructed it. The three plates give reproductions of: 1. A page of MS A; 2. A page of MS M; 3. A page of Cod. Paris. gr. 451 to illustrate a scholium by Arethas on Clement of Alexandria.

In the second volume, after brief prolegomena containing a history of the printed text of Photius and a description of the arrangement of the present edition of Codex 239, M. Severyns presents a new critical text of Codex 239 with *marginalia* from A and M and *testimonia* in addition to the critical apparatus. Below this is a French translation of the text. Far the greater part of the volume (some 200 pages) is given over to a lengthy commentary. The general purpose of the commentary is to reveal, as far as is possible, the thought of Proclus as it is presented in Photius' summary and then, with this as a basis, to arrive at a fair estimate of the capacities and achievements of Proclus. In general M. Severyns seems to have been reasonably successful in his effort to follow a middle course between those who treat Proclus "comme un parent pauvre" and those specialists who would try to make him seem more important than he really was. Many of the subjects treated in the commentary will, of course, be greatly expanded in later parts of this work when M. Severyns will have presented a complete study of the *Chrestomathy*. This is notably true of what many might consider the most important subject of all, the Epic Cycle. Another important matter which is postponed is the consideration of the date of Proclus. There are indications in these volumes, however,



that M. Severyns does not believe that the author of the *Chrestomathy* was the neo-Platonic philosopher (e. g. I, pp. 263, 324; II, p. 80; cf. also the double entries in the indices). It might be mentioned in passing that M. Severyns attacks with particular enthusiasm scholars who in attempting to reconstruct the *Chrestomathy* put great faith in the scholia to Dionysius Thrax.

The usefulness of these volumes has been enhanced by a series of indices. Each volume contains a very detailed general index, an index of Greek words which are discussed, and an index of references to MSS, Greek authors, and passages therefrom. The second volume contains in addition an *index verborum* of Codex 239 of Photius.

Perhaps the highest praise which can be given to this excellent work is to say that it whets the appetite for more, and makes us await with impatience the second part of the study, in which M. Severyns will treat other sources of information about Proclus and his *Chrestomathy*. One may echo with especial fervor in these days M. Severyns' prayer that "difficultés nouvelles" will not delay too long the completion of his task.

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ETTORE PARATORE. Introduzione alle Georgiche. Palermo, F. Ciuni, 1938. Pp. 145.

The author explains that the title of his book does not signify that he means to furnish a key to the full understanding of Virgil's poem. His purpose is to set the *Georgics* in their place within the poet's development, and specifically to show that this poem, while in important respects an advance on the *Eclogues*, is in the main a work of the same literary and political background as the earlier poems, and still a long way from the *Aeneid*.

His method is to assume that the "lyrical" passages—the Praise of Italy, and the rest—placed so regularly in the centre and at the end of each book, are a safe guide to the poet's frame of mind, since they are the most personal utterances in the poem. Within these passages he analyses the individual motives, comparing them with motives in the *Epodes* of Horace. He seldom refers to the *Eclogues*, apart from the fourth, and indeed his work virtually resolves itself into a demonstration that one epode, the sixteenth, shines through Virgil's fabric in a number of places. Presumably we have here the origin of Paratore's study, since he has already in an earlier publication sought traces of *Epode XVI* in Propertius. The relation of this epode to the fourth *Eclogue* has long had the attention of Latin scholars, but Paratore is the first to bring it into contact with the *Georgics*.

The topics most closely studied are the idyllic motives of *Georg.*, II, 136-76 and III, 294-338, the "political" motives of *Georg.*, II, 167-70 and 495-540, and the Myth of the Ages in *Georg.*, I, 121-46, to each of which is devoted a chapter. Most convincing is the confrontation of the Praise of Italy with Horace's description of his earthly paradise. The relationship is complicated by Virgil's having employed similar motives in the fourth Eclogue; but Paratore rightly assumes the influence of the epode on the eclogue, and further tries to show that when Virgil returns to the idyllic motives in the third Georgic these betray traits found in Horace but not in the fourth Eclogue. For this last point (p. 65) his evidence is not wholly convincing, especially since he hardly gives full weight to the fact that in *Georg.*, III, 294-338 Virgil is manifestly versifying Varro. We must grant that there is a very telling parallel between *Georg.*, III, 316-7 (*atque ipsae memores redeunt in tecta suosque / ducunt, et gravido superant vix ubere limen*) and *Epode XVI*, 49-50 (*Illic iniussae veniunt ad mulctra capellae, / refertque tenta grex amicus ubera*); but here again *Écl.* IV, 21 stands between: *ipsae lacte domum referent distenta capellae / ubera*.

It is easier to show that in general Virgil is moving within the circle of motives familiar to his youth than it is to prove the immediate influence of *Epode XVI*. Paratore goes on to the political motives of *Georgic II* and *Epode XVI*. Horace mentions the Marsi, the Etruscans, Capua, Spartacus, the Allobroges, Germany, and Hannibal as foreign foes of Rome. In *Georg.*, II, 167-70 Virgil names among the races of Italy the Marsi, Sabellae, Ligures, and Volsci, and cites as heroes the Decii, Marius, Camillus, the Scipios, and Octavian. The Marsi are in both lists, Virgil later (II, 533) mentions Etruria, and Paratore equates Marius with Germany and Scipio with Hannibal; but fundamental differences make this comparison no strong basis on which to establish even that the poems originated in the same moment of political feeling, to say nothing of their interdependence. There is more to be said for the suggestion that the final passage of Book II, with its allusions to the civil wars, reflects the epode, and that line 512 (*atque alio patriam quaerunt sub sole iacentem*) is a direct reference to Horace's invitation to escape.

Least convincing is the attempt to prove that the Myth of the Ages in *Georg.*, I, 121 ff. is dependent on the last four lines of the epode where the same myth is employed. In order to prove derivation it is necessary to show the existence of a peculiarity common to the two passages. This Paratore exerts himself to find. He says that only in Aratus, in *Epode XVI*, and in this passage of the *Georgics* is the number of ages given as three. Tibullus, who imitates the Virgilian passage, misunderstood it, as do Kiessling and Heinze, in finding there only two ages, whereas *tum* in line 143 marks a new age, and we have an age of

Saturn, an age of wood [!], and an age of iron. This is merely fantastic, and *tum* in line 143 to a candid reader is surely no different from *tum* in lines 137, 139, and 145 with which it forms a rhetorical repetition. Paratore strangely fails to mention in this connection the recurrence of the Ages at the end of Book II, where again there is a simple contrast between the age of Saturn and the age of Jove. Indeed he could have used this second occurrence since it ends a passage that he has otherwise plausibly connected with *Epode XVI*.

Despite the overstraining of his parallels, Paratore's discovery that there are echoes of *Epode XVI* in the *Georgics* will probably stand, and he has made plain in detail that Virgil in this poem is still working within the circle of motives inherited by him, by Horace, and by the elegists from the νεώτεροι. The book is valuable, and readers, if they can put up with its excessively parenthetical style, will find in it an abundance of good observations to which it is impossible to do justice in a review.

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VICTOR EHRENBERG. *Alexander and the Greeks*. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1938. Pp. 110. 7s. 6d.

This attractively printed book consists of four thoughtful essays. It abounds in correct and stimulating suggestions, and in guesses which may be right; but one is occasionally left with the feeling that Ehrenberg has set out to prove more than the present state of our evidence warrants; and, indeed, he appears so anxious to make his point that he often refers to a needlessly large number of supporting "facts," many of which are themselves wrong.

The burden of the first essay, "Alexander and the liberated Greek cities," is that the Asiatic cities and the Island Greeks did not belong to the Corinthian League. Perhaps Ehrenberg's third footnote on p. 15 will bring us to the heart of the matter: "Tarn (*Cambr. Anc. Hist.*, VI, p. 363) states that a purely Panhellenic policy could not have been carried through, but he believes (pp. 371 f.) in the cities joining the Corinthian League and enjoying very definite liberty: Alexander 'neither claimed nor exercised any further authority beyond what the League gave him.'" What Tarn really says, however, is this: "But once the preliminary settlement of the disturbed affairs of the cities was over—and this was a war measure—he neither claimed nor exercised any further authority, beyond what the League gave him, and sent no more orders or rescripts, save the formal documents. . . ." Considering the world as it then was, I do not see how Alexander could have done otherwise—his autocratic actions

during the immediate crisis do not exclude the probability that the cities became his allies and members of the League as well.

The second paper is entitled "Pothos"—this is Alexander's famous "longing"—and concludes "that Alexander himself picked out this word to convey a meaning peculiar to him alone, and alien to the mainly rational mind of the Greeks." I am not certain what Pothos means, if indeed it has any special meaning at all, but I doubt if it means this; in any event, Kornemann's *Alexandergeschichte des Ptolemaios* must be used with care (cf. my review, *A. J. P.*, LVIII, pp. 108 f.). The third essay, "Aristotle and Alexander's Empire," is a careful study of an intensely interesting subject. Ehrenberg shows, quite correctly I believe, that the great creations of Alexander and Aristotle "were conceived and grew and took effect without any mutual impressions worth mentioning." Ehrenberg argues, however, that Alexander aimed at oecumenic unity and not a unity of mankind. Since it is now much debated whether, with Alexander, the opposite to "national" is "cosmopolitan" or "oecumenic," I may add that the crux of the matter is Alexander's prayer at Opis: *Homonoia* can point only to cosmopolitanism. The final essay gives the title to the book and examines the emotional and intellectual process of Alexander's mind.

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GUSTAVE GLOTZ, PIERRE ROUSSEL, ROBERT COHEN. *Histoire Grecque*. Vol. IV, Alexandre et l'Hellénisation du Monde Antique. Part I, Alexandre et le Démembrement de son Empire. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1938. Pp. 434.

The book under review corresponds to sections of the sixth and seventh volumes of the *Cambridge Ancient History*, and it is rather instructive to place the two works side by side. Your preference will depend pretty much on what you are after. The French work is straight history, magnificently done; it starts with Persia and follows at once to Alexander and his successors, but nevertheless one is left with a feeling of incompleteness. There was more to the ancient world than just this; but another trouble, if it is a trouble, is probably inherent in the plan of the work itself. Tarn's chapters on Alexander, for example, come to less than 90 pages; obviously, this is not nearly enough space in which to tell everything that Alexander did, but it does give ample room for interpretation. Glotz and Cohen, on the other hand, devote 150 pages to Alexander's expedition; they are pages packed with Alexander's doings, culled from the ancient sources, but the story is so full that there is room for only the

briefest interpretation. It is a well-written and vividly interesting account, as one would expect of Glotz and Cohen, and it is also sound and well-documented; cautious might almost be the word at times.

There is interpretation, of course, with considerable leaning in spots toward Radet, but on the whole our four chapters on Alexander's expedition take us relentlessly from place to place with only the briefest halts to catch our breath. To take a fair sample, is it enough to say, as has been said so often, that Philip and Olympias met for the first time at the mysteries of Samothrace, and that Alexander inherited from his father intelligence and courage, and from his mother passion and mysticism? Thalestris, queen of the Amazons, is not mentioned at all, and yet someone must tell us sometime what significance this episode has for our Alexander-sources; at any rate, one might expect a recognition of some of these important problems: it is not enough, by way of introduction, to summarize the ancient writers. The Cleitus and Callisthenes episodes are treated in the usual way (though see *A. J. P.*, LIII, pp. 353 ff.), but today it is a serious mistake, I think, to give the orthodox account of Parmenio's death, for we now know that his death must be classed as a judicial murder and not as downright murder (*A. J. P.*, LVIII, pp. 108 ff.). The account of Alexander's future plans is correct, if one feels that Alexander envisaged nothing more than an exploration of Arabia and the Caspian, but one would like to have at least a statement of the problem. The discussion of Alexander's ideas of world-empire is vague (as such discussions generally are), while the discussion of his ideas on the unity of mankind does not advance the argument beyond Tarn. The only serious chronological difficulty in Alexander's entire expedition (his arrival at the Hindu Kush in mid-December, 330 B. C.) is successfully met; and in many another way the authors give proof of wide reading and sound judgment, but it is at least an open question whether in a book of this kind our chief final impression should be that Alexander did a good deal of marching. The account of the expedition is followed by a description of Greece under Alexander and by a general chapter on his government. Again it seems to me, to take an example, that either here or previously we should be given something more than a summary of Alexander's arrangements for Asia Minor. Does not Alexander's appointment of barbarians to important posts at the very beginning of his expedition reveal significantly the dawn of a startling policy (*Classical Studies presented to Edward Capps*, pp. 298 ff.)?

The second part of our volume, by Roussel, gives a meticulous picture of the Greek world after Alexander: Antigonos, Demetrius Poliorcetes, Lysimachus, Agathocles, they and all they did are here. It is good historical writing, and we may rejoice that



the great *Histoire Générale*, of which our volume in the *Histoire Ancienne* is a part, will very soon follow its Cambridge counterparts to a successful conclusion.

The two maps are commonplace, if not poor, and in several instances are wrong.

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ALBRECHT BECKER-FREYSENG. *Die Vorgeschichte des philosophischen Terminus 'contingens.'* Heidelberg, F. Bilabel, 1938. Pp. 79. (*Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Mittelalters*, Heft 7.)

In all European languages the word "contingent" is used as a philosophical *terminus technicus* in order to characterize an event as possible but not necessary, that is, as something that may happen or fail to happen. The use of the word in this sense can be easily traced back as far as the 14th century, when Nicolaus of Oresme used it in his translation of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. It began to be used more frequently in the late 17th and in the 18th century when it played a great part in the discussion of the so-called cosmological proof of the existence of God, which at that time is also called the proof "a contingentia mundi." Finally, in the 19th century there developed what may be called a philosophy of contingency (Kontingenzphilosophie), which was inaugurated by E. Boutroux's famous work *De la contingence des lois de la nature*.

The ultimate origin of the term, however, presents a rather puzzling problem, and it is this problem which the author of the work here reviewed has proposed to solve.

"Contingere, contingit" in classical Latin always refers to an event that actually happens. Such an event, of course, can also be considered as accidental or fortuitous. But, in order to express this, a "casu" or "forte" has always to be added to the verb. How, then, did the participle "contingens" and the adjective "contingent" come to be used in that sense without any such addition?

The earliest instance of this use of the word in extant literature is found in Boethius' commentary on Aristotle's work *περὶ ἐμνηρίας*. But here we encounter another rather puzzling problem.

Of Boethius' commentary two versions have come down to us, one of them obviously a revised and enlarged edition of the other. In both these versions the word "contingere" is used as a translation of two different Greek terms: *συμβαίνειν* and *ἐνδέχασθαι*. Of this fact there can be no doubt whatever, since each section of the commentary is preceded by a translation of the passage



commented upon so that one can easily see to what Greek terms the Latin words correspond. In spite of this there is an important difference between the two versions.

In the earlier edition we find the curious sentence (Aristotle, 22 a 15 ff.; Boethius, I, 180, 15-17): quod possibile est esse contingit *aliquando* ut sit et hoc est contingit esse. Since this sentence is meant to explain Aristotle's statement that the *δυνατόν* (possible) and the *ἐνδεχόμενον* (contingens) are *logically* equivalent, there can be no doubt that the "contingit esse" at the end of the sentence means *ἐνδέχεται εἶναι*. The first "contingit," however, can *not* mean *ἐνδέχεται*, since in this case the "aliquando" would be meaningless. If, on the other hand, one takes it in the sense of the earlier Latin "contingere" = "to happen" or of the Greek *συμβαίνει*, as is indicated by the construction with "ut," the explanation is not quite correct. For in the passage in question Aristotle is not at all concerned with the question whether an event of this kind will happen to occur sometime actually (*συμβήσεται ποτε γενέσθαι*), but is very careful to confine himself to the explanation that an *ἐνδεχόμενον* is something which *may* happen (*γένοιτο ἄν*), though actually it may never happen at all. But "contingit ut aliquando sit" in the sense of *γένοιτο ἄν* would be still another use of the word "contingere," to which there is no analogy elsewhere. The author is therefore probably right in his contention that Boethius, when writing this sentence, was not aware of the fact that his "contingere" corresponded to two different Greek terms and that he therefore tried—unsuccessfully—to derive one of its meanings from the other.

This view is further confirmed by the observation that in the second edition of the commentary the incriminated sentence is omitted and replaced by a rather lengthy explanation in which Boethius tries to make it clear that he is now using the term "contingens" in the sense of *ἐνδέχεσθαι*.

The author tries to explain this difference between the two editions of Boethius' commentary on the assumption that Boethius, when writing the first version, did not consult the Greek original but an earlier Latin translation made by Marius Victorinus in which "contingere" was already used in the sense of both *συμβαίνειν* and *ἐνδέχεσθαι*. But how Victorinus himself was induced to do so it is impossible to discover since his translation has not come down to us.

The further investigation deals with the meaning of *ἐνδέχεσθαι* in Aristotle's works. As Aristotle himself states, the word *ἐνδέχεσθαι* can be used in a wider and in a narrower sense. In the wider sense it includes the *ἀναγκαῖον*, because what is necessary must a fortiori be possible; in the narrower sense it *excludes* the *ἀναγκαῖον*, that is, it means what is possible but *not* necessary (cf. *Anal. Pr. I*, 13, 32 a 18 ff.: *λέγω δ' ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ τὸ*

ἐνδεχόμενον, οὐ μὴ ὄντος ἀναγκαῖον τεθέντος δ' ὑπάρχειν, οὐδὲν ἔσται διὰ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον. τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ὁμωλύμως ἐνδέχεσθαι λέγομεν. The author calls ἐνδέχεσθαι in the wider sense "ἐνδ I" and in the narrower sense "ἐνδ II." He contends that Aristotle, apart from *Anal. Pr.* I, 13-22, uses the word always in the sense of ἐνδ I. This is scarcely correct. In one of the cases quoted by the author as examples of ἐνδ I (p. 51 Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1139 b 7 ff.: οὐδὲ γὰρ βουλευέται περὶ τοῦ γεγονότος ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου) one has only to read the rest of the sentence τὸ δὲ γεγονός οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ γενέσθαι in order to see that the ἐνδεχομένον here excludes the ἀναγκαῖον, for οὐκ ἐνδέχεσθαι μὴ γενέσθαι is equivalent to ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι (cf. *περὶ ἔρμ.* 13, 22 a 29-31). In reference to *περὶ ἔρμηνείας* itself one may reduce the statement of the author to the observation that in those passages Aristotle, on account of the ambiguity of the term ἐνδέχεσθαι, always adds a καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι or a καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, in order to make it quite clear that he speaks of an οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον. Apart from that, he almost never makes any positive use of ἐνδέχεσθαι in the sense of ἐνδ I. It was therefore no great innovation when Porph. and Alex. Aphrod. used plain ἐνδέχεσθαι in the sense of ἐνδ II in their commentaries on *περὶ ἔρμηνείας*, as the author contends (p. 71).

Yet, in addition to many very valuable contributions to the interpretation of single passages in Boethius (cf. especially pp. 58 ff.) the author has given us the important result that Boethius used the term "contingere" in three different meanings: *συμβαίνειν*, ἐνδ I, and ἐνδ II, and that his commentary has had a decisive influence on the use of the word in the Middle Ages, and indirectly on its use in modern times.

The author does not follow the use of the word in detail because many of the relevant medieval works exist only in manuscripts which are not easily accessible. But he shows that John of Salisbury tries to distinguish between different meanings that had been confused by some of his predecessors.

The author seems to think that Boutroux's "contingent" corresponds exactly to Aristotle's ἐνδ II. Yet this too is somewhat doubtful. For whenever Aristotle uses the term ἐνδέχεσθαι a reference to the future is always implied. He therefore never calls an event that has actually happened an ἐνδεχόμενον though he may speak of it as of an ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ εἶναι. But in this case one thinks of it, so to speak, from a standpoint in the past, from which it appears as something that might have happened to be different or might not have occurred at all. Boutroux, on the other hand, very frequently calls actual events "contingent." This use of the word corresponds exactly to one of the many uses made of the word *συμβεβηκός* by Aristotle (cf., for instance, *Phys.* VIII, 5, 256 b 7 ff.: πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός [*sc.* *κινεῖται τὸ κινούμενον*] οὐκ ἀνάγκη κινεῖσθαι τὸ κινούμενον. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο

δῆλον ὡς ἐνδέχεται ποτε μηδὲν κινεῖσθαι τῶν ὄντων. οὐ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλ' ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ εἶναι. In this case even the problem discussed by Aristotle has some similarity to one of Boutroux's problems, though the solution is different). It might therefore be worth while considering whether "contingere" in the sense of συμβαίνειν has not also had some influence on the modern notion of "contingent."

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J. M. LE BLOND. Eulogos et l'argument de convenance chez Aristote. Paris, "Les Belles Lettres," 1938. Pp. vii + 133.

French scholars have in recent years made a number of useful lexicographical studies that throw light on the philosophical significance of terms; the present work takes its place among them. Recognizing the slight use made by Greek writers earlier than Aristotle of the term εὐλογος (or εὐλόγως) and Aristotle's fondness for the expression, M. le Blond skilfully distinguishes its many *nuances* of meaning and shows the part that it plays in Aristotle's thought.

Part I first surveys the use of εὐλογος before and after Aristotle, and then deals in a general way with Aristotle's use of it. Noting that the term is not found in the *Organon*, the rigorous reasoning of which leads to conclusions commonly described as ἀναγκαῖος, the author finds that in the treatises on astronomy, natural history, and morals Aristotle often adopts the expression εὐλογος to describe speculative judgments with regard to the relation between a fact and a body of knowledge already either possessed or assumed, or to indicate as natural (whether finally justified or not) a dialectical process leading to a new judgment. This last "speculative" use of the term is hardly to be distinguished from its "practical" use. In all these uses εὐλογος seems to be indicative less of objective, scientific certainty than of a subjective sense of satisfaction at the perception of a probable connection between facts or principles, such as numerical order, logical relationship, adaptation to a context.

Part II begins with an index of all passages in the Aristotelian *corpus* in which the term εὐλογος (or εὐλόγως) is employed. It proceeds to discuss these passages, classified according to the categories already established, quoting in every case the English phrase of the Oxford translators, as well as certain French and German translations. A few of the English versions may be worth citing, as instructive examples of the wide variety of phraseology required by the contexts.

"The reason is easily given." "This at once leads us to expect." "It is natural enough." "This fact enables us to understand." "Just what we should expect." "It is reasonable." "As was to be anticipated." "It is perfectly intelligible." "With good reason." "Rationally consistent." "So we see the reason of nature's handiwork." [Nature disposes all these things] "like an intelligent workman" (*De Gen. An.* I, 23, 731 a 24: καὶ ταῦτα πάντα εὐλόγως ἡ φύσις δημιουργεῖ). "Naturally." "As a matter of course." "This continuity has a sufficient reason in our theory." "Quite clear." "The presumption being." "It is not surprising." "Well grounded." "It is reasonable to infer." "More satisfactory to suppose." "It is highly probable." "Only a reasonable postulate." "This might plausibly seem to be the case." "Hence the propriety of the figure." And (with the negative) "it is difficult to conceive."

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CH. MUGLER. *L'Évolution des subordonnées relatives complexes en Grec*. Paris, "Les Belles Lettres," 1938. Pp. 132.

In this monograph the author follows closely the method of treatment which he employed in his work *L'Évolution des constructions participiales complexes en Grec et en Latin*. The material is again taken from Homer, Herodotus, Thucydides, and Plato, but it is to be noticed that this time the corresponding Latin constructions are not treated, except for a few examples of a special type on pp. 21 f.

The classification is naturally based on the various types of subordinate construction that may be used to enlarge the relative clauses. These are: participles; additional subordinate clauses; infinitives in *oratio obliqua* and other uses (*la proposition infinitive*); participles after such verbs as ὁράω, αἰσθάνομαι, etc. (*la proposition participiale*); and certain examples in which the relative clauses govern dependent clauses and participles together; as well as certain more complex types. Special attention is given to subordinate clauses which are incorporated within the relative clauses on which they depend, instead of merely being placed after them. The two types are treated in separate chapters, and the discussion of the incorporated type occupies more space because of the larger number of variations which it admits. From the comparative infrequency of these constructions in Homer and from Homer's somewhat awkward manner of handling them, sometimes resulting in anacoluthon, the author infers (p. 54) that their development belongs to a later stage of the language than is the case with the construction in which one subordinate clause follows another. In Thucydides, however,

the incorporated type is used with the freedom that we should expect, and indeed some of its sub-types are first found in this author. The starting-point for the type under discussion is reasonably assumed (p. 99) to be the replacement of a participle standing in the midst of a relative clause by another clause. In the first chapter (pp. 7 ff.) the author distinguishes three varieties of the use of participles in agreement with the subject of clauses introduced by a relative which stands in an object relation to the verb: either the relative depends only on the verb, or it depends on the verb and participle, or it depends only on the participle. This treatment leads to a new classification which reappears in some of the constructions where participles are replaced by clauses and which, in a sense, cuts across the main system of classification.

The present work, together with the monograph on complex participial constructions, offers to historical syntacticians a clearer knowledge of the development of Greek sentence structure, and it is to be hoped that the author will extend his investigations to other topics of a similar nature.

On p. 4 read H 27 for Π 27 and θ 87 for θ 81; on p. 49 in β 43 read ὑμῖν for ἡμῖν. On p. 40, the passages A 64, K 307, and M 238 all occur in speeches, despite the statement immediately below. On p. 68 the reference (Thuc.) VII. 68 is correct, but the passage was not quoted along with the others on pp. 68 f. On p. 101 in Γ 61 f., probably ἀνὴρ is the subject of ἐκτάμνησιν and πέλεκυς only of ὀφέλλει, so that the passage should be re-classified in C 2.

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MARS McCLELLAND WESTINGTON. *Atrocities in Roman Warfare to 133 B. C.* Private Edition, Distributed by the University of Chicago Libraries, 1938. Pp. 139. (Diss.)

The author has adopted as a working definition for his paper the view that an atrocity in time of war normally denotes "the infliction of injury to the person, or damage to the property of the foe in such a way as to aggravate his sufferings needlessly" but, for the purposes of his dissertation, he also takes it to mean, by a special connotation, "legal acts of extreme severity and offences which were either illegal or repugnant to the sentiments of humanity but which entailed little or no physical discomfort" (p. 1, n. 2). Within the compass of this generous definition he lists acts of every character from sacrilege to rape occurring in Roman warfare during the period extending from the foundation of the city to the fall of Numantia. The Romanophile will be pleased to learn that not only atrocious acts committed by the



Romans have been treated, but also those perpetrated by their friends, allies, and enemies. Moreover, the gentle reader at large will be considerably heartened to find that, in the dissertation, "no consideration has been taken of battlefield scenes portraying the agonies of the wounded, suffering from exposure, or death from exhaustion" (p. 3).

The objective purpose which the author has set for himself in the dissertation seems to be twofold. In the first place he hopes, in general, that his frank discussion of atrocious incidents and his inclusion of their starkly realistic details may serve as an indictment of war as waged, "not by nations in modern times, but by Rome and her enemies more than two thousand years ago" (p. 4)! In the second place he specifically endeavors to ascertain, by a topical and chronological classification of the data, "whether belligerent proceedings, from a humane standpoint, were marked by a progressive or retrogressive character" (p. 3). So far as the first is concerned, it seems fair to assume that any warfare is a subject for indictment among sober-thinking folk. As for the second purpose, the author himself seems unable to decide, for after reviewing the evidence he remarks: "If we accept the statement of Dionysius that as early as the regal period there existed a colonial system whereby the conquered instead of being killed or enslaved, were left to share their land with Roman colonists, then the warfare of the Romans was definitely retrogressive in character. If, however, this assertion is to be rejected as untrue, then the application of the principles of the *ius belli*, as reflected in milder and discriminating practices, did have an ameliorating influence in limiting the horrors of war" (p. 129).

Space does not permit a full discussion of the *minutiae* but one or two are of sufficient importance to warrant mention. For example the author accepts the old theory that what written records existed prior to 390 B. C. perished in the Gallic fire (p. 3). This seems to be one of the things that archaeology has disproved. We now know that the temples housing these records survived into the late Republic and it is probably a fair assumption that most of the records themselves also survived (cf. Frank, *Roman Buildings of the Republic*, pp. 53, 78, 83; *Life and Lit.*, pp. 179 f.).

His view, following Mommsen, that Corinth was destroyed in order to eliminate a strong commercial rival (p. 45) is probably false. This is not the place for a complete discussion of the evidence (for a fairly full treatment see *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XVIII [1913], pp. 233 ff., especially p. 243). Suffice it to say, however, that an examination of the epigraphical evidence from Delos, whose Roman merchants and capitalists, interested in the island's trade, supposedly influenced the senate in its drastic action, shows that strictly Roman commerce was of little importance in



the Aegean until the formation of the province of Asia in 132 B. C. and that prior to this the great volume of the trade there was handled by Orientals and south-Italic Greeks (cf. Tarn, *Hell. Civ.*<sup>2</sup>, pp. 229 ff.; Hatzfeld, *Les trafiquants Italiens*, p. 367).

The author has made a good deal of Marcellus' spoliation of Syracuse and the precedent he established there for later Roman commanders (pp. 56-7, 62, 64-5, 93 ff.). What he has failed to stress as important, however, is the fact that the citizens were not enslaved, a punishment which would have been quite in accord with the accepted principles of warfare prevailing at the time and the absence of which in this case considerably mitigates the atrocity of the pillaging of the town. Moreover, it is scarcely correct to say that the great masses of the Campanian citizens were sold into slavery after the fall of Capua (p. 97). Although their land was confiscated by Rome the original owners were allowed to remain as renters and, later on, to regain their citizenship (cf. De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani*, III, 2, pp. 342 ff.).

*Vae victis* can scarcely be called a representative policy of the Romans during the period covered by the work (pp. 124, 127). It is well to call to mind at least the Roman settlement in Latium (338 B. C.) after the Latin revolt, which represented one of the most humane treatments of a conquered foe the ancient world had ever seen.

On the whole this work may be serviceable in filling a small niche in the modern shelf of books on the history of ancient warfare. Its chief demerit, generally speaking, is that it fails to be sufficiently interpretative.

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*Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome*, Vol. XV. Rome, The American Academy, 1938. Pp. 124; Pls. 18.

The latest volume of the *Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome* opens with three catalogues of collections in the Academy Museum: "Terra-Cotta Revetments" by Isobel Simpson, "Amphora Handles" by Charlotte Ludlom, and "Ancient Coins Bequeathed by Esther Boise Van Deman," by Walter F. Snyder. All three collections are useful to students at the Academy for study, but contain nothing of any particular intrinsic interest. The catalogues have been most efficiently executed.

Mason Hammond has contributed the longest article in the volume: "The Tribunician Day during the Early Empire," which deals very thoroughly with the evidence as to the day on which the tribunician power of the Roman Emperors was renewed. He takes the subject through the reign of Alexander Severus, treating in more detail the period after Galba. The

conclusions may best be summarised in Mr. Hammond's own words. "Whether or not this discussion has added much to its predecessors, it has at least sought to present the material in its most recent and available forms. . . . The present collection may be useful as a touchstone for the new and, unless or until its conclusions are upset by that new, it may serve to reestablish Mommsen's day, December 10, throughout the second and early third centuries, against Mattingly's doubts."

Mr. Snyder presents an appendix to Mr. Hammond's article in a second contribution, a weighty "Note on the Irregular Evidence of the Date of the Beginning of the Year of the Tribunician Power during the Reigns of Septimius Severus and Caracalla." After a thorough examination of the evidence he comes to the conclusion that "the more significant portion of the irregularities (not mere errors) must be assigned to incomplete, erroneous, and tardy indication and communication of the correct official system of numeration." The reader will not be surprised to find nothing more startling, since Mr. Snyder states at the beginning of his article that "it will readily be recognized that this note does essentially no more than lend further precision and substance to the necessarily summary judgment of Mommsen in his *Staatsrecht* II, 2, 801 n. 3."

In "Pinacothecae, with Special Reference to Pompeii" the meaning of the word pinacotheca, the history of pinakes and their place in Pompeian art, and the picture galleries of Pompeii and Rome are discussed by A. W. Van Buren, who shows his well-known familiarity with the whole field of Pompeian material. He takes up the types of pinakes—votive tablets, panel picture, etc. and the relation to the Four Styles of wall painting. He identifies some rooms in Pompeii as pinacothecae and concludes that Friedländer underestimated the Roman interest in art which remained inarticulate in literature, but is shown by the presence of the paintings themselves.

Erling C. Olsen describes "Two Portrait Heads in the Museum of the American Academy in Rome." One, a relief head probably from a sepulchral monument, shows recutting which he believes proves that it was transferred to another monument. It appears to be a portrait head of the first century B. C., of the type derived from death masks. The other, the head of a child, he dates in the period of Trajan and considers that it offers evidence for a redating of the so-called "Marcellus" head in Berlin.

Claude W. Barlow closes the volume with "Codex Vaticanus 4929," a very careful and detailed description of the ninth century manuscript which is the "sole remaining authority for the text of Pomponius Mela, Vibius Sequester, and Julius Paris' Epitome of Valerius Maximus." It includes a text of the *Querolus*, and scholia which Mr. Barlow publishes here for the

first time. He discusses a variety of problems which arise from the texts in the manuscript, propounds several questions connected with them, and outlines the methods by which some of these may be answered. The article is illustrated by five excellent plates.

The volume is presented in the sumptuous style characteristic of the series. The clarity of the type and the presence and quality of the plates are things to be grateful for, but the almost pedantically elaborate system of notation sometimes becomes trying to read. One other point of criticism seems justified. In spite of the scholarly way in which the catalogues of the Academy Museum have been carried out by their authors, one is inclined to wonder why it was felt necessary to go to the expense of publishing them. As far as I can judge none of them has any really new material to contribute. Obviously a museum must be catalogued but it does not seem important to publish the contents of what is mainly a study collection.

AGNES KIRSOPP LAKE.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

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KARL ALBERT MÜLLER. Claudians Festgedicht auf das sechste Konsulat des Kaisers Honorius, herausgegeben und erklärt. Berlin, Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1938. Pp. 131. (*Neue deutsche Forschungen*, Band VII.)

This edition consists of four essential parts: introduction, text, notes, bibliography. Doubtless out of deference to custom the author starts his introduction with the usual trite, brief statement of Claudian's life and career as a court poet. In pages 17 through 22, however, he discusses, and, in the reviewer's opinion, ably refutes Birt's dating (403 A. D.) of the battle of Verona, concluding that it must be in 402 A. D. In reaching his conclusion Birt hypothecated an unmentioned sojourn by Alaric in Illyria for one year. Müller, rejecting this, is forced into a new hypothesis on the postponement of the emperor's triumph until 404 A. D., but his point is the less strained.

The text, published without critical apparatus, is very conservative. If the 120 lines selected at random as a check were a fair sample, it is precisely what the editor claims it to be—Birt's text with minor changes. These, by the way, are not conjectures but variant readings. To be specific, the reviewer found five different readings in the lines examined, and several changes in punctuation, of which only one is significant in that it changes the sense.

In some 85 lines examined for parallel passages which are so abundantly given in the notes the reviewer found a different

situation. Here there is almost complete independence of Birt's literary apparatus, for even where Birt and Müller each cite the same author the *locus* is often different. How much of Müller's material is borrowed from others and how much is the result of his own industry the reviewer is unable to say. The heavy debt which all editors must owe to Birt's introduction is shown by the 22 references to it in the notes, but Müller's freedom of thought is shown by the 6 places wherein he differs.

The interpretative notes are usually brief, sane, and, if controversial, documented. They range in nature from points of prosody and grammar to matters of history and literary parallels. The bibliography refers to the classic editions, the obvious historical texts, and a working selection of pertinent studies, some quite recent. The text is clear; misprints are few. The editor has done his job well.

LESTER K. BORN.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Ammianus Marcellinus, with an English Translation by JOHN C. ROLFE. Vols. II and III. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1937 and 1939. Pp. vii + 683; pp. ix + 602; frontispiece, illustrations, index, and maps in both volumes.

It is now possible to judge Rolfe's edition and translation as a whole. He expressly disclaims having produced a critical edition of the original; but as I pointed out in reviewing Vol. I (*Class. Phil.*, XXXIII [1938], pp. 124 ff.), he has given us a welcome revision of the latest text, with a few conservative emendations of his own, largely to fill lacunae. He has, however, accepted very few of the hundreds of changes suggested by various scholars during this last quarter century; those few are in general based on the sound principle of a return to the MS reading. Rolfe passes no judgment on Robinson's theory that V is a copy of M; I still believe it is simpler to postulate a joint ancestor, since the material is so scanty. In any case, Rolfe lists all the publications which must be considered by the scholar who would like to tackle the perennially fascinating task of Ammianus text correction; and the critical apparatus comprises the more important new suggestions. I note the inclusion in the text of a few conjectures which sin against the accentual cursus—a procedure of which I cannot approve. I feel it is perfectly legitimate to leave in the text a MS reading which offends the cursus, but that one should not adopt a new reading contrary to its principles, any more than a conjecture in Lucretius which contravenes the hexameter.

The translation makes available for us one of the great historical works of all time, and in an English style which closely reproduces the strange combination of the original. Ammianus was a Greek officer of the Roman General Staff under Julian the Apostate; he devoted his later years to writing a Roman history in a style partly Ciceronian and Tacitean, with reminiscences of Caesar, Livy, and many others, but at the same time permeated with Asian rhetoric and full of the words and idioms of his own day. Rolfe's translation, always intelligible, cannot help reflecting this curious mixture; Ammianus is slow reading in any language; but one finishes this English text with the same respect for a sturdy, independent character, a really great historian, that is given by acquaintance with the original. Rolfe may well be proud of the satisfactory achievement of a supremely difficult task. He has also done well to include the valuable *Excerpta Valesiana*, which supplement Ammianus, the one dealing with Constantine and the other with Theodoric, and both hitherto inaccessible in English.

CHARLES UPSON CLARK.

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ALOIS WALDE. Lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch. 3., neu bearbeitete Auflage von J. B. HOFMANN. 10. Lieferung, 1937; 11. Lieferung, 1938. Heidelberg, Carl Winter's Universitätsbuchhandlung.

The ninth fascicle of this work was briefly reviewed in this *Journal*, LVIII (1937), pp. 372-373. The tenth fascicle covers *ischiadicus* to *ligula* and in its 80 pages (721-800) corresponds to 36 pages (394-430) of the second edition. The eleventh fascicle includes pp. 801-841, to *lympa* (pp. 430-450 of the second edition), after which there are *Nachträge und Berichtigungen zum I. Band*, pp. 842-872. Inasmuch as this fascicle ends the first volume, pp. xxxiv of introductory material are prefixed to this fascicle, including the title-pages, a foreword (pp. v-ix), a table of the sources of the Latin sounds in the primitive Indo-European (pp. x-xii), bibliographical abbreviations (pp. xiii-xxxii), and other abbreviations (pp. xxxiii-xxxiv).

As in the previous fascicles, the articles on the various words show great increase in the material to which reference is made; there are a few added captions and some divisions of previous articles. I can only repeat my high estimate of the value of the work and make comment on a few words.

*Lectus* "bed" (p. 779) is said to be from \**lek-tlom*, on the evidence of Gk. λέκτρον, with dissimilative loss of *l*, while Gk. has dissimilative change or a suffix with original *r*. But in other



Italic words *-tl-* suffered first change to *-kl-*, then dissimilative change to *-kr:-* thus *vehiculum* (with later anaptyxis), but *lucrum*. In the face of the probable etymology *baculum* < *\*bak-klom* < *\*bak-tlom*, cf. Gk. *βάκτρον* with suffix *-tro-*, Hofmann must assume for *lectus* a loss of the *-l-* before the change of *-tl-* to *-kl-*; which is contrary to the order and nature of changes found in *lucrum* and (with a consonant before the suffix) in *sepulcrum*, and quite possibly in *fulcrum*. He also fails to give a convincing reason for the change from neuter to masculine gender. Either *\*legħ-tos* or *\*legħ-tus* seems a more probable origin; the evidence that the *-u-*stem forms are non-original is not conclusive.

Under *lingua* (pp. 806-807) there is an interpretation of the Indic and Iranian cognates which makes clear their probable relation to the original *\*dṇghuā*; but the Old Persian *harbāna-* (*ha-ra-ba-a-na-ma*) cannot be emended to *hizbāna-* (the form in which Hofmann quotes it), since there is no resemblance between the OP cuneiform *ra* and *za*. The proper reading is *hid<sup>h</sup>bāna-*, since the omission of one small stroke changes *du* to *ra* (so Meillet-Benveniste, *Gram. du Vieux Perse*<sup>2</sup>, 78). The *d* is a proper correspondent of Avestan *z* in *hizū*, and the *du* character instead of *da* anteconsonantal is to be ascribed to the fact that the following *b* came from *u*.

*Littera*, older *litera* (p. 814), I am glad to see, is taken (with Vaniček and many later scholars) as from *\*leites-ā*, cf. for formation *opera*; and not as a borrowing of Gk. *διφθέρα* ("writing-material," Ernout-Meillet s. v., after Bréal).

Among the many interesting articles, now much longer than those in the second edition, I might call attention to those on *iuxtā* (p. 737) *lacrima* (p. 746), *legūmen* (p. 781; to *legō* "gather," with *ū* after *frumentum*), *lictor* (p. 798), *locus* (p. 817), *loquor* (p. 821), *lupa* (p. 835), *lupus* (p. 836). The fulness of the references is most gratifying. For Hofmann has come to the conclusion that all etymological comments, however erroneous in his judgment, should be recorded, that the materials may be available to scholars; and I most heartily congratulate him on this decision, for not infrequently that which has seemed unlikely or impossible has been seen later to be probable, in the face of new material or of new combinations. For example, an article by A. Kuhn in *K. Z.*, IV (1855), pp. 75-77, and its utilization in Vaniček's *Et. Wtb. d. lat. Spr.*, p. 87 (1874) and *Gr.-Lat. Et. Wtb.*, I (1877), p. 383, is not mentioned in the first and second editions of this work, but it proved most valuable in my opinion (cf. *C. P.*, VIII [1913], pp. 317-326).

It was in 1924 that Hofmann was commissioned to prepare the new third edition of Walde's *Lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch*. The first fascicle was issued in 1930, the half-way mark has been reached in eight years. This work is and will

continue to be an indispensable tool. Dr. Hofmann is to be congratulated on the completion of this first volume; may he have strength and opportunity to complete the task!

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ROLAND G. KENT.

Livy, with an English Translation by EVAN T. SAGE and ALFRED C. SCHLESINGER. Vol. XII (Books XL-XLII). The Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, The Harvard University Press, 1938. Pp. ix + 521.

The translation of these last books was interrupted by the untimely death of Professor Sage, whose memoranda became available through the assistance of Dr. Adalaide J. Wegener. One third of the volume, beginning with book XLII, 22, is the work of Professor Schlesinger. The change will not obtrude itself upon the reader. The new translator renders his author understandingly and in clear and simple English. In the transitions more nicety might perhaps be desired. Those who believe that all versions would be improved if "indeed" were cut from the vocabulary might wish something better than "then indeed" for *tum vero* (pp. 349, 493); "he himself" for *ipse* (pp. 447, 451, 495) becomes cacophonous. "By far the majority" (p. 443) is not felicitous, nor is "had brought it about" for *effecerat* (p. 451) quite elegant. In the index it is doubtful whether fifty unclassified references under *Perseus* will be useful. Since the series is still far from complete such suggestions may be useful and the mention of faults does not mean that this is not a smart and handy volume. In the maps more detail is furnished than in their predecessors. Volumes VII and VIII are still awaited.

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